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STATE OF IDAHO 
JOSE AGUILAR, individually, as the 
Personal Representative of the Estate of 
Maria A. Aguilar, deceased, and as the 
natural father and guardian of 
GUADALUPE MARIA AGUILAR, 
ALEJANDRO AGUIlAR, and LORENA 
AGUILAR, minors and JOSE AGUIlAR, 
JR., heirs of Maria A. Aguilar, deceased, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
-vs-
NATHAN COONROD and PRIMARY 
HEALTH CARE CENTER, an Idaho 
corporation, JOHN and JANE DOES I 
through X, employees of one or more of 
the Defendants, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Appealed from the District of the Third Judicial District 
for the State of Idaho, in and for Canyon County 
Honorable GREGORY M. CULET, District Judge 
Steven K. Tolman 
TOLMAN & BRIZEE, P.C. 
Steven J. Hippler 
GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP. 
Attorneys for Appellants 
David E. Comstock 
and 
Byron V. Foster 
Attorneys for Respondents 
and 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO 
JOSE AGUILAR, individually, as the 
Personal Representative of the Estate of 
Maria A. Aguilar, deceased, and as the 
natural father and guardian of GUADALUPE 
MARIA AGUILAR, ALEJANDRO AGUILAR, 
and LORENA AGUILAR, minors and JOSE 
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Supreme Court No. 36980 
Appeal from the Third Judicial District, Canyon County, Idaho. 
HONORABLE GREGORY M. CULET, Presiding 
Steven K. Tolman, TOLMAN & BRIZEE, P.C., P. O. Box 1276, 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1276 
Steven J. Hippler, GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP., P. O. Box 2720, 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Attorneys for Appellants 
David E. Comstock, P. O. Box 2774, Boise, Idaho 83701-2774 
Byron V. Foster, P. O. Box 1584, Boise, Idaho 83701 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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Case No. CV 05-5781 
PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTIONS TO 
THE DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
COME NOW, Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys of record, David E. 
Comstock of the firm Comstock and Bush, and Byron Foster, attorney at law and hereby 
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submit the following objections to the Defendants' proposed jury instructions. 
I. 
OBJECTIONS TO DEFENDANT COONROD! 
PRIMARY HEALTH'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
1. Defendant Coonrod's Proposed JUry Instruction # 13: 
Plaintiff objects to this instruction on the grounds that after paragraph #4, the 
instruction restates the verdict form interrogatories. It is redundant and unnecessary to 
include the verdict form interrogatories on the same instruction that informs the Jury of 
the Plaintiffs' burden of proof. 
2. Defendant Coonrod's Proposed Jury Instruction # 14: 
Plaintiffs object to this instruction in that it asks whether the Defendants 
"negligently failed" to meet the standard of care. This question presents the jury with a 
double negative, as if the jury must find that the Defendants were "negligently negligent" 
in their treatment of Mrs. Aguilar. The question should read, "Did the Defendants fail to 
meet the standard of care?" or "Were the Defendants negligent?" Asking the jury to 
find that the Defendants negligently failed to meet the standard of care imposes too high 
of a burden on the Plaintiffs to prove that the Defendants did not meet the standard of 
care in this case. 
3. Defendant Coonrod's Proposed Jury Instruction # 16: 
Plaintiff objects to this instruction on the grounds that it is a comment on the 
evidence and is covered elsewhere in the Court's instructions. Furthermore, because 
out of state witnesses for both parties have testified at trial, the foundational 
requirements of §6-1 013 have already been met. There is no need to instruct the Jury 
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on such requirements if it is a moot point. 
4. Defendant Coonrod's Proposed Jury Instruction # 17: 
Plaintiff objects to this instruction on the grounds that it is cumulative, redundant 
and/or covered in an instruction elsewhere. The Jury should be instructed only once on 
the issue of proximate cause. Any instruction that repeats or restates the proximate 
cause instruction would have the tendency to confuse the Jury. 
5. Defendant Coonrod's Proposed Jury Instruction # 18: 
Plaintiff objects to this instruction on the basis that it is not proper. The proper 
test for proximate cause in this case is not a "but for" test, but rather "a substantial 
factor" test. In determining actual cause, the Idaho Supreme Court has held the 
"substantial factor" test is appropriate when there are multiple possible causes that lead 
to the injury. Newberry v. Martens, 142 Idaho 284,288 127 P.3d 187, 191 (2005). It is 
the defendant's conduct (actual cause) that inflicts the harm, but it is the law (legal 
cause or true proximate cause) that determines whether liability for that conduct 
attaches. Id. In Newberry v. Martens, Instruction number 10 was taken from standard 
pattern jury instruction 2.30.2 but the district court omitted the following language: "It is 
not a proximate cause if the injury, loss or damage likely would have occurred anyway." 
Defendant Coonrod proposed exactly the same language here. The Idaho Supreme 
Court upheld the district court's omission of that sentence because the district court 
explained the omission by pointing out that the excluded language was a rephrasing of 
the "but for" test and therefore inappropriate in a multiple cause case. Id. at pg. 289. As 
noted in Newberry, the language stricken by the district court was also deemed 
improper by the Idaho Supreme Court in Fussell v. St. Clair, 120 Idaho 591, 591, 818 
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P.2d 295,295 (1991). The Court expressed what instruction should have been used in 
Fussell: 
"When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause 
which, in natural or probable sequence, produced the damage complained 
of. It need not be the only cause. It is sufficient if it is a substantial factor 
concurring with some other cause acting at the same time, which in 
combination with it, causes the damage." 
120 Idaho at 595,818 P.2d at 299. 
As the Defendant was prohibited from doing in Newberry, the Defendants in this 
case "cannot simultaneously point to a second cause, independent of (its) negligence, 
and at the same time maintain that this is a single cause case." Newberry, 142 Idaho at 
289. Therefore, the appropriate language for the jury to consider is whether the 
Defendants' negligence was a "substantial factor" in causing Maria Aguilar's death, and 
the Court should not give Defendant Coonrod's proposed instruction number 18. The 
instruction proposed by Defendant Coonrod would unfairly prejudice the Plaintiffs. 
6. Defendant Coonrod's Proposed Jury Instruction # 19: 
Plaintiff objects to this instruction on the grounds that it is cumulative, redundant 
and/or covered in an instruction elsewhere. The Jury should be instructed only once on 
the issue of proximate cause. Any instruction that repeats or restates the proximate 
cause instruction would have the tendency to confuse the Jury and unfairly prejudice 
the Plaintiffs. 
7. Defendant Coonrod's Proposed Jury Instruction # 20: 
Plaintiff objects to this instruction on the grounds that it is a comment on the 
evidence and is argument. It is not a standard IDJI and has the tendency to confuse the 
Jury as to what the legal standard of care is. It is also cumulative, redundant and/or 
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covered in an instruction elsewhere. The Jury should be instructed only once on the 
issue of proximate cause. Any instruction that repeats or restates the proximate cause 
instruction would have the tendency to confuse the Jury. 
8. Defendant Coonrod's Proposed Jury Instruction # 22: 
Plaintiff objects to this instruction on the grounds that it does not bear upon the 
evidence presented at trial. For example, proposition no. 4 states, "if force was 
intentionally used by Nathan Coonrod, M.D. against another, it was not unexpected by 
Primary Health Care Center." (See, Defendant Coonrod's Proposed Instruction No. 22, 
proposition no. 4). There has been no evidence to that effect. Furthermore, there has 
been no indication from Defendant Coonrod or Defendant Primary Health that 
Defendant Coonrod was not acting within the course and scope of his employment. The 
fact that Dr. Coonrod was acting within the course and scope of his employment at 
Primary Health has been an admitted fact. Instructing the Jury on this issue is not 
necessary and it is confusing. 
9. Defendant Coonrod's Proposed Jury Instruction # 23: 
Plaintiff objects to this instruction on the grounds that it does not bear upon the 
evidence presented at trial. Again, there has been no indication from Defendant 
Coonrod or Defendant Primary Health that Defendant Coonrod was not acting within the 
course and scope of his employment. The fact that Dr. Coonrod was acting within the 
course and scope of his employment at Primary Health has been an admitted fact. 
Defendants Coonrod and Primary Health admitted in their answer to the Plaintiffs' 
complaint, in paragraphs 16 and 29 that Defendant Coonrod was acting within the 
course and scope of his employment at Primary Health. Instructing the Jury on this 
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issue is not necessary and it is confusing. 
10. Defendant Coonrod's Proposed Jury Instruction # 25: 
Plaintiff objects to this instruction on the grounds that the instruction does not do 
service to the loss of a loved one in a wrongful death case. No where in the instruction 
do the elements of damages discuss the loss of "love, care, companionship, affections 
and guidance. These elements, as opposed to Maria Aguilar's "services" and "society" 
are the elements that are meaningful to those who loose loved ones, no matter what the 
circumstances, and they certainly are the ones that matter to the Aguilar family. 
Furthermore, the instruction does not separate or specify what the economic damages 
are versus what the non-economic damages are, which will be necessary when the Jury 
fills out the verdict form. (See Plaintiffs' proposed No. 21). 
11. Defendant Coonrod's Proposed Jury Instruction # 26: 
Plaintiff objects to this instruction on the grounds that it is argumentative and is 
not a standard IDJ!. 
12. Defendant Coonrod's Proposed Jury Instruction # 27: 
Plaintiff objects to this instruction on the grounds that it is argumentative, 
cumulative, not a standard IDJI and is not the rule of law. The instruction is another 
burden of proof instruction and it is not a standard IOJ!. It also misstates, or omits the 
entirety of the law on the Plaintiffs' burden of proof for future damages because a 
Plaintiff is only required to prove future loss with reasonable certainty or that it will likely 
occur. Cole v. Esquibel, 145 Idaho 652, 182 P.3d 709 (2008). 
13. Defendant Coonrod's Proposed Jury Instruction # 28: 
Plaintiff objects to this instruction on the grounds that it is already covered 
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elsewhere in the Court's preliminary instructions, it is argumentative, and it 
unnecessarily emphasizes instructions previously provided to the Jury and unfairly 
prejudices the Plaintiffs. 
14. Defendant Coonrod's Proposed Jury Instruction # 29: 
Plaintiff objects to this instruction on the grounds that it is not supported by the 
evidence, facts and issues of this case. Defendant Coonrod has not defended this case 
on the grounds that the Plaintiffs or decedent failed to mitigate and/or failed to prevent 
her own death. Without evidence on the issue, the instruction would only tend to create 
confusion with the Jury. 
15. Defendant Coonrod's Proposed Jury Instruction # 30: 
Plaintiff objects to this instruction on the grounds that it is not supported by the 
evidence, facts and issues of this case. Defendant Coonrod has not defended this case 
on the grounds that the Plaintiffs or decedent failed to mitigate and/or failed to prevent 
her own death. Without evidence on the issue, the instruction would only tend to create 
confusion with the Jury. 
16. Defendant Coonrod's Proposed Jury Instructions 40 and 41: 
Plaintiff objects to this verdict form on basis that other health care providers, not 
a party to this case have been left on the verdict form. Defendant Coonrod has not 
proven that any other health care provider has breached the applicable standard of 
care, nor that such a breach was the proximate cause of Maria Aguilar's death. Plaintiffs 
further object to this instruction on the grounds that breach of the standard of care and 
proximate cause are separated into two questions. The verdict form is easily simplified 
by combining the breach and proximate cause issue into one question, as is written in 
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the Plaintiffs' proposed verdict form. The Plaintiffs further object on the grounds that the 
individual Plaintiffs are not separated out on Defendant Coonrod's proposed jury 
instruction. This is important because the Jury may determine, for example, the Jose 
Aguilar Sr., as Maria's spouse suffered a different kind of loss than Jose and Maria's 
children. It is also important if and when the statutory cap on non-economic damages is 
applied because the cap is applied against each individual Plaintiff, as opposed to the 
group as a whole. Horner v. Sani-Top, Inc., 143 Idaho 230,234,141 P.3d 1099, 1103 
(2006) 
II. 
OBJECTIONS TO DEFENDANT NEWMAN'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
1. Defendant Newman's Proposed JUry Instruction # 9: 
Plaintiff objects to this instruction on the grounds that it is not the standard IDJ I 
for what the duty of a physician is. The more appropriate instruction is found in IDJI 
2.10.2, or Plaintiffs' proposed instruction no. 12. 
2. Defendant's Proposed Jury Instruction # 10: 
Plaintiff objects to this instruction on the basis that it is not proper. The proper 
test for proximate cause in this case is not a "but for" test, but rather "a substantial 
factor" test. In determining actual cause, the Idaho Supreme Court has held the 
"substantial factor" test is appropriate when there are multiple possible causes that lead 
to the injury. Newberry v. Martens, 142 Idaho 284,288 127 P.3d 187, 191 (2005). It is 
the defendant's conduct (actual cause) that inflicts the harm, but it is the law (legal 
cause or true proximate cause) that determines whether liability for that conduct 
attaches. Id. In Newberry v. Martens, Instruction number 10 was taken from standard 
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pattern jury instruction 2.30.2 but the district court omitted the following language: "It is 
not a proximate cause if the injury, loss or damage likely would have occurred anyway." 
The Idaho Supreme Court upheld the district court's omission of that sentence because 
the district court explained the omission by pointing out that the excluded language was 
a rephrasing of the "but for" test and therefore inappropriate in a multiple cause case. Id. 
at pg. 289. As noted in Newberry, the language stricken by the district court was also 
deemed improper by the Idaho Supreme Court in Fussell v. Sf. Clair. 120 Idaho 591, 
591.818 P.2d 295.295 (1991 ). The Court expressed what instruction should have been 
used in Fussell: 
"When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause 
which, in natural or probable sequence, produced the damage complained 
of. It need not be the only cause. It is sufficient if it is a substantial factor 
concurring with some other cause acting at the same time, which in 
combination with it, causes the damage." 
120 Idaho at 595,818 P.2d at 299. 
As the Defendant was prohibited from doing in Newberry, the Defendants in this 
case "cannot simultaneously point to a second cause, independent of (its) negligence, 
and at the same time maintain that this is a single cause case." Newberry, 142 Idaho at 
289. Therefore, the appropriate language for the jury to consider is whether the 
Defendants' negligence was a "substantial factor" in causing Maria Aguilar's death, and 
the Court should not give Defendant Newman's proposed instruction number 10. 
3. Defendant Newman's Proposed Jury Instruction #1: 
Plaintiff objects to this instruction on the grounds that places undue emphasis on 
the Plaintiffs' burden of proof. In element no. 1, the phrase "with direct expert 
testimony" is not contained in the standard IDJI, and there is no reason to insert the 
PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTIONS TO THE DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS -
P.9 
language into the instruction in this case. 
4. Defendant Newman's Proposed Jury Instruction # 13: 
Plaintiff objects to this instruction on the grounds that it has been modified from 
the IOJI to include the last sentence, "There can be no recovery for any pain and 
suffering of the decedent prior to death." The Plaintiffs have never claimed that they are 
entitled to any pain and suffering that Maria Aguilar suffered prior to her death. As such, 
this sentence should be removed from the instruction. 
5. Defendant Newman's Proposed Jury Instruction # 14: 
Plaintiff objects to this instruction on the grounds that it is not a complete 
instruction pursuant to §5-311. That section reads: 
(1) When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of 
another, his or her heirs or personal representatives on their behalf may 
maintain an action for damages against the person causing the death, or 
in case of the death of such wrongdoer, against the personal 
representative of such wrongdoer, whether the wrongdoer dies before or 
after the death of the person injured. If any other person is responsible for 
any such wrongful act or neglect, the action may also be maintained 
against such other person, or in case of his or her death, his or her 
personal representatives. In every action under this section, such 
damages may be given as under all the circumstances of the case as may 
be just. 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) of this section, "heirs" mean: 
(a) Those persons who would be entitled to succeed to the 
property of the decedent according to the provisions of 
subsection (21) of section 15-1-201, Idaho Code. 
(b) Whether or not qualified under subsection (2)(a) of this 
section, the decedent's spouse, children, stepchildren, 
parents, and, when partly or wholly dependent on the 
decedent for support or services, any blood relatives and 
adoptive brothers and sisters. It includes the illegitimate child 
of a mother, but not the illegitimate child of the father unless the 
father has recognized a responsibility for the child's support. 
1. "Support" includes contributions in kind as well as 
money. 
PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTIONS TO THE DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS -
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2. "Services" mean tasks, usually of a household 
nature, regularly performed by the decedent that will 
be a necessary expense to the heirs of the decedent. 
These services may vary according to the identity of 
the decedent and heir and shall be determined under 
the particular facts of each case. 
(Emphasis added). There is no need to provide a separate definition of "services" in 
this case." Even if the Court determines that a definition of "services is necessary to 
instruct the Jury on the law, then the Court should instruct the Jury on the entirety of the 
law, including the above underlined portion in section one, which states, "In every action 
under this section. such damages may be given as under all the circumstances of the 
case as may be just." The legislature felt it was necessary to include this language in 
the wrongful death statute, and if the "services" element is stripped of the entire statute 
and read alone, then the Jury is stripped of the capacity to award damages "as may be 
just" under the circumstances. In addition, the time that the Plaintiffs take to perform the 
decedent's contributions in kind and tasks, of a household nature, are an expense that 
they incur as a result of her death. They are entitled to such compensation, and the 
Jury should be properly instructed on those grounds. 
6. Defendant Newman's Proposed Jury Instruction # 16: 
Plaintiff objects to this instruction on the grounds that it is argumentative, 
cumulative, not a standard IOJI and is not the rule of law. The instruction is another 
burden of proof instruction and it is not a standard IOJ/. It also misstates, or omits the 
entirety of the law on the Plaintiffs' burden of proof on future damages because a 
Plaintiff is only required to prove that future loss with reasonable certainty or that they 
will likely occur. Cole v. Esquibel, 145 Idaho 652, 182 P.3d 709 (2008). 
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7. Defendant Newman's Proposed JUry Instruction # 17: 
Plaintiff objects to this instruction on the grounds that it is argumentative, 
cumulative, not a standard IDJI and is a comment on the evidence. The Jury decides 
the amount of damages to award, not counsel for either party. The Jury has already 
been instructed on not accepting counsels' argument as evidence in the Court's 
preliminary instructions and there is no need to repeat the instruction again. 
8. Defendant Newman's Proposed Verdict Form: 
Plaintiff objects to this verdict form on basis that other health care providers, not 
a party to this case have been left on the verdict form. Defendant Newman has not 
proven that any other health care provider has breached the applicable standard of 
care, nor that such a breach was the proximate cause of Maria Aguilar's death. Plaintiffs 
further object to this instruction on the grounds that breach of the standard of care and 
proximate cause are separated into two questions. The verdict form is easily simplified 
by combining the breach and proximate cause issue into one question, as is written in 
the Plaintiffs' proposed verdict form. The Plaintiffs further object on the grounds that the 
individual Plaintiffs are not separated out on Defendant Newman's proposed jury 
instruction. This is important because the Jury may determine, for example, the Jose 
Aguilar Sr., as Maria's spouse suffered a different kind of loss than Jose and Maria's 
children. It is also important if and when the statutory cap on non-economic damages is 
applied because the cap is applied against each individual Plaintiff, as opposed to the 
group as a whole. Hornerv. Sani-Top, Inc., 143 Idaho 230,234,141 P.3d 1099,1103 
(2006). 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED This .iL day of May, 2009. 
~-=J) ? 
B . 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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I hereby certify that on the ~ day of May, 2009, I served a true and correct 
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132 3rd Ave. E 
P.O. Box 1276 
Twin Falls, 10 83303 
Attorneys for Defendants Nathan 
Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care 
Center 
Gary T. Dance 
Moffatt Thomas Barrett Rock & 
Fields Chartered 
412 W. Center, Suite 2000 
PO Box 817 
Pocatello I D 83204-0817 
Attorneys for Defendant Steven R. 
Newman, M.D. 
D U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivery a-- Facsimile (208) 733-5444 
D U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
0-- Facsimile (208) 232-0150 
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COME NOW, Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel of record, David E. Comstock, 
and Byron V. Foster, pursuant to Rule 51 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and hereby 
submit the following proposed supplemental jury instruction No. 21, attached hereto as 
Exhibit "A," to replace the previously submitted jury instruction No. 21. 
A clean copy of the supplemental proposed jury instruction No. 21. is attached as 
Exhibit "B" for the Court's convenience. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED This ~7ay of May, 2009. 
COMSTOCK & BUSH 
4 --
Taylo . Mossman, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the -Way of May, 2009, I served a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Steven K. Tolman 
Tolman & Brizee, PC 
132 3rd Ave. E 
P.O. Box 1276 
Twin Falls, 1083303 
Attorneys for Defendants Nathan 
Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health 
Care Center 
Gary T. Dance 
Moffatt Thomas Barrett Rock & 
Fields Chartered 
412 W. Center, Suite 2000 
PO Box 817 
Pocatello 1083204-0817 
Attorneys for Defendant Steven R. 
Newman, M.D. 
o U.S. Mail 
W Hand Delivery 
o Facsimile (208) 733-5444 
o ~.S.Mail 
~ Hand Delivery 
D' Facsimile (208) 232-0150 
Taylor L. M~ssman 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 21 
If the jury decides the Aguilars are entitled to recover from the Defendants, the jury must 
determine the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate them for any 
damages proved to be proximately caused by defendants' negligence. 
The elements of damage the jury may consider are: 
ECONOMIC DAMAGES 
1. The reasonable cost of the decedent's funeral. 
2. The reasonable cost of the decedent's monument. 
3. The Plaintiffs' loss of financial support from the decedent, and the present cash 
value of financial support the decedent would have provided to the plaintiff in the future, but for 
the decedent's death, taking into account the Plaintiffs' life expectancy, the decedent's age and 
normal life expectancy, the decedent's earning capacity, habits, disposition and any other 
circumstances shown by the evidence. 
NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES 
1. The reasonable value to the Plaintiffs of the loss of the Maria Aguilar's comfort, 
love, companionship, affections, guidance, training, services and society and the present cash 
value of any such loss that is reasonably certain to occur in the future, taking into consideration 
the life expectancy of the Plaintiffs, the decedent's age and normal life expectancy, habits, 
disposition and any other circumstances shown by the evidence. 
Death is inevitable. Although the law compensates for the untimeliness of a death caused 
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INSTRUCTION NO. __ _ 
If the jury decides the Aguilars are entitled to recover from the Defendants, the jury must 
determine the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate them for any 
damages proved to be proximately caused by defendants' negligence. 
The elements of damage the jury may consider are: 
ECONOMIC DAMAGES 
1. The reasonable cost of the decedent's funeral. 
2. The reasonable cost ofthe decedent's monument. 
3. The Plaintiffs' loss of financial support from the decedent, and the present cash 
value of financial support the decedent would have provided to the plaintiff in the future, but for 
the decedent's death, taking into account the Plaintiffs' life expectancy, the decedent's age and 
normal life expectancy, the decedent's earning capacity, habits, disposition and any other 
circumstances shown by the evidence. 
NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES 
1. The reasonable value to the Plaintiffs of the loss of the Maria Aguilar's comfort, 
love, companionship, affections, guidance, training, services and society and the present cash 
value of any such loss that is reasonably certain to occur in the future, taking into consideffltion 
the life expectancy of the Plaintiffs, the decedent's age and normal life expectancy, habits, 
disposition and any other circumstances shown by the evidence. 
Death is inevitable. Although the law compensates for the untimeliness of a death caused 
by another, no damages are allowed for grief or sorrow. 
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COME NOW Plaintiffs' above named, by and through their counsel of record and 
hereby make their Final Rebuttal Disclosure. Based upon the testimony of Defendants' 
experts to this point in the trail; Plaintiffs intend to call Dean Lapinel, M.D. as a rebuttal 
witness to rebut opinions of defense experts which were either an enhancement of 
Defendants' expert witness disclosures or which constituted new opinions rendered at 
trial and not previously disclosed. Dr. Lapinel will testify regarding the following issues: 
1. Whether or not the signs and symptoms of sub-lethal pulmonary emboli 
would be continuous as testified to by one of Defendants' expert witnesses or would 
rather be transient. 
2. Whether or not the D-Dimer blood test fell out of favor because of an 
alleged tendency to produce false positive results and the evolution of D-Dimer in the 
diagnostic pathway to pulmonary embolus. 
3. Whether or not the Wells criteria for pre-test probability of pulmonary 
emboli was in use in the Treasure Valley in 2003; the significance of the Wells pre-test 
probability criteria in this case and the steps to be taken based upon the probability 
categories. 
4. Whether or not dehydration medically explains Maria Aguilar's signs and 
symptoms on May 31, 2003. 
5. The risk factors for pulmonary embolus as set forth in the Rosen text, 
especially with regard to whether or not superficial thrombophlebitis, obesity and use of 
oral contraceptives are or are not risk factors to be considered in a work-up for 
pulmonary embolus. 
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6. Whether a consideration versus a suspicion of pulmonary embolus 
triggers a requirement that a D-Dimer be performed. 
7. Whether or not emergency department physicians should use information 
outside their own history and physical examination to reach a consideration/suspicion of 
pulmonary embolus. 
8. The relationship or lack thereof between syncope and dehydration as 
testified to by defense expert witnesses and the parameters of any alleged dehydration 
as an explanation for syncope. 
9. An explanation of the signs and symptoms of dehydration compared to the 
signs and symptoms exhibited by Maria Aguilar on May 31,2003, including an analysis 
of her history as given to Defendant Coonrod on June 4, 2003. 
10. The relationship of diaphoresis to dehydration and pulmonary embolus. 
11. A refutation of the testimony of defense experts regarding the 81 Q3T3 
pattern being out of date and no longer utilized to consider right heart strain on Maria 
Aguilar's EKGs and a refutation of defense experts' meaning of the EKGs. 
12. The meaning of R-wave progression in precordial leads and a refutation of 
the testimony of Dr. Bosely regarding the significance of such an occurrence. 
13. The significance of a sodium bicarbonate level of 14 and a refutation of 
the testimony that one would need to have a respiratory rate of 30 for 6-8 hours to suffer 
metabolic acidosis 
14. An explanation of the mechanism by which sub-lethal pulmonary emboli 
move within the blood stream as a refutation of the testimony of Dr. Bosely that if a 
pulmonary embolus occurs the symptoms will continue rather than wax and wane. 
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15. A refutation of defense expert Dobson's testimony regarding micturation 
syncope, its alleged occurrence in women versus men and it's mechanism and 
presentation including the timing of such presentation. 
16. A refutation of the testimony of defense experts that back pain is not chest 
pain leading to consideration of pulmonary embolus. 
17. A refutation of the testimony of defense experts that shortness of breath 
with exertion is cardiac and not pulmonary. 
DATED This ~ day of May, 2009. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ~ day of May, 2009, I served a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Steven K. Tolman 
Tolman & Brizee, PC 
132 3rd Ave. E 
P.O. Box 1276 
Twin Falls, 10 83303 
Attorneys for Defendants Nathan 
Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care 
Center 
Gary T. Dance 
Moffatt Thomas Barrett Rock & 
Fields Chartered 
412 W. Center, Suite 2000 
PO Box 817 
Pocatello 1083204-0817 
Attorneys for Defendant Steven R. 
Newman, M.D. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DIS~GERSEN, DEPUTY 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
JOSE AGUILAR, individually, as the Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Maria A. 
Aguilar, deceased, and as the natural father 
and guardian of GUADALUPE MARIA 
AGUILAR, ALEJANDRO AGUILAR, AND 
LORENA AGUILAR, minors, and JOSE 




STEVEN R. NEWMAN, M.D., NATHAN 
COONROD, M.D., and PRIMARY HEALTH 
CARE CENTER, an Idaho corporation, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 2005-5781 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows: 
Question No.1: Did Defendant Steven R. Newman, M.D., breach the standard of care in 
his treatment of the decedent, Maria Aguilar? 
Answer to Question No.1: Yes [--1 No ~ 
If the answer to Question No.1 is Yes, go to Question No.2. If the answer to Question No.1 is 
No, skip Question No.2 and go to Question No.3. 
Question No.2: Was Defendant Steven R. Newman, M.D.'s, breach of the standard of 
care in his treatment of the decedent, Maria Aguilar, a proximate cause of the decedent's death? 
[AUTO-FOOTER) 
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Answer to Question No.2: Yes [---.J No [---.J 
Question No.3: Did Defendant Nathan Coonrod, M.D., breach the standard of care in 
his treatment of the decedent, Maria Aguilar? 
Answer to Question No.3: Yes [~NO [---.J 
If the answer to Question No.3 is Yes, go to Question No.4. If the answer to Question No.3 is 
No, skip Question Nos. 4 and go to Question No.5. 
Question No.4: Was Defendant Nathan Coonrod, M.D.'s, breach of the standard of care 
in his treatment of the decedent, Maria Aguilar, a proximate cause of the decedent's death? 
Answer to Question No.4: Yes rf(1 No Ll 
If you answered "Yes" to any of the proximate cause questions (Question Nos. 2 and 4), then 
please answer Question No.5. If you answered "No" to both of the proximate cause questions 
(Question Nos. 2 and 4), then you are done. Skip Question Nos. 5 through 11, sign the jury 
verdict form as instructed and advise the bailiff. 
Instruction for Question No.5: You will answer this question only if you have found that the 
actions of one or both of the Defendants (Steven R. Newman, M.D. and Nathan Coonrod, M.D.) 
were the proximate cause of any damages to the Plaintiffs. In this question, you are to apportion 
the fault between any parties for whom you found proximate cause. As to each party or entity to 
which you answered "Yes" to the proximate cause questions (Question Nos. 2 and 4), you must 
determine the percentage of fault for that party or entity, and enter the percentage on the 
appropriate line. If you answered "No" to the proximate cause questions for a party, insert a "0" 




Question No.5: What is the percentage of fault (if any) you assign to each of the 
following: 
To the Defendant, Steven R. Newman, M.D. 
To the Defendant, Nathan Coonrod, M.D. 
~% 
JQQ.% 
Total must equal 100% 
Your answers to Question No. 5 must total 100%. Regardless of your answer, however, proceed 
to Questions No.6 through 11. 
Question No.6: What is the total amount of economic damages sustained by the 
Plaintiffs Jose Aguilar, Alejandro Aguilar and Lorena Aguilar? 
Answer to Question No.6: We assess Plaintiffs Jose Aguilar, Alejandro Aguilar and 
Lorena Aguilar's economic damages to be: 
$ ;fOO,OOO 
Question No.7: What is the total amount of non-economic damages sustained by the 
Plaintiff Jose Aguilar? 
Answer to Question No.7: We assess Plaintiff Jose Aguilar's non-economic damages to 
be: 
$_-\,-qOJoL...:Z>~/ _00_0 __ 
Question No.8: What is the total amount of non-economic damages sustained by the 
Plaintiff Jose Aguilar, Jr.? 
Answer to Question No.8: We assess Plaintiff Jose Aguilar, Jr. 's non-economic 
damages to be: 





Question No.9: What is the total amount of non-economic damages sustained by the 
Plaintiff Guadalupe Maria Aguilar? 
Answer to Question No.9: We assess Plaintiff Guadalupe Maria Aguilar's 
non-economic damages to be: 
$+15,00Q 
I 
Question No.1 0: What is the total amount of non-economic damages sustained by the 
Plaintiff Alejandro Aguilar? 
Answer to Question No. 10: We assess Plaintiff Alejandro Aguilar's non-economic 
damages to be: 
$ 00,2.000 
I 
Question No. 11: What is the total amount of non-economic damages sustained by the 
Plaintiff Lorena Aguilar? 
Answer to Question No. 11: We assess Plaintiff Lorena Aguilar's non-economic damages 
to be: 
I 
You have now completed the verdict form and you may simply sign the verdict form and 
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Case No. CV 05-5781 
JUDGMENT UPON SPECIAL 
VERDICT 
This action came on regularly for trial on the 2ih day of April, 2009, said parties 
appearing by their attorneys, David E. Comstock and Byron V. Foster appearing for the 
Plaintiffs Jose Aguilar, Sr., Jose Aguilar, Jr., Guadalupe Maria Aguilar, Alejandro Aguilar 
and Lorena Aguilar, Steven Tolman appearing for the Defendants Nathan Coonrod, M.D. 
and Primary Health Care Center, and Gary Dance appearing for the Defendant Steven R. 
Newman, M.D., a jury of twelve persons was regularly impaneled and sworn to try said 
cause; witnesses on the part of the Plaintiffs and Defendants were sworn and examined; 
after hearing the evidence, the arguments of counsel and instructions of the court, the 
issues having been submitted to the jury by way of a special verdict containing questions 
therein, said questions having been answered, and the special verdict being returned by 
the jury on May 13, 2009, as follows: 
"We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows: 
Question No.1: Did Defendant Steven R. Newman, M.D., breach the standard of 
care in his treatment of the decedent, Maria Aguilar? 
Answer to Question No.1: YesL-j NoUU 
If the answer to Question No.1 is Yes, go to Question No.2. If the Answer to Question No. 
1 is No, skip Question No.2 and go to Question NO.3. 
Question No.2: Was the Defendant Steven R. Newman, M.D.'s, breach of the 
standard of care in his treatment of the decedent, Maria Aguilar, a proximate cause of the 
decedent's death? 
Answer to Question No.2: Yes L-j NoL-j 
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Question No.3: Did Defendant Nathan Coonrod, M.D., breach the standard of 
care in his treatment of the decedent, Maria Aguilar? 
Answer to Question No.3: Yes UU No L-.l 
If the answer to Question NO.3 is Yes, go to Question No.4. If the Answer to Question No. 
3 is No, skip Question Nos. [sic] 4 and go to Question No.5. 
Question No.4: Was Defendant Nathan Coonrod, MD.'s, breach of the standard 
of care in his treatment of the decedent, Maria Aguilar, a proximate cause of the decedent's 
death? 
Answer to Question No.4: Yes UU No L-.l 
If you answered "Yes" to any of the proximate cause questions, (Question Nos. 2 and 4), 
then please answer Question NO.5. If you answered "No" to both of the proximate cause 
questions (Questions Nos. 2 and 4), then you are done. Skip Question Nos. 5 through 11, 
sign the jury verdict form as instructed and advise the bailiff. 
Instruction for Question No.5: You will answer this question only if you have found that the 
actions of one or both of the Defendants (Steven R. Newman, M.D. and Nathan Coonrod, 
M.D.) were the proximate cause of any damages to the Plaintiffs. In this question, you are 
to apportion the fault between any parties for whom you found proximate cause. As to 
each party or entity to which you answered "Yes" to the proximate cause questions 
(Question Nos. 2 and 4), you must determine the percentage of fault for that party or entity, 
and enter the percentage on the appropriate line. If you answered "No" to the proximate 
cause questions for a party, insert a "0" or "Zero" as to that party or entity. 
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Question No.5: What is the percentage of fault (if any) you assign to each of the 
following: 
To the Defendant, Steven Newman, M.D. 
To the Defendant, Nathan Coonrod, M.D. 




Your answers to Question NO.5 must total 100%. Regardless of your answer, however, 
proceed to Questions NO.6 through 11. 
Question No.6: What is the total amount of economic damages sustained by the 
Plaintiffs Jose Aguilar, Alejandro Aguilar and Lorena Aguilar? 
Answer to Question No.6: We assess Plaintiffs Jose Aguilar, Alejandro Aguilar 
and Lorena Aguilar's economic damages to be: 
$ 700.000 
Question No.7: What is the total amount of non-economic damages sustained by 
the Plaintiff Jose Aguilar? 
Answer to Question No.7: 
damages to be: 
$ 903,000 
We assess Plaintiff Jose Aguilar's non-economic 
Question No.8: What is the total amount of non-economic damages sustained by 
the Plaintiff Jose Aguilar, Jr.? 
Answer to Question No.8: 
economic damages to be: 
$ 485.000 
We assess Plaintiff Jose Aguilar, Jr.'s non-
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Question No.9: What is the total amount of non-economic damages sustained by 
the Plaintiff Guadalupe Maria Aguilar? 
Answer to Question No.9: 
economic damages to be: 
$ 725,000 
We assess Plaintiff Guadalupe Maria Aguilar's non-
Question No.1 0: . What is the total amount of non-economic damages sustained by 
the Plaintiff Alejandro Aguilar? 
Answer to Question No.1 0: We assess Plaintiff Alejandro Aguilar's non-economic 
damages to be: 
$ 602,000 
Question No. 11: What is the total amount of non-economic damages sustained by the 
Plaintiff Lorena Aguilar? 
Answer to Question No. 11: We assess Plaintiff Lorena Aguilar's non-economic 
damages to be: 
$_--'-78;::;.;:5:;..L.,0::::..::0'-""0 _______ " 
WHEREFORE, By virtue of the law and by reason of the premises aforesaid, it is 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Steven R. Newman, M.D., is awarded 
judgment against Plaintiffs. 
It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Jose Aguilar, Sr., Jose 
Aguilar, Jr., Guadalupe Maria Aguilar, Alejandro Aguilar and Lorena Aguilar are awarded 
judgment against Defendants Nathan Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care Center and 
have and recover the sum of $4,200,000.00, plus interest accruing from the date of 
judgment at the rate of 7.625% per annum pursuant to Idaho Code § 28-22-104. 
JUDGMENT UPON SPECIAL VERDICT - 5 
.. 
The issues of attorneys' fees, costs and the application of I.C. § 6-1603 will be 
determined at a later date upon proper application, hearing and decision. 
DATED THIS '~ day of May, 2009. 
,// 
/ 
onorable Gregory M. Culet 
District Judge 
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The above-entitled action was brought before this Court for jury trial on April 27, 
2009. David E. Comstock, of the firm, COMSTOCK & BUSH, and Byron V. Foster, of the firm, 
LAW OFFICE OF BYRON V. FOSTER, appeared on behalf of the Plaintiffs. Gary T. Dance, of the 
firm, MOFFATT THOMAS BARRETT ROCK & FIELDS, appeared on behalf of defendant Steven R. 
Newman, M.D. Steven Tolman, of the firm, TOLMAN & BRIZZEE, appeared on behalf of 
defendants Nathan Coonrod, M.D., and Primary Health Care Center. 
A jury of twelve persons was regularly and properly impaneled and sworn to try 
said cause, and after hearing evidence, and having been submitted a special verdict by the Court, 
and having returned the special verdict on May 13, 2009, in favor of Steven R. Newman, M.D., 
against the Plaintiffs, 
THIS COURT, in accordance with the law and the special verdict returned by the 
jury, HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that defendant Steven R. Newman, 
M.D., be awarded Judgment against the Plaintiffs. 
The issues of attorneys' fees and costs shall be determined at a later date upon 
proper application, hearing, and decision. 
DATED this + day of May, 2009. 
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TOLMAN & BRIZEE, P.C. 
132 3rd Avenue East 
P.O. Box 1276 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1276 
Telephone: (208) 733-5566 
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Attorney for Defendants Nathan Coonrod, MD and Primary Health Care Center 
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JOSE AGUILAR, individually, as the 
Personal Representative of the Estate of 
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ANDREW CHAI, M.D., STEVEN R. 
NEWMAN, M.D., NATHAN COONROD, 
M.D., MITCHELL LONG, D.O., and 
PRIMARY HEALTH CARE CENTER, an 
Idaho corporation, JOHN and JANE 
DOES I through X, employees of one or 
more of the Defendants, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS NATHAN COONROD, 
M.D. AND PRIMARY HEALTH CARE 
CENTER'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, 
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE MOTION TO 
AMEND JUDGMENT FOR A 
REMITTITUR OF DAMAGES, AND 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 
COME NOW the defendants Nathan Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care 
Center by and through their attorney of record, Tolman & Brizee, P.C., and respectfully 
move this Court, pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 59(a)(1), (5), (6) and (7), for 
a new trial for the following reasons: (a) the trial court's refusal to allow defendants to 
DEFENDANTS NATHAN COONROD, M.D. AND PRIMARY HEALTH CARE CENTER'S MOTION FOR 
NEW TRIAL, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT FOR A REMITTITUR OF 
DAMAGES, AND MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, PAGE 1 
present evidence through plaintiffs' expert witness, Paul Blaylock, M.D., regarding the 
non-party negligence of Dr. Long and Dr. Chai constitutes abuse of discretion and/or 
error in law occurring at the trial and which prevented Nathan Coonrod, M.D. and 
Primary Health Care Center from having a fair trial; (b) the jury instruction regarding 
proximate cause constitutes a misstatement of Idaho law, and therefore, an error in law 
occurring at trial; (c) the trial court's separate listing of plaintiffs individually, rather than 
collectively, for non-economic damages on the special verdict form constitutes a 
misstatement or misapplication of Idaho law, and therefore, an abuse of discretion 
and/or an error in law occurring at trial and which prevented Nathan Coonrod, M.D. and 
Primary Health Care Center from having a fair trial; and (d) the award of economic and 
non-economic damages are excessive, not permitted by law, and appear to have been 
given under the influence of passion or prejudice, with no supporting evidence in the trial 
record. 
In the alternative, if a new trial is denied on these issues, defendants respectfully 
request an amendment to the judgment for a remittitur of economic damages be entered, 
pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 59.1 reducing the amount of 
economic damages in this case to $244,847, or another amount deemed reasonable and 
appropriate by this Court. 
Furthermore, defendants respectfully move this Court, pursuant to Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 50(b), for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the evidence 
presented at trial was not of sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds 
could have reached the same conclusion as the jury in the above-entitled case. 
DEFENDANTS NATHAN COONROD, M.D. AND PRIMARY HEALTH CARE CENTER'S MOTION FOR 
NEW TRIAL, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT FOR A REMITTITUR OF 
DAMAGES, AND MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, PAGE 2 
Defendants have submitted their memorandum of law and affidavit in support of 
their respective motions, and incorporate herein, the law and fact contained within said 
memorandum of law and affidavit. 
Defendants request a hearing for oral argument on their respective motions. 
~ 
DATED this ~ i day of May, 2009. 
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COME NOW the defendants Nathan Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care 
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submit this Memorandum in Support of their Motion for New Trial, or in the Alternative 
Motion to Amend Judgment for a Remittitur of Damages, and Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict. 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
Nathan Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care Center (hereinafter referred to as 
"defend9nts") respectfully request this Court grant a new trial, pursuant to Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 59(a)(1) and/or (7), on the basis the Court's refusal to allow defendants to 
present evidence through plaintiffs' expert witness, Paul Blaylock, M.D., regarding the non-
party negligence of Dr. Long and Dr. Chai constitutes irregularity in the proceedings of the 
court which prevented defendants from having a fair trial. Defendants also request this 
Court grant a new trial, pursuant to Rule 59(a)(1) and/or (7), on the basis the jury 
instruction regarding proximate cause is a misstatement of Idaho law, and therefore, an 
error in law occurring at trial and which prevented defendants from having a fair trial. 
In addition, defendants request this Court grant a new trial, pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(1) and/or (7), on the basis the trial court's separate listing 
of plaintiffs individually, rather than collectively, for non-economic damages on the 
special verdict form are a misstatement or misapplication of Idaho law, and therefore, 
an error in law occurring at trial and such error prevented defendants from having a fair 
trial. Moreover, defendants request this Court grant a new trial, pursuant to Rules 
59(a)(5) and/or (6), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, on the basis the award of economic 
and non-economic damages are excessive, appearing to have been given under the 
influence of passion or prejudice, with no supporting evidence in the trial record. 
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( 
In the alternative, if a new trial is denied on these issues, defendants respectfully 
request an amendment to the judgment for a remittitur of economic damages be 
entered, pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 59.1, reducing the 
amount of economic damages in this case to $244,847, or another amount deemed 
reasonable and appropriate by this Court. 
Furthermore, defendants respectfully move this Court, pursuant to Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 50(b), for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the evidence 
presented at trial was not of sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds 
could have reached the same conclusion as the jury in the above-entitled case. 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
A. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL PURSUANT TO IDAHO RULE OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 59(a) 
Defendants bring the present motion for new trial pursuant to Rule 59 (a), Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides: 
Rule 59 (a). New trial - Amendment of judgment -
Grounds. 
A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and 
on all or part of the issues in an action for any of the 
following reasons: 
1. Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or 
adverse party or any order of the court or abuse of 
discretion by which either party was prevented from 
having a fair trial. 
2. Misconduct of the jury. 
3. Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not 
have guarded against. 
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4. Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making 
the application, which the party could not, with reasonable 
diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial. 
5. Excessive damages or inadequate damages, 
appearing to have been given under the influence of 
passion or prejudice. 
6. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or 
other decision, or that it is against the law. 
7. Error in law, occurring at the trial. 
Any motion for a new trial based upon any of the grounds 
set forth in subdivisions 1, 2, 3 or 4 must be accompanied 
by an affidavit stating in detail the facts relied upon in 
support of such motion for a new trial. Any motion based on 
subdivisions 6 or 7 must set forth the factual grounds 
therefor with particularity. On a motion for new trial in action 
tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one 
has been entered, take additional testimony, amend 
findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new 
findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment. 
I.R.C.P. 59(a) (emphasis added). More specifically, defendants submit subsections 1, 5, 
6, and/or 7, quoted and emphasized hereinabove, are applicable to support defendant's 
motion for a new trial. 
1. The Court's refusal to allow defendants to present evidence through 
plaintiffs' expert witness, Paul Blaylock, M.D., regarding the non-party 
negligence of Dr. Long and Dr. Chai constitutes abuse of discretion 
and/or error in law occurring at the trial and which prevented 
defendants from having a fair trial. 
Defendants respectfully submit the grant of a new trial in this matter, pursuant to 
IRCP 59(a)(1) and/or (7), is appropriate on the basis the Court's refusal to allow 
defendants to present evidence through plaintiffs' expert witness, Paul Blaylock, M.D., 
regarding the non-party negligence of Dr. Long and Dr. Chai constitutes an abuse of 
discretion and/or an error in law which prevented defendants from having a fair trial. 
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Defendants submit, in accordance with Idaho Code §§ 6-801 and 6-802, and 
pursuant to the Idaho appellate authority, all actors, including non-parties, whose 
negligent conduct caused or contributed to the subject occurrence and resulting 
damages claimed by plaintiffs must be included on the special verdict form. Vannoy v. 
Uniroyal Tire Company, 111 Idaho 536, 542, 726. P.2d 648, 654 (1985). In Pocatello 
Industrial Park Company v. Steel West, Inc., 101 Idaho 783, 621 P.2d 399 (1980), the 
Idaho Supreme Court expressly approved the inclusion of non-parties on the special 
verdict form: 
It is established without a doubt that, when apportioning 
negligence a jury must have the opportunity to consider the 
negligence of all parties to the transaction, whether or not 
they be parties to the lawsuit and whether or not they can be 
liable to the plaintiff or to the other tortfeasors either by 
operation of law or because of a prior release. 
J.Q., 101 Idaho at 786,671 P.2d at 402 (citation omitted). 
Likewise, in Lasselle v. Special Products Company, 106 Idaho 170, 677 P.2d 483 
(1983), the plaintiff was injured while using a post hole digger manufactured by the 
Special Products Company and assembled and sold by D & 8 Supply Company. Prior 
to trial, the plaintiff dismissed his action against D & 8 Supply Company; and, at trial, 
Special Products Company submitted a proposed form of verdict that included a 
comparison of fault of all parties to the transaction, including D & 8 Supply Company. 
The trial court refused to include D & 8 Supply Company on the verdict form. On 
appeal, the Supreme Court held the refusal to include D & B Supply Company on the 
special verdict to the jury for the purposes of comparing fault was reversible error 
because evidence had been submitted that D & B had failed to provide the 
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manufacturer's directions on assembly of the digger and the jury could have concluded 
o & B was negligent. Id. 
Pursuant to the application of Idaho Code § 6-801, and in accordance with Idaho 
appellate authority, non-parties are required to be included on the jury verdict form upon 
the presentation of evidence of their failure to exercise ordinary care to protect plaintiff 
from harm and injury, breach of any applicable standard of hE?alth care practice (in the 
instance of health care providers), any statutory violation(s), and/or failure to perform 
statutory duties, which failure(s) and/or violation(s) caused or contributed to the subject 
incident and the injuries or damages allegedly sustained by plaintiff. Munns v. Swift 
Transportation Co.! Inc., 138 Idaho 108, 112,58 P.3d 92, 96 (2002). 
Moreover, Idaho Code Section 6-1012 provides the requirements that defendants 
were to satisfy, as part of their defense, to establish negligence at trial against any non-
party or non-parties, including Dr. Long and/or Dr. Chai, in the above-entitled case. 
Idaho Code Section 6-1012 states, in relevant part: 
In any case, claim or action for damages due to injury to or 
death of any person, brought against any physician and 
surgeon or other provider of health care ... such claimant or 
plaintiff must, as an essential part of his or her case in chief, 
affirmatively prove by direct expert testimony and by a 
preponderance of all the competent evidence, that such 
defendant then and there negligently failed to meet the 
applicable standard of health care practice of the community 
in which such care allegedly was or should have been 
provided .... 
I.C. § 6-1012. Defendants were required to present as part of their defense, by direct 
expert testimony, and in accordance with the elements of Idaho Code Section 6-1012, 
that certain non-parties breached the applicable standard of health care practice of the 
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community and that there was a causal connection between the breach of care of the 
non-parties and the death of the Maria Aguilar in this case. To accomplish this, 
defendants were required to call an expert witness and intended to utilize plaintiffs' 
expert witness, Paul Blaylock, M.D., to show that non-parties were negligent in the 
above-entitled case. Specifically, defendants tried to call Dr. Blaylock to establish the 
negligence of the non-parties in this case; however, this Court refused to allow 
defendants to call Dr. Blaylock in establishing their defense. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court stated that no party to litigation has "anything 
resembling a proprietary right" to any witness evidence. Fitzgerald v. Stanley Roberts, 
Inc., 186 N.J. 286, 301,895 A.2d 405,413-414 (2006). "Absent a privilege no party is 
entitled to restrict an opponent's access to a witness, however partial or important to 
him, by insisting on some notion of allegiance. Even an expert whose knowledge has 
been purchased cannot be silenced by the party who is paying him on that ground 
alone." Id. at 301,414. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Also, "[bJy declaring that 
an expert witness will be produced at trial and providing the expert's identity and opinion 
to another party, as required by [the local discovery rules], the original proponent has 
waived his claim that the information is privileged. Thus, we hold that access to the 
testifying witness is allowed .... " Id. at 302,414. "[D]iscovery rules designed to protect 
consulting experts do not prevent a party from calling an adversary's expert when that 
expert has been designated a 'testifying expert,' even without a showing of exigent 
circumstances." Id. 
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In addition, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa 
Western Division ruled that "once an expert is designated, the expert is recognized as 
presenting part of the common body of discoverable, and generally admissible, 
information and testimony available to all parties. House v. Combined Insurance 
Company of America, 168 F.R.D. 236, 245 (N.D. Iowa 1996). In House v. Combined 
Insurance Company of America, the court reasoned that once a party designates an 
expert witness as probably testifying at trial pursuant to the applicable discovery rule(s). 
"the party will have to live with the consequence that the opposing party will likely be 
given the opportunity to depose the expert or even to call the expert at trial on their own 
behalf." Id. at 247. 
In the present case, plaintiffs designated in their initial expert disclosure Dr. 
Blaylock as an expert witness to be called at trial to testify pursuant to Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure (IRCP) 26(b)(4). Thereafter, plaintiffs designated Dr. Blaylock as an 
expert witness to be called at trial to testify in accordance with IRCP 26(b)(4) in their 
supplemental expert disclosure, second supplemental expert disclosure, third 
supplemental expert disclosure, sixth supplemental expert disclosure, seventh 
supplemental expert disclosure, eighth supplemental expert disclosure, ninth 
supplemental expert disclosure, rebuttal expert disclosure, and supplemental rebuttal 
expert disclosure. 
At no time did plaintiffs de-designate or withdraw Dr. Blaylock as an expert 
witness to be called at trial. In plaintiffs' expert disclosure, and subsequent 
supplemental expert disclosures, regarding Dr. Blaylock, plaintiffs provided Dr. 
Blaylock's opinions and related reports -relating to the present case. In formulating his 
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opinions and related reports, Dr. Blaylock familiarized himself with the applicable 
community standard of care relating to Nathan Coonrod, M.D., Andrew Chai, M.D., and 
Mitchell Long, D.O. Defendants had also deposed Dr. Blaylock. Accordingly, Dr. 
Blaylock was a testifying witness pursuant to IRCP 26. 
Furthermore, defendants always reserved and maintained the right to examine 
plaintiffs' expert witnesses, including Dr. Blaylock, either on direct examination or cross-
examination to establish its defense. The following documents, and responses 
contained therein, are specific examples of defendants' notice to plaintiffs of defendants' 
intent to use plaintiffs' witnesses, including expert witnesses, as well as using plaintiffs' 
witnesses' reports and depositions at trial: 
• Primary Health Care Center's answers to plaintiffs' first set of interrogatories and 
requests for production of documents, answers to interrogatory #1 and #2; 
• Primary Health Care Center's supplemental answers to plaintiffs' first set of 
interrogatories and requests for production of documents, answers to 
interrogatory #2, #3, #5, #16, #18, and #19; 
• Primary Health Care Center's answers to plaintiffs' second set of interrogatories 
and requests for production of documents, request for production #20; 
• Primary Health Care Center's supplemental answers to plaintiffs' second set of 
interrogatories and requests for production of documents, answers to 
interrogatory #20, #21, and #22; 
• Nathan Coonrod, M.D.'s supplemental answers to plaintiffs' first set of 
interrogatories and requests for production of documents, answers to 
interrogatory #2, #3, #5, #17, #19, and #20; 
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• Nathan Coonrod, M.D.'s answers to plaintiffs' second set of interrogatories and 
requests for production of documents, request for production #20; 
• Nathan Coonrod, M.D.'s supplemental answers to plaintiffs' second set of 
interrogatories and requests for production of documents, answers to 
interrogatory #21, #22, and #23. 
In addition, defendants' supplemental answer to interrogatory number five (5) to 
plaintiffs' first set of interrogatories and requests for production of documents 
specifically states U[tJo the extent any other defendant in this action is dismissed prior to 
trial. this defendant reserves the right to call or cross-examine plaintiffs' expert 
witnesses at triaL" Defendant Nathan Coonrod, M.D.'s Supplemental Answers and 
Responses to Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of 
Documents, p. 10 (emphasis added). Since plaintiffs disclosed Dr. Blaylock as an 
expert witness pursuant to IRCP 26(b)(4), and defendants' preserved their right to 
examine plaintiffs' witnesses, the Court should have permitted defendants to examine 
plaintiffs' expert witnesses, specifically Dr. Blaylock, at trial. 
However, this Court denied defendants' right to call Dr. Blaylock in their case-in-
chief to prove the negligence of non-parties as required by Idaho law despite plaintiffs' 
expert disclosure to defendants concerning Dr. Blaylock's opinions, his familiarity with 
the local standard of care, and defendants' deposition of Dr. Blaylock and even though 
defendants' provided sufficient legal notice to plaintiffs and the Court of defendants' 
reservation of right to call plaintiffs' expert witnesses, including Dr. Blaylock, at trial. As 
demonstrated in the list of defendants' discovery responses, there was no basis for this 
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Court to deny the defendants their right to call Dr. Blaylock in order for the defendants' 
to establish the negligence of non-parties in the above-entitled cause of action. 
The Court allowed defendants to make an offer of proof regarding the testimony 
of Dr. Blaylock pertaining to his familiarity with the standard of care and opinion relating 
to the negligence of the non-parties, but the Court did not permit such testimony to 
come before the jury. Defendants aver that the Court's refusal to allow defendants to 
present evid~nce through plaintiffs' expert witness, Paul Blaylock, M.D., regarding the 
non-party negligence of Dr. Long and Dr. Chai constitutes an abuse of discretion and/or 
an error in law which prevented defendants from having a fair trial, and therefore, this 
Court should grant defendants' motion for a new trial. 
2. The jury instruction regarding proximate cause constitutes a 
misstatement of Idaho law, and therefore, an error in law occurring at 
the trial and which prevented defendants from having a fair trial. 
Defendants respectfully submit the grant of a new trial in this matter, pursuant to 
IRCP 59(a)(1) and/or (7), is appropriate on the basis the Court's instruction of the jury 
during the course of trial with regard to the proximate cause element of plaintiffs' cause 
of action constituted an error in law and which prevented defendants from having a fair 
trial. Said instruction is Instruction No. 23, which provides: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 23 
When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a 
cause that, in natural or probable sequence, produced the 
injury, the loss or the damage complained of. It need not be 
the only cause. It is sufficient if it is a substantial factor in 
bringing about the injury, loss or damage. 
There may be one or more proximate causes of an injury. 
When the negligent conduct of two or more persons or 
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entities contributes concurrently as substantial factors in 
bringing about an injury, the conduct of each may be a 
proximate cause of the injury regardless of the extent to 
which each contributes to the injury. 
Defendants respectfully assert the Court's jury instruction is contrary to the most recent 
Idaho pattern jury instructions and impermissibly alters plaintiffs' burden of proof with 
regard to the element of proximate cause by applying a "substantial factor" test, rather 
than a "but-for" test, for provifl9 proximate cause. The Court used a modified version of 
pattern IOJI.2d 2.30.2 in formulating Instruction No. 23. Jury Instruction No. 23 includes 
only a portion of the recommended language set forth within IDJI.2d 2.30.2. IDJI.2d 
2.30.2 reads as follows: 
When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a 
cause that, in natural or probable sequence, produced the 
injury, the loss or the damage complained of. It need not be 
the only cause. It is sufficient if it is a substantial factor in 
bringing about the injury, loss or damage. It is not a 
proximate cause if the injury loss or damage likely would 
have occurred anyway. 
There may be one or more proximate causes of an injury. 
When the negligent conduct of two or more persons or 
entities contributes concurrently as substantial factors in 
bringing about an injury, the conduct of each may be a 
proximate cause of the injury regardless of the extent to 
which each contributes to the injury. 
IDJI.2d 2.30.2 - Proximate cause - "substantial factor," without "but for" test (October 
2003). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 51 (a)(2) addresses the use of the pattern jury 
instructions as follows: 
Whenever the latest edition of Idaho Jury Instructions (IOJI) 
contains an instruction applicable to a case and the trial 
judge determines that the jury should be instructed on the 
subject, it is recommended that the judge use the IOJI 
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instruction unless the judge finds that a different instruction 
would more adequately, accurately or clearly state the law. 
Whenever the latest edition of IOJI does not contain an 
instruction on a subject upon which the trial judge 
determines that the jury should be instructed, or when an 
IOJI instruction cannot be modified to submit the issue 
properly, the instruction given on that subject should be 
simple, brief, impartial and free from argument. When an 
instruction requested by a party is a modified IOJI 
instruction, the party should indicate therein, by use of 
parentheses or other appropriate means, the respect in 
which it is modified. 
I.R.C.P. 51 (a)(2). 
While use of the IDJI.2d pattern instructions are recommended, and not required, 
modification of an instruction constitutes error if the modified instruction does not 
conform to the state of the law or omits elements basic to the case. Ramco v. H-K 
Contractors, 118 Idaho 108, 111, 794 P.2d 1381, 1385 (1990), citing Anderson v. 
Gailey, 97 Idaho 813, 555 P.2d 144 (1976). In the present case, since defendants 
contend plaintiffs could not meet their burden of proof with regard to the element of 
"proximate cause" (and therefore a defense verdict was proper), the Court's improper 
instruction of the jury with regard to said element was highly prejudicial to the 
defendant. 
There is no question in this medical malpractice cause of action, plaintiffs have 
the burden to prove not only that the defendants breached the applicable standard of 
health care, but also the alleged breach of the standard of health care practice was the 
proximate cause of plaintiffs' damages. Hake v. Delane, 117 Idaho 1058, 1062, 793 
P.2d 1230, 1234 (1990). This burden requires plaintiffs prove defendants' alleged 
breach, if any, was more probably than not the proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries. 
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Therefore, it is proper for the jury, as the finder of fact, to determine whether plaintiff has 
met his burden of proof as to causation. However, in this case, the impermissible 
alteration of the applicable burden of proof amounts to an error in law, and a proper 
basis for the grant of a new trial. 
In particular, defendants respectfully submit the Court's modified IDJI.2d 2.30.2 
instruction applied the "substantial factor" test for proximate causation by omitting the 
sentence: "It is not a proximate cause if the injury loss or damage likely would have 
occurred anyway," and such an omission constitutes an error in law during the course of 
trial in accordance with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(7). Defendants posit that 
this Court should have used the "but-for" test for proving proximate causation by either 
including the omitted sentence: "It is not a proximate cause if the injury loss or damage 
likely would have occurred anyway" from pattern IDJI.2d 2.30.2, by using pattern 
IDJI.2d 2.30.1 (which instructs the jury concerning the "but-for" test for proximate 
causation), or by using defendants' proposed jury instruction number 18 (instruction 
regarding "but-for test for proximate causation), which is a modified version of pattern 
IDJI.2d 2.30.1. 
IDJI.2d 2.30.1 reads as follows: 
When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a 
cause which, in natural or probable sequence, produced 
the complained injury, Joss or damage, and but for that 
cause the damage would not have occurred. It need not be 
the only cause. It is sufficient if it is a substantial factor in 
bringing about the injury, loss or damage. It is not a 
proximate cause if the injury, loss or damage likely would 
have occurred anyway. 
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[There may be one or more proximate causes of injury. 
When the negligent conduct of two or more persons or 
entities contribute concurrently as substantial factors in 
bringing about an injury, the conduct of each may be a 
proximate cause of the injury regardless of the extent to 
which each contributes to the injury.] 
IDJI.2d 2.30.1 - Proximate cause - "but for" test (October 2003). Defendants' proposed 
jury instruction number 18, reads as follows: 
When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a 
cause which, in natural or probable sequence, produced the 
injury, the loss or the damage complained of. It need not be . 
the only cause. It is sufficient if it is a substantial factor in 
bringing about the injury, loss or damage. It is not a 
proximate cause if the injury, loss or damage likely would 
have occurred anyway. 
There may be one or more proximate causes of an injury. 
Plaintiff must prove proximate cause by expert testimony, by 
a preponderance of the evidence, and to a reasonable 
degree of medical certainty. 
Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction No. 18. The "but for" test is appropriate for cases 
that involve only a single force or cause. Hilden v. Ball, 117 Idaho 314, 787 P.2d 1122 
(1998); See also Fussell v. St. Clair, 120 Idaho 591,595,818 P.2d 295,299 (1991). In 
Hilden, a patient died from cardiac arrest brought on by a lack of oxygen to the heart 
and the plaintiff alleged the attending doctor's failure to preoxygenate the patient prior to 
surgery caused the patient's death. Hilden v. Ball, at 335, 787 P.2d at 1143; Fussel v. 
st. Clair, at 595, 818 P.2d at 299. The doctor's defense was that the failure to 
preoxygenate the patient was not a violation of the local standard of health care. !Q. The 
Idaho Supreme Court held that the lower court was not wrong in viewing the case as a 
single cause case. Hilden v. Ball, at 335, 787 P.2d at 1143; Fussel v. St. Clair, at 595, 
818 P.2d at 299. 
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The facts in the present case are similar to the facts of Hilden. The decedent, . 
Maria Aguilar visited Dr. Coonrod in April, May, and June 2003. Plaintiffs allege Dr. 
Coonrod's failure to diagnose a pulmonary embolism was the cause of death. Dr. 
Coonrod's defense (and Primary Health Care Center's defense) is his failure to 
diagnose Mrs. Aguilar's pulmonary embolism was not a violation of the local standard of 
health care. Therefore, the Court should have applied the "but for" test in determining 
proximate cause when instructing the jury. 
Defendants assert that the Court should have instructed the jury concerning the 
"but-for" test for proximate causation, rather than the "substantial factor" test, because the 
" 
above-entitled case involves only a single cause-plaintiffs' allegation that Dr. Coonrod 
failed to diagnose a pulmonary embolism-and therefore, it was appropriate for the 
Court to instruct the jury concerning the "but for" test for proximate causation. 
Thus, defendants respectfully submit the Court's jury instruction regarding 
proximate cause amounts to a misstatement of Idaho law, and fails to address the key 
issue of burden of proof with regard to an essential element of this medical malpractice 
case. On the basis of the significant prejudice to the defendants of the foregoing error 
of law in instruction of the jury, it is proper for this Court to grant defendants a new trial 
in this matter. 
3. The trial court's separate listing of plaintiffs individually, rather than 
collectively, for non-economic damages on the special verdict form 
are a misstatement or misapplication of Idaho law, and therefore, an 
abuse of discretion and/or an error in law occurring at trial and 
prevented defendants from having a fair trial. 
Defendants respectfully submit the grant of a new trial in this case, pursuant to 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(1) and/or (7), is appropriate on the basis the trial 
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court's separate listing of plaintiffs individually, rather than collectively, for non-
economic damages on the special verdict form are a misstatement or misapplication of 
Idaho law, and therefore, an abuse of discretion and/or an error in law occurring at trial 
and such abuse of discretion and/or error prevented defendants from having a fair trial. 
Defendants assert that the statutory cap on non-economic damages, pursuant to 
Idaho Code Section 6-1603, applies to all plaintiffs collectively, and not individually. See 
Defendants Nathan Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care Center's Objection to the 
Judgment Upon the Verdict and Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment To Apply the 
Statutory Cap On Non-Economic Damages To All Plaintiffs Collectively. In regards to 
the statutory cap for non-economic damages applying to all plaintiffs, defendants 
incorporate herein and in their entirety, the argument and analysis as set forth in their 
Objection to the Judgment Upon the Verdict and Motion to Alter or Amend the 
Judgment To Apply Non-Economic Damages Cap to All Plaintiffs Collectively and 
Memorandum in Support of their Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment. Therefore, 
since one cap for non-economic damages applies to all plaintiffs, regardless of the 
number of plaintiffs in a cause of action, the Court abused its discretion and/or erred by 
separately listing a non-economic damages award to each plaintiff on the special verdict 
form. 
Furthermore, the pattern Idaho Jury Instructions provide a model special verdict 
form which the Court may modify to meet the specific issues of a case. IDJI.2d 1.43.1. 
Specifically, the Comments section for IDJI.2d 1.43.1 states: 
This form is included only as an example, and may be 
modified as needed to meet the specific issues of a given 
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case. The committee recommends separate damage 
allocations be no more numerous than between economic 
and non-economic damages. In the court's discretion the 
liability questions may be split between negligence and 
proximate cause. 
IDJI.2d 1.43.1 - Example verdict on special interrogatories (emphasis added). 
Defendants posit that the special verdict form's separation of damages for non-
economic damages to each individual plaintiff is improper and is error because IDJI.2d 
1.43.1 instructs one determination of economic damages and one determination of non-
economic damages for the plaintiffs. 
The Court had four different special verdict forms to choose from, which were 
categorized as Jury Instruction No. 29-Alt-1, Jury Instruction No. 29-Alt-2, Jury 
Instruction No. 29-Alt-3, and Jury Instruction No. 29-Alt-4. The Court marked 
defendants' proposed special verdict form as Jury Instruction No. 29-Alt-3, which had 
one line item for an economic damages award to plaintiffs collectively and one line item 
for a non-economic damages award to plaintiffs collectively. However, the Court used 
Jury Instruction No. 29-Alt-4 for its special verdict form (and which the jury used to 
render its verdict) which had one line item for an economic damages award to plaintiffs 
collectively, but deviated from defendants' proposed special verdict form by listing a 
non-economic damages award to each plaintiff individually. 
Thus, defendants respectfully submit the Court abused its discretion by using a 
special verdict form which separately listed plaintiffs individually, rather than collectively 
and as one line item, for non-economic damages, and which abuse of discretion 
constitutes a misstatement and/or misapplication and/or an error of Idaho law. On the 
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basis of the significant prejudice to the defendants of the foregoing error of law in 
instruction of the jury, it is proper for this Court to grant defendants a new trial in this 
matter. 
4. The award of economic and non-economic damages are excessive, 
appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or 
prejudice, with no supporting evidence in the trial record. 
Defendants submit the jury's award of economic damages in the amount of 
$700,000 is excessive and its award of non-economic damages in the amount of 
$3,500,000 is excessive, both awards appearing to have been given under the influence 
of passion or prejudice with no supporting evidence in the trial record. Therefore, 
pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 59(a)(5) and/or (6), it is proper for this Court 
to grant a new trial. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(5) states a new trial may be 
granted for excessive damages appearing to have been given under the influence of 
passion or prejudice. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(6) states a new trial may be 
granted for insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict. 
In Tello v. United States, 2009 WL 1064940 (W.O. Tex. 2009), the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Texas analyzed Texas law to determine 
whether household services are economic damages not subject to a statutory cap, or 
whether household services are non-economic damages subject to the applicable 
statutory cap on non-economic damages in a wrongful death cause of action. The 
pertinent Texas statute defines economic damages as "compensatory damages 
intended to compensate a claimant for actual economic or pecuniary loss; the term does 
not include exemplary damages. ~ (quoting Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 
41.001 (4». Since the applicable Texas statute did not define "actual economic or 
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pecuniary loss," the Tello court relied upon the language of the Mississippi medical 
malpractice statute for guidance, which stated in relevant part, "actual economic 
damages" include "objectively verifiable pecuniary damages arising from ... costs of 
obtaining substitute domestic services." Id. (quoting Miss. Code. Ann. § 11-1-60(b)). 
The Tello court held that the Mississippi definition of economic damages 
comported with the Texas statute pertaining to economic damages, as well as the 
legislative intent of the respective Texas statute, and concluded a plaintiff must provide 
evidence of actual payment for the replaced household services for the recovery to be 
economic in nature. lQ. The Tello court stated, specifically: 
The Court does not determine that the loss of [the 
decedent's] homemaker services such as cooking, 
cleaning, child care, and the like, is not a very real loss and 
a significant part of the damages which plaintiffs sustained. 
Certainly, the services performed by [the decedent] were 
manifestations of love and affection and the loss of theses 
(sic) services is a consideration in determining damages in 
this wrongful death case. However, there is no evidence 
the loss of these services necessarily resulted in direct 
financial loss to the survivors, and so in this respect it is not 
a pecuniary loss. Accordingly, plaintiffs' recovery attaches 
to the non-economic loss of companionship and society 
inherent in her relationship with her family. 
Id. Consequently, the Tello court applied the statutory cap for non-economic damages 
to the household services portion of the damages award. 
Likewise, Idaho law is similar to the Texas and Mississippi statutes relied upon 
by the Tello court. Idaho defines "economic damages" to mean "objectively verifiable 
monetary loss, including, but not limited to, out-of-pocket expenses, loss of earnings, 
loss of use of property, cost of replacement or repair, cost of obtaining substitute 
domestic services, loss of employment, medical expenses, or loss of business or 
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employment opportunities." I.C. § 6-1601 (2008) (emphasis added). Defendants aver 
that the Tello court's analysis of economic damages and household services is 
applicable and relevant to the above-entitled case, and respectfully request this Court to 
apply the Tello court's reasoning and holdings relating to household services to the 
present case. 
In this matter, the jury awarded economic damages to the plaintiffs in the amount 
of $700,000, despite no evidence to support such an award. Plaintiffs' exhibits depicted 
economic damages in the total amount of $652,759 in the lower bound and $704,417 in 
the upper bound of damages. See Plaintiffs' Exhibits 18 and 19. In attempting to prove 
economic damages, plaintiffs relied upon the testimony and calculations of their expert 
witness, Cornelius Hofman, who testified that economic damages to plaintiffs consisted 
of lost past wages of $83,492 in both the lower and higher bound of calculations, and 
lost future wages of $153,345 in the lower bound and $165,772 in the higher bound. 
See Plaintiffs' Exhibits 18 and 19. Based upon these calculations, the total lost financial 
wages (or support) sustained by plaintiffs was $236,837 in the lower bound and 
$249,264 in the higher bound. See Plaintiffs' Exhibits 18 and 19. 
In addition, the plaintiffs' expert witness opined that the plaintiffs suffered a total 
loss in household services of $415,922 in the lower bound and $455,153 in the higher 
bound. See Plaintiffs' Exhibits 18 and 19. Plaintiffs' expert then added the estimated 
economic loss of household services to the total lost financial wages of $236,837 (lower 
bound) and $249,264 (higher bound) for the total economic loss of $652,759 in the 
lower bound and $704,417 in the upper bound of damages. See Plaintiffs' Exhibits 18 
and 19. However, other than Mr. Hofman's opinions and calculations relating to the 
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economic effect of lost household services, plaintiffs did not proffer any evidence 
pertaining to actual or incurred financial or economic loss sustained by the plaintiffs 
regarding household services. See Tello v. United States, 2009 WL 1064940 (W.D. Tex. 
2009). 
Thus, the evidence proffered by plaintiffs is insufficient to sustain an award for 
$700,000 in economic damages because plaintiffs did not provide evidence of the 
actual or incurred economic loss suffered by the loss of the decedent's household 
services. Therefore, defendants respectfully submit, at most, plaintiffs produced 
evidence of economic damages in the total amount of $244,847 in the lower bound or 
$284,078 in the higher bound ($700,000 economic damages jury award minus either 
$415,922 in the lower bound or $455,153 in the higher bound of estimated lost 
household services, respectively). Defendants respectfully request this Court to 
apportion plaintiffs' total loss in household services of $415,922 in the lower bound and 
$455,153 in the higher bound to the non-economic damages jury award, and further 
request the Court to apply the statutory cap on non-economic damages to the 
household services award. 
Moreover, the jury awarded non-economic damages in favor of plaintiffs, and 
against the defendants, in the total amount of $3,500,000. The jury awarded each 
individual plaintiff an award for non-economic damages in the amount of $903,000 to 
Jose Aguilar, $485,000 to Jose Aguilar, Jr., $725,000 to Guadalupe Maria Aguilar, 
$602,000 to Alejandro Aguilar, and $785,000 to Lorena Aguilar. Defendants aver that 
the plaintiffs failed to proffer evidence sufficient to support such awards for non-
economic damages in favor of plaintiffs. Defendants posit that plaintiffs presented 
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evidence to support an award for non-economic damages for all plaintiffs collectively in 
the amount of $682,200.65-at most. The applicable non-economic damages cap at the 
time the above-entitled cause of action arose in June 2003 was $682,200.65. 
Also, defendants assert it was an abuse of discretion and/or an error of law for 
the Court to utilize a special verdict form that listed each plaintiff individually for non-
economic damages, rather than collectively, supra. Consequently, the jury awarded 
non-economic damages that are excessive, due in part to the special verdict form used 
by the Court. Thus, the non-economic damages award of $3,500,000 can only be 
explained as resulting from passion or prejudice of the jury. Therefore, the Court should 
amend the non-economic damages award from $3,500,000 to $682,200.65 (the 
applicable non-economic damages cap) and grant defendants' motion for a new trial 
due to such damages appearing to be the result of partiality by the jury. 
Furthermore, in accordance with Idaho law, the issue of whether damages 
awarded are excessive is an issue that may form the basis of both a motion for a new 
trial; or, in the alternative, a remittitur. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a}(5) is 
applicable to support a grant of a new trial in instances where damages are so 
excessive or inadequate as to appear to be the result of partiality by the jury. Pratton v. 
Gage, 122 Idaho 848, 851, 840 P.2d 392, 395 (1992). If the trial judge believes the 
jury's award may only be explained as resulting from passion or prejudice, then he 
should grant a new trial under 59(a)(5). Id. When a new trial is granted pursuant to Rule 
59(a}(5} on the basis the damages are excessive, the Court is not required to find the 
verdict was not supported by the evidence as a condition precedent to granting the new 
trial. lQ., 122 Idaho at 852, 840 P.2d at 396. 
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When a party contends the jury award is so great as to appear to have been 
activated by passion or prejudice, the trial court is not restricted to rule on this issue as 
a matter of law, but must weigh the evidence and considerations of doing substantial 
justice. Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 624, 603 P.2d 575, 580 (1979). The Court 
must look at the amount of damages awarded and compare the award with the amount 
of damages the trial court, in its view, would have awarded. In Quick v. Crane, the Idaho 
Supreme Court adopted the following rule set forth in Dinneen, supra: 
Where a motion for a new trial is premised on inadequate or 
excessive damages, the trial court must weigh the evidence 
and then compare the jury's award to what he would have 
given had there been no jury. If the disparity is so great that 
it appears to the trial court that the award was given under 
the influence of passion or prejudice, the verdict ought not 
stand. It need not be proven that there was in fact passion or 
prejudice nor is it necessary to point to such in the record. 
The appearance of such is sufficient. A trial court is not 
restricted to ruling a verdict inadequate or excessive as a 
matter of law. Additionally, the rule that a verdict will not be 
set aside when supported by substantial but conflicting 
evidence has no application to trial court ruling upon a 
motion for new trial. 
Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 768, 727 P.2d 1187, 1196 (1986) (citations omitted, 
italicized emphasis in original, further emphasis added), quoting Dinneen, 100 Idaho at 
625-26,603 P.2d at 580-81. 
In Quick v. Crane, the Court further provided, again citing to the Dinneen opinion: 
Trial courts, unlike jurors, have the advantage of having 
heard and determined many hundreds of damage claims. A 
trial court in a jury trial hears exactly the same evidence as 
the jury hears, and makes his own inward assessment of 
credibility and weight. So, when after a trial the jury returns 
a verdict which is thereafter assailed, either as excessive or 
as inadequate, the trial court's judgment is then called into 
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play, requiring of him a weighing of evidence. The sole 
question on a Rule 59(a)(5) motion is the amount of the 
jury's damage award, as compared to the amount of 
damages the trial court in his view of the evidence would 
have awarded. 
jQ., 111 Idaho at 768-69, 727 P.2d at 1196-97 (italicized emphasis in original), quoting 
Dinneen, 100 Idaho at 624-25, 603 P.2d at 579-80. 
If the trial judge discovers his determination of damages is so substantially 
different from that of the jury so he can only explain this difference as resulting from 
some unfair behavior, or what the law calls "passion or prejudice," on the part of the jury 
against one or some of the parties, then he should grant a new trial. Quick, 111 Idaho at 
769, 727 P.2d at 1197. As the Quick court noted, however, it is difficult to establish how 
substantial the disparity must be to warrant a new trial: 
How substantial this difference must be is impossible to 
formulate with any degree of accuracy. It will necessarily 
vary with the factual context of each case and the trial 
judge's sense of fairness and justice. Frequent 
characterizations have included the idea that the disparity 
must "shock the conscience" of the trial judge or lead him to 
conclude that it would be "unconscionable" to let the damage 
award stand as the jury set it. These characterizations, of 
course, do little more than restate the trial judge's 
discretionary perspective but are, nonetheless, frequently 
employed in other areas of the law and, therefore, may be 
useful to the trial judge. 
Id., 111 Idaho at 769-770, 769, 727 P.2d at 1197-98. 
Defendants respectfully request this Court weigh the evidence and proceed 
through an analysis of damages in this case. Defendants request this Court compare 
its evaluation of economic and non-economic damages with the award of the jury. As 
the record reflects, the jury awarded plaintiffs in this matter an amount substantially in 
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excess of the amount plaintiffs actually proved during the course of the trial, specifically 
in regard to the amount of lost household services actually incurred or sustained. A 
review of the amount of damages awarded by the jury can only lead to the ·conclusion 
the jury was influenced by passion or prejudice in this case. Such an award should not 
be allowed to stand. 
Furthermore, it is proper for this Court to grant a new trial in accordance with 
Rule 59(a)(6} on the basis there was insufficient evidence to justify the jury's verdict in 
this matter. As is outlined hereinabove, it is clear plaintiffs did not present evidence to 
support an economic damages verdict in the amount of $700,000 or a non-economic 
damages verdict in the amount of $3,500,000, and upon consideration of evidence 
submitted by plaintiffs in the present matter it is highly probable a different result would 
follow retrial. 
In the event this Court does not find the economic or non-economic damages 
awarded by the jury appear to have been givet;l under the influence of passion or 
prejudice, said damages must have been awarded based upon speculation or 
guesswork. Plain~jffs have the burden of proving not only a right to damages, but also 
the amount of damages. Beare v. Stowes' Builders Supply, Inc., 104 Idaho 317, 321, 
658 P.2d 988, 992 (Ct. App.1983), citing Fish v. Fleishman, 87 Idaho 126,391 P.2d 344 
(1964). "The law does not permit the arriving at the amount of damages by conjecture." 
Beare, supra. Idaho courts have consistently held damages must be proved with 
reasonable certainty and cannot be based on mere speculation. See Hake, 117 Idaho at 
1062,793 P.2d at 1234; Anderson & Nafziger v. G. T. Newcomb. Inc., 100 Idaho 175, 
182, 595 P .2d 709, 716 (1979). Because the record and proceedings reflect insufficient 
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evidence to justify the economic damages award or the non-economic damages award, 
if the jury did not arrive at the excessive economic or non-economic damages award 
under the influence of passion or prejudice, the jury must have improperly speculated to 
arrive at said sums. 
When a motion for a new trial is based upon subdivision 6, the trial court must 
determin~ whether the jury verdict is against the weight of the evidence, if the ends of 
justice would be served by vacating the verdict, and whether a different result would 
follow retrial. Litchfield v. Nelson, 122 Idaho 416, 422, 835 P.2d 651, 657 (Ct. App. 
1992). Under Rule 59(a)(6), a trial court is not required to view the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the non-moving party, but is free to weigh conflicting evidence 
himself. Nations v. Bonner Building Supply, 113 Idaho 568,572,746 P.2d 1027, 1031 
(Ct. App. 1987). If the judge, having considered the entire evidence, and having given 
full respect to the jury's findings, is left with the conviction an injustice has been done, 
he may grant a new trial. lQ. 
On a motion for new trial, unlike a motion for directed verdict or judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, the trial court has broad discretion to weigh all the evidence, 
pass on the credibility of witnesses and make independent findings of fact and compare 
them to the jury's findings. Smith v. Praegitzer, 113 Idaho 887, 892, 749 P.2d 1012, 
1017 (Ct. App. 1988), cert denied 114 Idaho 147,754 P.2d 1184 and 116 Idaho 467, 
776 P.2d 829 (1988); Litchfield, supra. Furthermore, after the trial court has performed 
its own weighing of the evidence and review of the witnesses' credibility, it may set 
aside the verdict based upon its own independent evaluation of the evidence, even 
though there is substantial evidence to support the verdict. Litchfield, supra; Quick, 111 
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Idaho at 767,727 P.2d at 1195. It should be noted with regard to the determination on a 
motion for new trial, the trial court is not merely "authorized" to engage in this weighing 
process, but is obligated to do so. Litchfield, supra. In addition, on a motion for new 
trial, the trial court is not required to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party. Quick, 111 Idaho at 767, 727 P.2d at 1195. 
In the matter at issue it is clear the jury's award of economic damages and non-
economic damages are against the clear weight of the evidence, the ends of justice 
would be served by vacating the verdict, and it is highly probable a different result would 
follow retrial. In addition, defendants submit the awards by the jury establish the jury 
was influenced by passion and prejudice, or in the alternative, awarded damages based 
upon speculation or guesswork. Therefore, the grant of a new trial is proper in this 
matter. 
B. MOTION FOR AMENDMENT TO JUDGMENT FOR A REMITTITUR OF 
DAMAGES PURSUANT TO IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 59(e) and 
59.1. 
In the alternative to the foregoing argument in favor of a new trial, in the event 
this Court denies said motion for new trial, defendants respectfully submit an 
amendment to the judgment for a remittitur of damages is appropriate in accordance 
with Rules 59(e) and 59.1, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, reducing the amount of 
economic damages in this case to $244,847, or another amount deemed reasonable 
and appropriate by this Court, and non-economic damages to $682,200.65, or another 
amount deemed reasonable and appropriate by this Court. In accordance with said 
Rules, the Court may grant, as an alternative to a new trial, a remittitur of damages. See 
also, Quick, 111 Idaho at 770, 727 P.2d at 1198. The amount by which the trial judge 
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offers to reduce the damage award is a discretionary decision that is inexorably linked 
to the exercise of discretion in ruling on a new trial motion. Quick, supra. 
However, it is important to note a potential limitation to the alternative of an 
amendment and remittitur. Pursuant to the Idaho Supreme Court decision in Quick, 
supra, if the trial court concludes "the verdict was the result of passion or prejudice to 
such an extent that such passion or prejudice may have infected the jury's decision on 
liability as well as damages," then use of the remittitur as an alternative is improper. Id., 
111 Idaho at 770, 727 P.2d at 1198 (emphasis added). In such an instance, the trial 
court must order a new trial. Id. 
Defendants respectfully request this Court weigh the evidence and proceed 
through an analysis of damages in this case. Defendants request this Court compare 
its evaluation of economic and non-economic damages with the award of the jury. In 
addition, given the significant departure from the evidence presented at trial, defendants 
request the Court further review, in its discretion, whether the jury may have also been 
influenced by passion or prejudice in deciding the liability issues as well, in which case a 
new trial is the exclusive proper remedy. 
C. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT PURSUANT 
TO IDAHO RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 50(b). 
Defendants respectfully request this Court rule, as a matter of law, that Nathan 
Coonrod, M.D. was not negligent nor the proximate cause of decedent's death. 
Defendants submit the jury's finding that Nathan Coonrod, M.D. was negligent is against 
the clear weight of the evidence, and requires the Court to grant a judgment in favor of 
defendants notwithstanding the jury's verdict. 
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Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) governs a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, and reads, in pertinent part: 
A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict ... may 
be made whether or not a party moved for a directed 
verdict .... If a verdict was returned the court may allow 
the judgment to stand or may reopen the judgmeAt and 
either order a new trial or direct the entry of judgment. ... 
I.R.C.P. 50(b). Under Idaho law, the requisite standard on a judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict motion (hereinafter referred to as "JNOV motion") is whether substantial and 
competent evidence exists to support the jury's verdict after drawing all inferences in 
favor of the verdict. Horner v. Sani-Top, Inc., 143 Idaho 230,238, 141 P.3d 1099, 1107 
(2006). The party moving for a JNOV motion admits any adverse facts and the court 
makes all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id. at 233, 141 P.3d 
at 1102 (citing Ricketts v. E. Idaho Equipment. Co., Inc., 137 Idaho 578, 580, 51 P.3d 
392, 394 (2002». "A jury verdict must be upheld if there is evidence of sufficient quantity 
and probative value that reasonable minds could have reached a similar conclusion to 
that of the jury." Id. (citing Hudson v. Cobbs, 118 Idaho 474,478, 797 P.2d 1322, 1326 
(1990». 
In ruling on a JNOV motion the court has no discretion and must consider only 
the question of law whether there is sufficient evidence to raise a jury issue. Quick v. 
Crane, at 766, 727 P.2d at 1194. u[T]he trial court is not free to weigh the evidence or 
pass on the credibility of witnesses, making its own independent findings of fact and 
comparing them to the jury's findings, as would be the case in deciding a motion for a 
new trial." Smith v. Praegitzer, 113 Idaho at 890, 749 P.2d at 1015 (citing Quick v. 
Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 727 P.2d 1187 (1986». At the close of plaintiffs' case, 
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defendants moved for a judgment as a matter of law on the issue of whether Nathan 
Coonrod, M.D.'s conduct was negligent or the proximate cause of Maria Aguilar's death. 
Defendants now renew that motion, and request the Court rule, as a matter of law, that 
Dr. Coonrod was not negligent nor the proximate cause of the decedent's death. 
The basis for defendants' JNOV motion is the plaintiffs' failure to establish 
sufficient foundation for their expert witnesses, Paul Blaylock, M.D.'s and Samuel 
Lebaron, M.D.'s, testimony and opinions as to the local standard of care relating to 
Nathan Coonrod, M.D, and any breach of said standard of care, as required by Idaho 
Code Sections 6-1012 and 6-1013. Specifically, plaintiffs failed to establish that their 
expert witnesses possessed "actual knowledge" of the community standard of care 
applicable to Dr. Coonrod or that Dr. Coonrod failed to meet the local community 
standard of health care practice relating to the practice of family medicine in April, May 
and June, 2003. The relevant community, for purposes of the "community" standard of 
health care practice, is defined by Idaho Code § 6-1012 as the "geographical area 
ordinarily served by the licensed general hospital at or nearest to which such care was 
or allegedly should have been provided." I.C. § 6-1012. In the case at issue, the local 
community for which plaintiffs' expert witness must have actual knowledge of the 
standard of care is Nampa, Idaho. 
In order to introduce expert testimony in accordance with Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 
and 6-1013, plaintiffs must establish each expert witness possessed actual knowledge 
of the applicable standard of health care practice. In Strode v. Lenzi, 116 Idaho 214, 
215, 775 P.2d 106, 107 (1989), plaintiffs contended an out-of-state board-certified 
orthopedic surgeon was competent to testify regarding the standard of health care 
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practice of a similar specialist in the relevant community without first demonstrating the 
physician had "actual knowledge" of the local standard of health care practice. Id., 116 
Idaho at 215, 775 P.2d 106 at 107. The Idaho Supreme Court disagreed, and in 
affirming the trial court's dismissal of the action, ruled Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 6-
1013 require an expert outside the local community demonstrate he or she has "actual 
knowledge" of the local standard of health care practice. The Court wrote: 
[Plaintiffs'] argument that [physician expert witness] did not 
have to establish that he possessed "actual knowledge of 
the applicable .. , community standard" for [the particular 
specialty in the relevant community], because both he and 
[defendant] were certified by the American Academy of 
Orthopedic Surgeons contradict both Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 
and 6-1013, and the decisions of this Court which have been 
consistently applied to those statutes . 
... [I]n order to testify. a competent expert residing outside 
the applicable community must "adequately familiariz[e] 
himself with the standards and practices of (a particular) 
such area ... " Thus, an expert from outside the state must 
demonstrate that he possesses actual knowledge of the 
local community standard. If he is board-certified in the same 
specialty, he must, at a minimum, inquire of a local specialist 
to determine whether the community standard varies from 
the national standard for that board-certified specialty ... 
Id., 116 Idaho at 216,775 P.2d at 108 (citations omitted). 
Further, the Idaho Court of Appeals addressed the expert witness requirements 
in Kunz v. Miciak, 118 Idaho 130, 131, 795 P.2d 24, 25 (Ct. App. 1990), wherein it 
affirmed the District Court's order granting summary judgment for failure to meet the 
expert witness requirements of Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013. Id., 118 Idaho at 
131,795 P.2d at 25. In Kunz, the Court of Appeals wrote: 
[T]he statute requires the expert witness to possess 
"professional knowledge and expertise coupled with actual 
knowledge of the applicable said community standard ... " The 
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phrase "coupled with" denotes a contemporaneous 
relationship; awareness of the standard must exist when the 
expert testimony is given. If contemporaneous awareness 
is not demonstrated, the expert's testimony is subject to 
being excluded or stricken at trial '" 
lQ. (Emphasis added). 
In accordance with Kunz, if each of plaintiffs' designated expert witness(es) 
cannot demonstrate adequate professional knowledge and expertise, coupled with 
actual knowledge of the applicable standard of health care practice in the community 
during the relevant time period, said expert(s)' testimony is subject to being excluded at 
trial. Kunz, supra. 
The Idaho Supreme Court, in Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 211, 868 
P .2d 1224, 1227 (1994), cited the Strode opinion favorably, reinforcing the requirement 
that even if an expert witness testifies in a medical malpractice action that there is a 
national standard of health care practice, then the expert must be able to link the 
national standard to the local standard by inquiring of a local expert to verify there is no 
deviation from the national standard in the relevant community. Id. Defendants should 
be entitled to cross-examine plaintiffs' out-of-area expert witness(es) regarding whether 
or not such expert has actual knowledge of the local standard of health care practice, 
how he or she gained such actual knowledge and if his or her under understanding is 
consistent with the local practitioner's description and/or definition of the local standard 
of health care practice. Furthermore, pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-1012 a health care 
provider must be compared to a health care provider with similar training and in the 
same category or class, "taking into account his or her training, experience, and fields of 
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medical specialization." Evans v. Griswold, 129 Idaho 902, 905, 935 P.2d 165, 168 
(1997), citing I.C. § 6-1012. 
In the present case, plaintiffs' failed to prove their expert witnesses, Dr. Blaylock 
and Dr. Lebaron, possessed actual knowledge regarding the community standard of 
care for Nathan Coonrod, M.D. in Nampa, Idaho in April, May, and June 2003. Plaintiffs' 
experts only familiarized themselves regarding the community standard of care by 
consulting with Idaho physicians who practiced outside of the local community of 
Nampa, Idaho. Thus, plaintiffs failed to establish that their experts had "actual 
knowledge" of the standard of care for a physician practicing family medicine in Nampa, 
Idaho in April, May, and June, 2003 as required by Idaho Code Sections 6-1012 and 6-
1013. Therefore, defendants respectfully request this Court to grant their JNOV motion 
due to plaintiffs' failure to establish that their expert witnesses possessed actual 
knowledge of the applicable community standard of care for Dr. Coonrod in April, May, 
and June, 2003 in Nampa, Idaho. 
Moreover, in further support of their JNOV motion, defendants submit that the 
plaintiffs failed to prove the element of damages as required to sustain a medical 
negligence cause of action. As stated previously, supra, regarding lost household 
services, plaintiffs failed to prove actual costs or expenditures incurred by plaintiffs for 
household services. Defendants incorporate herein, in its entirety, the argument and 
analysis as contained in its motion for new trial relating to household services and the 
plaintiffs failure to provide any proof of actual costs for household services at trial. 
Plaintiffs have the burden of proving not only a right to damages, but also the 
amount of damages. Beare v. Stowes' Builders Supply, Inc., at 321, 658 P.2d at 992. 
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Since plaintiffs failed to prove the actual amount of damages for household services 
incurred by plaintiffs, plaintiffs have therefore failed to prove the damages element of 
their negligence action against defendants. Thus, this Court should grant defendants 
JNOV motion and grant a directed verdict to defendants. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of their arguments, supra, defendants respectfully request a new 
trial be granted due to the Court's refusal to allow defendants to present evidence through 
plaintiffs' expert witness, Paul Blaylock, M.D., regarding the non-party negligence of Dr. 
Long and Dr. Chai. Defendants also request a new trial on the basis the jury instruction 
regarding proximate cause is a misstatement of Idaho law. 
In addition, defendants request a new trial due to the Court's separate listing of 
plaintiffs individually, rather than collectively, for non-economic damages on the special 
verdict form. Moreover, defendants request a new trial because the award of economic 
and non-economic damages are excessive, appearing to have been given under the 
influence of passion or prejudice, with no supporting evidence in the trial record. 
In the alternative, if the Court denies defendants' motion for new trial, defendants 
respectfully request an amendment to the judgment for a remittitur of economic 
damages be entered, reducing the amount of economic damages in this case to 
$244,847, or another amount deemed reasonable and appropriate by this Court, and 
reducing the amount of non-economic damages in this case to $682,200.65, or another 
amount deemed reasonable and appropriate by this Court. 
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Furthermore, defendants respectfully request for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict because the evidence presented at trial was not of sufficient quantity and 
probative value that reasonable minds could have reached the same conclusion as the 
jury in the above-entitled case. 
DATED t~f May, 2009. 
TOLMAN & BRIZEE, P. 
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PRIMARY HEALTH CARE CENTER, an 
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DEFENDANTS NATHAN COONROD, 
M.D. AND PRIMARY HEALTH CARE 
CENTER'S OBJECTION TO THE 
JUDGMENT UPON THE VERDICT AND 
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND THE 
JUDGMENT TO APPLY THE 
STATUTORY CAP ON NON·ECONOMIC 
DAMAGES TO ALL PLAINTIFFS 
COLLECTIVEL Y 
COME NOW the defendants, Nathan Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care 
Center, by and through their attorney of record, Tolman & Brizee, P.C., and respectfully 
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object to this Court's Judgment entered upon the jury verdict dated May 20, 2009. The 
basis for Nathan Coonrod, M.D.'s and Primary Health Care Center's (hereinafter 
referred to as "defendants") objection is the Court entered judgment in contravention 
with the statutory language of Idaho Code Section 6-1603 regarding the application of 
the statutory non-economic damages cap to wrongful death cases. 
In addition, defendants respectfully move this Court, pursuant to Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 59(e), to alter or amend the judgment in the above-entitled case by 
reducing the non-economic damages portion of the judgment against defendants to 
$682,200.65, and to apply the non-economic damages cap, pursuant to Idaho Code 
Section 6-1603, to all listed plaintiffs collectively so there is only one non-economic 
damages award for all plaintiffs in the total amount of $682,200.65. The non-economic 
damages cap amount of $682,200.65 is the applicable statutory cap on non-economic 
damages at the time the above-entitled cause of action arose in June 2003. 
Defendants have submitted herewith their memorandum of law in support of this 
objection and motion, and incorporate herein, the law and fact contained within said 
memorandum to this objection and motion to alter or amend the judgment in 
accordance with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). 
Defendants request oral argument on their objection and motion. 
,e---
DATED thitl2.day of May, 2009. 
TOLMAN & BRIZE 
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JOSE AGUILAR, individually, as the 
Personal Representative of the Estate of 
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natural father and guardian of 
GUADALUPE MARIA AGUILAR, 
ALEJANDRO AGUILAR, and LORENA ZJ ORIGINAL 
AGUILAR, minors, and JOSE 
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NEWMAN, M.D., NATHAN COONROD, 
M.D., MITCHELL LONG, D.O., and 
PRIMARY HEALTH CARE CENTER, an 
Idaho corporation, JOHN and JANE 
DOES I through X, employees of one or 
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AMEND JUDGMENT FOR A 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) 
County of Twin Falls ) 
STEVEN K. TOLMAN, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am the attorney of record for defendants Nathan Coonrod, MD and 
Primary Health Care Center in the above matter and I make this affidavit based upon 
my own personal information, knowledge and belief in support of defendants' motion for 
new trial. 
2. I n reference to the Court's refusal to allow defendants to present evidence 
through plaintiffs' expert witness, Paul Blaylock, M.D., regarding the non-party 
negligence of Dr. Long and Dr. Chai constituting an abuse of discretion and an error in 
law which prevented defendants from having a fair trial, I proffer the following particular 
and detailed facts relied upon in support of defendants' motion for new trial. 
a. Plaintiffs designated in their initial expert disclosure Dr. Blaylock as 
an expert witness to be called at trial to testify pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure (IRCP) 26(b)(4). Thereafter, plaintiffs 
designated Dr. Blaylock as an expert witness to be called at trial to 
testify in accordance with IRCP 26(b)(4) in their supplemental 
expert disclosure, second supplemental expert disclosure, third 
supplemental expert disclosure, sixth supplemental expert 
disclosure, seventh supplemental expert disclosure, eighth 
supplemental expert disclosure, ninth supplemental expert 
disclosure, rebuttal expert disclosure, and supplemental rebuttal 
expert disclosure. 
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b. At no time did plaintiffs de-designate or withdraw Dr. Blaylock as an 
expert witness to be called at trial. In plaintiffs' expert disclosure, 
and subsequent supplemental expert disclosures, regarding Dr. 
Blaylock, plaintiffs provided Dr. Blaylock's opinions and related 
reports relating to the present case. In formulating his opinions and 
related reports, Dr. Blaylock familiarized himself with the applicable 
community standard of care relating to Nathan Coonrod, M.D. 
Defendants also deposed Dr. Blaylock. Accordingly, Dr. Blaylock 
was a testifying witness pursuant to IRCP 26. 
c. Defendants always reserved and maintained the right to examine 
plaintiffs' expert witnesses, including Dr. Blaylock, either on direct 
examination or cross-examination to establish their defense. The 
following documents, and responses contained therein, are specific 
examples of defendants' notice to plaintiffs of defendants' intent to 
use plaintiffs' witnesses, including expert witnesses, as well as 
using plaintiffs' witnesses' reports and depositions at trial: 
i. Primary Health Care Center's answers to plaintiffs' 
first set of interrogatories and requests for production 
of documents, answers to interrogatory #1 and #2; 
ii. Primary Health Care Center's supplemental answers 
to plaintiffs' first set of interrogatories and requests for 
production of documents, answers to interrogatory #2, 
#3, #5, #16, #18, and #19; 
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iii. Primary Health Care Center's answers to plaintiffs' 
second set of interrogatories and requests for 
production of documents, request for production #20; 
iv. Primary Health Care Center's supplemental answers 
to plaintiffs' second set of interrogatories and requests 
for production of documents, answers to interrogatory 
#20, #21, and #22; 
v. Nathan Coonrod, M.D.'s supplemental answers to 
plaintiffs' first set of interrogatories and requests for 
production of documents, answers to interrogatory #2, 
#3, #5, #17, #19, and #20; 
vi. Nathan Coonrod, M.D.'s answers to plaintiffs' second 
set of interrogatories and requests for production of 
documents, request for production #20; 
vii. Nathan Coonrod, M.D.'s supplemental answers to 
plaintiffs' second set of interrogatories and requests 
for production of documents, answers to interrogatory 
#21, #22, and #23. 
d. In addition, defendants' supplemental answer to interrogatory 
number five (5) to plaintiffs' first set of interrogatories and requests 
for production of documents specifically states "[t1o the extent any 
other defendant in this action is dismissed prior to trial, this 
defendant reserves the right to call or cross-examine plaintiffs' 
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expert witnesses at trial." Defendant Nathan Coonrod, M.D.'s 
Supplemental Answers and Responses to Plaintiffs' First Set of 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents, p. 10. 
e. The Court allowed defendants to make an offer of proof regarding 
the testimony of Dr. Blaylock pertaining to his familiarity with the 
standard of care and opinion relating to the negligence of the non-
parties, but the Court did not permit such testimony to come before 
the jury. 
3. In reference to the Court's jury instruction with regard to the proximate 
cause element of plaintiffs' cause of action constituting an error in law and which 
prevented defendants from having a fair trial, I proffer the following particular and 
detailed facts relied upon in support of defendants' motion for new trial. 
a. The Court's Jury Instruction No. 23, which was read to the jury, 
states: 
When I use the expression "proximate cause," 
I mean a cause that, in natural or probable 
sequence, produced the injury, the loss or the 
damage complained of. It need not be the only 
cause. It is sufficient if it is a substantial factor 
in bringing about the injury, loss or damage. 
There may be one or more proximate causes 
of an injury. When the negligent conduct of 
two or more persons or entities contributes 
concurrently as substantial factors in bringing 
about an injury, the conduct of each may be a 
proximate cause of the injury regardless of the 
extent to which each contributes to the injury. 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS NATHAN COONROD AND PRIMARY HEALTH CARE 
CENTER'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT 
FOR A REMITTITUR OF DAMAGES, AND MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT, PAGE 5 
b. IDJI.2d 2.30.2 - Proximate cause - "substantial factor," without "but 
for" test pattern instruction reads as follows: 
When I use the expression "proximate cause," I 
mean a cause that, in natural or probable 
sequence, produced the injury, the loss or the 
damage complained of. It need not be the only 
cause. It is sufficient if it is a substantial factor 
in bringing about the injury, loss or damage. It 
is not a proximate cause if the injury loss or 
damage likely would have occurred anyway. 
There may be one or more proximate causes 
of an injury. When the negligent conduct of two 
or more persons or entities contributes 
concurrently as substantial factors in bringing 
about an injury, the conduct of each may be a 
proximate cause of the injury regardless of the 
extent to which each contributes to the injury. 
c. IDJI.2d 2.30.1 - Proximate cause - "but for" test reads as follows: 
When I use the expression "proximate cause," 
I mean a cause which, in natural or probable 
sequence, produced the complained injury, 
loss or damage, and but for that cause the 
damage would not have occurred. It need not 
be the only cause. It is sufficient if it is a 
substantial factor in bringing about the injury, 
loss or damage. It is not a proximate cause if 
the injury, loss or damage likely would have 
occurred anyway. 
[There may be one or more proximate causes 
of injury. When the negligent conduct of two or 
more persons or entities contribute 
concurrently as substantial factors in bringing 
about an injury, the conduct of each may be a 
proximate cause of the injury regardless of the 
extent to which each contributes to the injury.] 
d. Defendants' proposed jury instruction number 18 reads as follows: 
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When I use the expression "proximate cause," I 
mean a cause which, in natural or probable 
sequence, produced the injury, the loss or the 
damage complained of. It need not be the only 
cause. It is sufficient if it is a substantial factor 
in bringing about the injury, loss or damage. It 
is not a proximate cause if the injury, loss or 
damage likely would have occurred anyway. 
There may be one or more proximate causes of 
an injury. 
Plaintiff must prove proximate cause by expert 
testimony, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
and to a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty. 
e. The decedent, Maria Aguilar visited Nathan Coonrod, M.D. in April, 
May, and June 2003. 
f. Plaintiffs allege Nathan Coonrod, M.D.'s failure to diagnose a 
pulmonary embolism was the cause of death. 
g. Nathan Coonrod, M.D.'s defense (and Primary Health Care 
Center's defense) is his failure to diagnose Mrs. Aguilar's 
pulmonary embolism was not a violation of the local standard of 
health care. 
h. The present case involves only a single cause-plaintiffs' allegation 
that Nathan Coonrod, M.D. failed to diagnose a pulmonary 
embolism-and therefore, the jury should have been instructed 
concerning the "but for" test for proximate causation. 
4. In reference to the Court's separate listing of plaintiffs individually, rather 
than collectively, for non-economic damages on the special verdict form constituting an 
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error in law and which prevented defendants from having a fair trial, I proffer the 
following particular and detailed facts relied upon in support of defendants' motion for 
new trial. 
a. The Comments section for IDJI.2d 1.43.1 - Example verdict on 
special interrogatories reads as follows: 
This form is included only as an example, and 
may be modified as needed to meet the 
specific issues of a given case. The committee 
recommends separate damage allocations be 
no more numerous than between economic 
and non-economic damages. In the court's 
discretion the liability questions may be split 
between negligence and proximate cause. 
b. The Court had four different special verdict forms to choose from, 
which were categorized as Jury Instruction No. 29-Alt-1, Jury 
Instruction No. 29-Alt-2, Jury Instruction No. 29-Alt-3, and Jury 
Instruction No. 29-Alt-4. 
c. The Court marked defendants' proposed special verdict form as 
Jury Instruction No. 29-Alt-3, which had one line item for an 
economic damages award to plaintiffs collectively and one line item 
for a non-economic damages award to plaintiffs collectively. 
d. The Court used Jury Instruction No. 29-Alt-4 for its special verdict 
form, and which the jury used to render its verdict. The special 
verdict form had one line item for an economic damages award to 
plaintiffs collectively, but deviated from defendants' proposed 
special verdict form by listing a non-economic damages award to 
each plaintiff individually. 
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5. In reference to the award of economic damages being excessive, 
appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice, with no 
supporting evidence in the trial record, I proffer the following particular and detailed 
facts relied upon in support of defendants' motion for new trial. 
a. The jury awarded economic damages to plaintiffs in the amount of 
$700,000. 
b. Plaintiffs' exhibits depicted economic damages in the total amount 
of $652,759 in the lower bound and $704,417 in the upper bound of 
damages. See Plaintiffs' Exhibits 18 and 19. 
c. Plaintiffs relied upon the testimony and calculations of its expert 
witness, Cornelius Hofman, who testified that economic damages 
to plaintiffs consisted of lost past wages of $83,492 in both the 
lower and higher bound of calculations, and lost future wages of 
$153,345 in the lower bound and $165,772 in the higher bound. 
See Plaintiffs' Exhibits 18 and 19. Based upon these calculations, 
Mr. Hofman testified that the total lost financial wages (or support) 
sustained by plaintiffs was $236,837 in the lower bound and 
$249,264 in the higher bound. See Plaintiffs' Exhibits 18 and 19. 
d. Plaintiffs' expert witness, Cornelius Hofman, testified that the 
plaintiffs suffered a total loss in household services of $415,922 in 
the lower bound and $455,153 in the higher bound. See Plaintiffs' 
Exhibits 18 and 19. 
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e. Plaintiffs' expert, Cornelius Hofman, added the estimated economic 
loss of household services to the total lost financial wages of 
$236,837 (lower bound) and $249,264 (higher bound) for the total 
economic loss of $652,759 in the lower bound and $704,417 in the 
upper bound of damages. See Plaintiffs' Exhibits 18 and 19. 
f. Other than Mr. Hofman's opinions and calculations relating to the 
economic effect of lost household services, plaintiffs did not provide 
any evidence pertaining to actual or incurred financial or economic 
loss sustained by the plaintiffs in relation to household services. 
g. Plaintiffs only produced evidence of economic damages in the total 
amount of $244,847 in the lower bound or $284,078 in the higher 
bound ($700,000 economic damages jury award minus either 
$415,922 in the lower bound or $455,153 in the higher bound of 
estimated lost household services, respectively). 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NAUGH 
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ANDREW CHAI, M.D., STEVEN R. 
NEWMAN, M.D., NATHAN COONROD, 
M.D., MITCHELL LONG, D.O., and 
PRIMARY HEALTH CARE CENTER, an 
Idaho corporation, JOHN and JANE 
DOES I through X, employees of one or 
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DEFENDANTS NATHAN COONROD, 
M.D. AND PRIMARY HEALTH CARE 
CENTER'S MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF THEIR OBJECTION TO 
THE JUDGMENT UPON THE VERDICT 
AND MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND 
THE JUDGMENT TO APPLY THE 
STATUTORY CAP ON NON-ECONOMIC 
DAMAGES TO ALL PLAINTIFFS 
COLLECTIVEL Y 
COME NOW the defendants Nathan Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care 
Center by and through their attorney of record, Tolman & Brizee, P.C., and respectfully 
submit this Memorandum in Support of their Objection to the Judgment upon the Verdict 
and Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment. 
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Nathan Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care Center (hereinafter referred to as 
"defendants") respectfully object to this Court's Judgment entered upon the jury verdict 
dated May 20, 2009. Defendants object to the Court's entry of judgment upon the 
verdict because it contravenes the statutory language of Idaho Code Section 6-1603 
regarding the application of the statutory non-economic damages cap to wrongful death 
cases. In addition, defendants request this Court, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 59(e), to alter or amend the judgment by reducing the non-economic damages 
portion of the judgment against defendants to $682,200.65. 
Specifically, defendants request this Court to apply the statutory non-economic 
damages cap, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 6-1603, to all listed plaintiffs collectively so 
there is only one non-economic damages award for all plaintiffs in the amount of 
$682,200.65. Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 6-1603, the applicable non-economic 
damages cap amount is $682,200.65-the applicable non-economic damages cap at 
the time the above-entitled cause of action arose in June 2003. 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
A. WHETHER THE APPLICABLE STATUTORY NON·ECONOMIC DAMAGES 
CAP APPLIES COLLECTIVELY OR INDIVIDUALLY TO THE FIVE 
PLAINTIFFS, AND WHETHER THEIR COLLECTIVE NON·ECONOMIC 
DAMAGES CAP IS A COMBINED $682,200.65 OR $3,500,000. 
Defendants respectfully submit that a Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment, 
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) is appropriate in the above-entitled case 
in order to correctly calculate the non-economic damages award rendered by the jury 
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against the defendants. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as "IRCP") 
59 (e) functions as a means to circumvent an appeal by providing the trial court a 
mechanism to correct legal and factual errors occurring in proceedings before it. 
Slaathaug v. Allstate Insurance Company, 132 Idaho 705, 707, 979 P.2d 107, 109 
(1999). 
As the Court is aware, plaintiffs initiated a wrongful death cause of action against 
defendants alleging negligence and medical malpractice. After a jury trial, the jury 
rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs and against defendants, and which verdict 
included both economic and non-economic damages. The jury apportioned $700,000 in 
economic damages in favor of the plaintiffs collectively; however, the jury awarded 
$3,500,000 in non-economic damages separately and individually to each listed plaintiff 
in the wrongful death cause of action. On May 20, 2009, this Court entered judgment 
upon the verdict in favor of the plaintiffs. Defendants object to the Court's entry of 
judgment upon the verdict because it contravenes the statutory language of Idaho Code 
Section 6-1603 regarding the application of the statutory non-economic damages cap to 
wrongful death cases. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 6-1603 (hereinafter referred to as I.C. § 6-1603), 
this Court must determine whether the total non-economic damages award for the 
plaintiffs exceeds the statutory cap for non-economic damages after a jury has properly 
apportioned liability at the conclusion of a trial. Horner v. Sani-Top, Inc., 143 Idaho 230, 
235, 141 P.3d 1099, 1104 (2006). The Court must reduce the defendant's responsibility 
on a proportional basis, based upon the jury's allocation of fault, so the plaintiffs' total 
judgment does not exceed the statutory cap on non-economic damages. See I.C. 6-
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1603. Defendants respectfully aver that the statutory cap on non-economic damages 
applies in the present case. Moreover, defendants assert that the plaintiffs in this 
wrongful death case constitute a single plaintiff within the meaning of I.C. § 6-1603. 
Therefore, defendants respectfully request this Court apply the statutory non-economic 
damages cap, pursuant to I.C. § 6-1603, to all listed plaintiffs collectively so there is only 
one non-economic damages award for all plaintiffs. 
I n order to correctly apply the non-economic damages cap to the above-entitled 
case, the Court must analyze both the wrongful death and the limitation on non-economic 
damages statutes together. Idaho Code Section 5-311 (hereinafter referred to as I.C. § 5-
311) relating to wrongful death causes of action reads, in pertinent part: 
(1) When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act 
or neglect of another, his or her heirs or personal 
representatives on their behalf may maintain an action for 
damages against the person causing the death ... whether 
the wrongdoer dies before or after the death of the person 
injured. 
I.C. § 5-311 (emphasis added). The applicable version of I.C. § 6-1603 pertaining to the 
limitation or statutory cap on non-economic damages states, in relevant part: 
(1) In no action seeking damages for personal injury, 
including death, shall a judgment for noneconomic 
damages . be entered for a claimant exceeding the 
maximum amount of four hundred thousand dollars 
($400,000); provided, however, that beginning on July 1, 
1988, and each July 1 thereafter, the cap on noneconomic 
damages established in this section shall increase or 
decrease in accordance with the percentage amount of 
increase or decrease by which the Idaho industrial 
commission adjusts the average annual wage as computed 
pursuant to section 72-409(2), Idaho Code. 
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(2) The limitation contained in this section applies to the 
sum of: (a) noneconomic damages sustained by a claimant 
who incurred personal injury or who is asserting a wrongful 
death; (b) noneconomic damages sustained by a claimant, 
regardless of the number of persons responsible for the 
damages or the number of actions filed. 
I.C. § 6-1603 (2003) (emphasis added). The interpretation of a statute is a question of 
law. Kelso & Irwin, PA v. State Ins. Fund, 134 Idaho 130, 134, 997 P.2d 591 (2000). 
However, ambiguity is not established merely because the parties present differing 
interpretations to the court. Rim View Trout Co. v. Higginson, 121 Idaho 819, 823, 828 
P.2d 848 (1992). Statutory interpretation begins with the literal language of the statute. 
0& M Country Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Romriell, 138 Idaho 160,164-65,59 P.3d 
965 (2002). If a statute is unambiguous, statutory construction is unnecessary and 
courts are free to apply the plain meaning of the statute. Martin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 244, 246, 61 P.3d 601 (2002) ('The starting point for any statutory 
interpretation is the literal wording of the statute, and the court will give the statute's 
language its plain, obvious and rational meaning"). 
Defendants assert that the language of I.C. § 6-1603 in 2003 is unambiguous 
and the Court should give the statutory language its plain, obvious and rational 
meaning. In an action seeking damages in wrongful death, I.C. § 6-1603(2) applies the 
non-economic damages cap of $682,200.65 (the 2003 cap of $400,000 plus the 
increase by which the Idaho industrial commission adjusts the average annual wage as 
computed pursuant to section' 72-409(2), Idaho Code) collectively regardless of the 
"number of actions filed." Whether five plaintiffs file a collective wrongful death suit as 
the Aguilar family did in the present case or whether five plaintiffs filed five individual 
DEFENDANTS NATHAN COONROD, M.D. AND PRIMARY HEALTH CARE CENTER'S 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THEIR OBJECTION TO THE JUDGMENT UPON THE VERDICT 
AND MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND THE JUDGMENT TO APPLY THE STATUTORY CAP ON NON-
ECONOMIC DAMAGES TO ALL PLAINTIFFS COLLECTIVELY, PAGE 5 
and separate wrongful death actions, does not change the legal conclusion that I.C. § 6-
1603(2) applies the total $682,200.65 non-economic damages cap for a wrongful death 
action to all plaintiffs collectively. The language of I.C. § 6-1603 is unambiguous. 
However, if the Court determines that I. C. § 6-1603 is ambiguous, the Court shall 
still apply the non-economic damages cap in I.C. § 6-1603 collectively to all plaintiffs, 
rather than to each individual plaintiff. "A statute is ambiguous where the language is 
capable of more than one reasonable construction." Inama v. Boise County, 138 Idaho 
324, 329, 63 P.3d 450, 455 (2003). "If the statute is ambiguous, then it must be 
construed to mean what the legislature intended for it to mean." Id. In order to 
determine the intent of the legislature, the courts examine not only the literal words of 
the statute, "but also the reasonableness of proposed constructions, the public policy 
behind the statute, and its legislative history." Id. 
Idaho Code Section 6-1603 does not define the term "claimant." I.C. § 6-1603. In 
addition, under the wrongful death statute, the heirs or personal representatives on behalf 
of the heirs may sue for damages for the wrongful death of the decedent. I.C. § 5-311. But, 
in wrongful death cases, the heirs or personal representatives on behalf of the heirs may 
only "maintain an action" against the person causing the death of the decedent. Id. 
(emphasis added). Therefore, the term "claimant" in I.C. § 6-1603 is ambiguous when 
considered in the context of a wrongful death action. 
In Kirkland v. Blaine County Medical Center, 134 Idaho 464, 4 P.3d 1115 (2000), 
in affirming the constitutionality of I.C. § 6-1603, the Idaho Supreme Court examined the 
legislative history behind I.C. § 6-1603. The Idaho Supreme Court stated that the 
legislative history of I.C. § 6-1603 revealed that the Idaho Legislature passed I.C. § 6-
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1603 "as part of a larger legislative package aimed at addressing concerns that large 
civil jUry verdicts were driving UP the cost of liability insurance." Kirkland v. Blaine 
County Medical Center, 134 Idaho 464, 470, 4 P.3d 1115, 1121 (2000) (emphasis 
added). The Supreme Court also stated: 
As part of the bill which included I.C. § 6-1603, the 
legislature also included reforms to the liability insurance 
business so Idaho policyholders would have more control 
over the prices and conditions of liability insurance; 
legislation designed to encourage settlements by giving 
defendants additional incentive to settle and by giving the 
courts greater latitude to impose sanctions on those brining 
frivolous lawsuits; and some limitations on the application of 
joint and several liability. 
Id. (See Act of April 1 , 1987, ch. 278, 1987 Idaho Session Laws 571). Furthermore, U[b]y 
striking this balance between a tort victim's right to recover noneconomic damages and 
society's interest in preserving the availability of affordable liability insurance, the 
legislature 'is engaging in its fundamental and legitimate role of structuring and 
accommodating the burdens and benefits of economic life.'" Id. (quoting Patton v. TIC 
United Corp., 77 F.3d 1235,1247 (10th Cir. 1996». 
In addition, "[wh]en the [I]egislature passes a statute, it is presumed to be aware 
of existing statutes." Worley Highway Dist. v. Kootenai County, 104 Idaho 833,839,663 
P.2d 1135, 1141 (Ct. App. 1983) (citing First American Title Co. of Idaho, Inc. v. Clark, 
99 Idaho 10, 576 P.2d 581 (1978». At the time the Idaho Legislature enacted I.C. § 6-
1603, it was aware that the wrongful death statute (I.C. § 5-311) identifies those 
persons entitled to sue and recover damages for a wrongful death, namely heirs and 
personal representatives, and that such heirs or the heirs' personal representatives may 
maintain an action for damages against the person causing the death. See I.C. § 5-311. 
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Specifically, Idaho's wrongful death statute provides that anyone plaintiff (Le. anyone 
of the decedent's heirs or heirs' personal representatives) can initiate and maintain a 
wrongful death cause of action and recover such damages without the joinder of any 
other person entitled to maintain such lawsuit or recover such damages. I.C. § 5-311. 
Consequently, knowing that the wrongful death statute creates a cause of action 
enforceable by one or more persons (Le. one or more heirs of the decedent), the Idaho 
Legislature has declined thus far to increase the non-economic damages cap where 
more than one person, or "claimant," brings a wrongful death cause of action. See I.C. § 
6-1603. 
Moreover, in interpreting the plain statutory language of I.C. § 6-1603, the Idaho 
Supreme Court held that the language "regardless of the number of persons 
responsible for the damages or the number of actions filed" located within I.C. § 6-
1603(2) simply means that "regardless of how many defendants are listed on the verdict 
form or how many actions the plaintiff brings to collect damages, ultimately, a judgment 
cannot be entered in favor of 'a claimant' that exceeds the amount of the statutory cap." 
Horner v. Sani-Top. Inc., 143 Idaho at 234-235, 141 P.3d at 1103-1104 (emphasis 
added). Therefore, in reading I.C. § 5-311 and I.C. § 6-1603 together, it is necessary to 
conclude that "heirs or personal representatives on their behalf' are "a claimant" for 
purposes of applying the non-economic damages cap to a wrongful death cause of 
action. As such, in a wrongful death cause of action, multiple plaintiffs are subject to 
one non-economic damages cap collectively, rather than individually, because they are 
"a claimant" as defined by I.C. § 6-1603. 
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Furthermore, the application of the non-economic damages cap to each 
individual and separate plaintiff in a wrongful death cause of action does not further nor 
comport with the stated legislative goal of addressing concerns of large civil jury 
verdicts driving up the cost of liability insurance. In fact if this Court adopts plaintiffs' 
argument that the non-economic damages cap applied to each plaintiff separately and 
individually, and carried the plaintiffs' reasoning to its logical conclusion, then such 
reasoning would suggest that a decedent with ten (10) siblings and two (2) parents 
could possibly have a total cap of $8,186,407.80 (applying pre-July 1, 2003 cap of 
$682,200.65), while a decedent with one (1) parent and no siblings would be limited to a 
recovery of only $682,200.65 (pre-July 1, 2003 cap). 
Such a paradoxical effect does not comport with the Idaho Legislature's clear 
intent to limit the non-economic damages to the statutory cap regardless of the "number 
of actions filed." As stated previously, whether five plaintiffs file a collective wrongful 
death suit as the Aguilar family did in the present case or whether five plaintiffs filed five 
individual and separate wrongful death actions, does not change the legal conclusion 
that I.C. § 6-1603(2) applies the total $682,200.65 non-economic damages cap for a 
wrongful death action to all plaintiffs collectively. Therefore, defendants respectfully 
submit that this Court must apply the applicable non-economic damages cap to the 
plaintiffs collectively, and not individually. If the Court concluded otherwise, then such a 
determination would strip the purpose and policy from the Idaho Legislature's intent of 
limiting the cost of liability insurance. 
Other jurisdictions that have analyzed this issue have ruled in favor of 
defendants' position that the non-economic damages cap applies to plaintiffs 
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collectively, and not to each individual plaintiff. In Yates v. Pollock, 194 Cal.App.3d 195, 
239 Cal. Rptr. 383 (Ca.App.2nd.Dist. 1987), the California Court of Appeal, Second 
District, Division 2, held that the relevant statutory cap on non-economic damages 
applied to a medical malpractice wrongful death case and applied the non-economic 
damages cap to the multiple plaintiffs in the aggregate, rather than individually. Yates v. 
Pollock, 194 Cal.App.3d 195, 239 Cal.Rptr. 383 (Ca.App.2nd.Dist. 1987). The California 
court reviewed the respective statute pertaining to the non-economic damages cap, 
which is similar to I.C. § 6-1603, which states in relevant part: 
(a) In any action for injury against a health care provider 
based on professional negligence, the injured plaintiff shall 
be entitled to recover noneconomic losses to compensate 
for pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, 
disfigurement and other nonpecuniary damages. 
(b) In no action shall the amount of damages for 
noneconomic losses exceed two hundred fifty thousand 
dollars ($250,000). 
(c) For the purposes of this section: ... (2) 'Professional 
negligence' means a negligent act or omission to act by a 
health care provider in the rendering of professional 
services, which act or omission is the proximate cause of a 
personal injury or wrongful death .... 
19.., 194 Cal.App.3d at 198-199, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 384-385 (emphasis part of original). 
The California court held that the legislative intent of the relevant statute was 
unambiguous on its face and that the plain language of the statute unequivocably 
manifests a desire to place a $250,000 cap on awards for non-economic damages in all 
medical malpractice litigation including wrongful death cases. Id., 194 Cal.App.3d at 
199, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 385. 
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In Yates v. Pollock, the plaintiffs argued that the non-economic damages cap 
applied to each plaintiff individually and not to all plaintiffs in the aggregate. Id., 194 
CaLApp.3d at 200, 239 CaLRptr. at 386. The California court rejected this argument by 
stating, "it is evident from the terms of the statute that while each plaintiff is entitled to 
seek noneconomic damages, the maximum recovery permitted in any single medical 
malpractice action is $250,000, regardless of the number of plaintiffs involved." Id. 
(emphasis part of original). The Yates court continued by holding: 
Since the Legislature was obviously aware that case 
precedent has consistently held 'only one action [can] be 
brought for the wrongful death of a person thereby 
preventing multiple actions by individual heirs and the 
personal representative' and that 'the cause of action for 
wrongful death has been consistently characterized as a 
joint one, a single one and an indivisible one ... ," we can 
but conclude its use of the word 'action' in [the applicable 
non-economic damages statute] represents its conscious 
decision to limit the total recovery for noneconomic loss in 
such suits to $250,000. 
Id., 194 CaLApp.3d at 200-201, 239 CaLRptr. at 386 (emphasis part of the original). 
Thus, based upon the analysis, supra, the California court ruled that multiple plaintiffs 
were considered to be one plaintiff collectively for purposes of applying California's 
statutory non-economic damages cap in a wrongful death case. 
In Cook v. Newman, M.D., 142 S.W.3d 880 (Mo.App. W.O. 2004), the Missouri 
Court of Appeals for the Western District held, in a wrongful death case, that decedent's 
surviving husband and two children were entitled to recover damages, they were 
considered to be· one plaintiff for purposes of applying Missouri's statutory non-
economic damages cap. Cook v. Newman. M.D., 142 S.W.3d 880, 888 (Mo.App. W.O. 
DEFENDANTS NATHAN COONROD, M.D. AND PRIMARY HEALTH CARE CENTER'S 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THEIR OBJECTION TO THE JUDGMENT UPON THE VERDICT 
AND MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND THE JUDGMENT TO APPLY THE STATUTORY CAP ON NON-
ECONOMIC DAMAGES TO ALL PLAINTIFFS COLLECTIVELY, PAGE 11 
2004). The Missouri court reviewed the respective statute pertaining to the non-
economic damages cap, which is similar to I.C. § 6-1603, and states in relevant part: 
In any action against a health care provider for damages for 
personal injury or death arising out of the rendering of or the 
failure to render health care seNices, no plaintiff shall 
recover . . . for noneconomic damages from anyone 
defendant .... 
lQ. at 887 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The applicable Missouri statute did not 
define the term "plaintiff' and the Missouri court determined ambiguity existed for the 
term "plaintiff' in the context of a wrongful death action because the Missouri wrongful 
death statute only permitted one action for wrongful death against anyone defendant. 
Id. Also, the Missouri wrongful death statute permitted the sUNiving spouse, children, 
parents, or others named in the statute to sue for damages for the wrongful death of a 
decedent. Id. 
The Missouri court examined the legislative history for the non-economic 
damages cap statute due to the ambiguity, and determined that the legislature intended 
"to impose a specific limitation on tort claims against health care providers to temper the 
high cost of health care." lQ. (citing Burns v. Elk River Ambulance, Inc., 55 S.W.3d 466, 
486 (Mo.App. S.D. 2001)). In interpreting and analyzing the wrongful death and non-
economic damages cap statutes together, the Missouri court quoted its Supreme Court, 
which said: "The wrongful death statute creates but one indivisible cause of action 
which remains the same whether enforceable by the sUNiving spouse, by the minor 
child or children, or by the others named in the statute. Id. at 888 (quoting Nelms v. 
Bright, 299 S.W.2d 483, 487 (Mo. banc 1957). 
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The Missouri court also reasoned that even though the Missouri legislature knew 
that the wrongful death statute created an indivisible cause of action enforceable by one 
or more persons, the legislature decided not to increase the non-economic damages 
cap where more than one person brings a wrongful death action. lQ.. Additionally, the 
Missouri Court of Appeals stated: 
If Plaintiffs argument [that two caps should have been 
applied] is accepted, a widow could sue for her husband's 
wrongful death and recover a separate cap for herself and 
each of the couple's six children. This interpretation does 
not further the legislative goal of harnessing increasing 
health care costs .... 
lib, (quoting Burns v. Elk River Ambulance, Inc., 55 S.W.3d 466, 486-487 (Mo.App. S.D. 
2001». Therefore, based upon the analysis, supra, the Missouri Court of Appeals ruled 
that multiple plaintiffs were considered to be one plaintiff for purposes of applying 
Missouri's statutory non-economic damages cap in a wrongful death case. 
In Mitson v. AG Engineering and Development Co., Inc., 835 F.Supp. 572 
(D.Colo. 1993), the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, in a wrongful 
death case, ruled that the relevant non-economic damages cap applied to the 
decedent's widow and two daughters collectively and the number of plaintiffs bringing a 
single wrongful death action does not increase the applicable statutory cap on non-
economic damages. Mitson v. AG Engineering and Development Co., Inc., 835 F.Supp 
572 (D.Colo. 1993). In Mitson, each plaintiff (three in all) sought to recover non-
economic damages in the amount of $250,000 for the wrongful death of the decedent-
for a total non-economic damages award of $750,000. Id. The sole issue presented to 
the Mitson court was whether the applicable statutory cap on non-economic damages 
applied to wrongful death plaintiffs on an individual or collective basis. Id. 
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The Mitson court reviewed Colorado's statutes pertaining to wrongful death 
causes of action and the cap on non-economic damages awards. Id. Colorado's 
wrongful death statute, states in relevant part: 
All damages . . . shall be sued for and recovered by the 
same parties ... and every such action the jury may give 
such damages as they deem fair and just . . . including 
damages for noneconomic loss ... There shall be only one 
civil action under [this wrongful death statute] . . . for 
recovery of damages for the wrongful death of anyone 
decedent. Notwithstanding anything in this section or [in the 
applicable statute for a cap on non-economic damages] to 
the contrary, there shall be no recovery under [the wrongful 
statute] for noneconomic loss ... in excess of two hundred 
fifty thousand dollars. 
Id. (emphasis added). Colorado's cap on non-economic damages statute, states in 
relevant part: 
. . (3)(a) In any civil action in which damages for 
noneconomic loss or injury may be awarded, the total of 
such damages shall not exceed the sum of two hundred 
fifty thousand dollar (sic), unless the court finds justification 
by clear and convincing evidence therefor. In no case shall 
the amount of such damages exceed five hundred 
thousand dollars. 
Id. The Mitson court concluded that the statutory provisions limited non-economic 
damages to a total of $250,000 for a single wrongful death claim in "only one civil 
action", but determined that the statutes were silent in regards to whether the statutory 
cap on non-economic damages applied to each plaintiff individually, or to all plaintiffs 
collectively. 
The Mitson court analyzed the legislative intent when construing the statutes by 
interpreting the plain and ordinary meaning of the language used within the statutes. Id. 
The court held that the two statutes read together cap non-economic recovery in one 
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civil action (Le. a wrongful death action) and that U[i]f the Colorado General Assembly 
intended that the statutory cap be applicable to each individual plaintiff, it could have 
explicitly said so. It is not for the courts to supply this missing language absent evidence 
of the legislature's intent that it be there." Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis part of 
original). 
I n addition, the Mitson court reviewed the legislative history of the applicable 
statutes, which stated: 
There have been some misunderstandings as to whether 
multiple actions could be brought based on the death of 
one person. It is the Colorado case law as interpreted by 
the courts that only one action can be brought for the 
wrongful death of anyone decedent, and based on some of 
the misunderstanding, [the legislator] felt it was necessary 
to put that into the statute to codify the rule. And you see 
the ... floor amendment which says that for the wrongful 
death of any person there may only be one action and one 
recovery and not multiple actions by multiple survivors .... 
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis part of original). Therefore, the Mitson court ruled that 
Ua wrongful death action lies first and foremost in the spouse, who may join at her 
election, heir or heirs of the deceased. The judgment's amount does not very by the 
number of plaintiffs entitled to share in the proceeds." Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). Thus, based upon the analysis, supra, the United States District Court for the 
District of Colorado held that multiple plaintiffs were considered to be one plaintiff 
collectively, and not individual plaintiffs, for purposes of applying Colorado's statutory 
non-economic damages cap in a wrongful death case. 
Therefore, based upon the preceding analysis and reasoning, supra, defendants 
respectfully submit to this Court that the statutory non-economic damages cap located 
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in I.C. § 6-1603 applies to the five listed plaintiffs of the Aguilar family collectively, and 
not on an individual basis, in the present wrongful death cause of action. Moreover, 
since the wrongful death cause of action arose in June 2003, pursuant to Idaho Code 
Section 6-1603, the applicable non-economic damages cap amount is $682,200.65. 
Therefore, defendants respectfully assert that the applicable non-economic damages 
cap is $682,200.65 total, and not $3,500,000 as awarded by the jury. Defendants aver 
that the total amount of non-economic damages awarded to plaintiffs should be capped 
collectively at $682,200.85. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
Pursuant to IRCP 59(e), defendants respectfully object to this Court's Judgment 
entered upon the jury verdict dated May 20, 2009 because it contravenes the statutory 
language of Idaho Code Section 6-1603 regarding the application of the statutory non-
economic damages cap to wrongful death cases. Also, defendants respectfully request 
this Court grant their motion to alter or amend the judgment by reducing the non-economic 
damages portion of the judgment against defendants to $682,200.65-the applicable 
non-economic damages cap at the time the above-entitled wrongful death cause of 
action arose in June 2003. Specifically, defendants request this Court to apply the 
statutory non-economic damages cap, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 6-1603, to all listed 
plaintiffs collectively so there is only one non-economic damages award for all plaintiffs in 
the amount of $682,200.65. 
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DEFENDANT ANDREW CHAI, 
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COME NOW Plaintiffs, Jose Aguilar, Sr., Individually, and as the personal 
representative of the Estate of Marla A. Aguilar. and as the natural father and guardIan of ' 
Alejandro Aguilar and Lorena Aguilar, Jose Aguilar. Jr., and Guadalupe Marfa Aguilar, by 
and through their 'counsel of record. David E. Comstock Of the firm Comstock and Bush. 
and Byron V. Foster, Attorney ~t Lawj and Defendant, Andrew Chall M.D •• by and thro~gh 
his counsel of record. Andrew C. 8rassey ofihe firm 8rassey, Wetherell & Crawford, L.LP •• 
and hereby $tJ~ulate and agree that PlafnUffs' claims against Defendant Chal may be 
dismissed, with prejudice. wiftach party to bear their own attomey fees and costs. 
DATED THIS 2.l.. day of May, 2009. ' 
Ovid • Comstock 
Attomey for Plaintiffs 
,;1~fV' , 
DAT~O THIS f/C7 day of May. 2009. 
~~~EY, WETHERELL & CRAWFORD. LLP 
t Andrew Chait M.D. 
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Byron V. Foster 
Attorney At Law 
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Based upon the STIPULATION FOR DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE AS TO 
DEFENDANT ANDREW CHAI, MD., filed herein, and good cause appearing therefor: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND THIS DOES ORDER That the above-entitled cause 
of action against Defendant Andrew Chai, MD., is hereby dismissed with prejudice, with 
each party to bear their own costs and attorney's fees. 
DATED THIS --!-- day of 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE AS TO DEFENDANT ANDREW CHAI, M.D. - 2 
~?hF\ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ~day Of~009, I served a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Andrew C. Brassey, Esq. 
Brassey Wetherell Crawford & 
Garrett LLP 
203 W. Main st. 
Boise, 10 83702 
Attorneys for Defendant Andrew Chait 
M.D. 
Steven K. Tolman 
Tolman & Brizee, PC 
132 3rd Ave. E 
P.O. Box 1276 
Twin Falls, 1083303 
Attorneys for Defendants Nathan 
Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care 
Center 
Gary T. Dance 
Moffatt Thomas Barrett Rock & 
Fields Chartered 
412 W. Center, Suite 2000 
PO Box 817 
Pocatello 10 83204-0817 
Attorneys for Defendant Steven R. 
Newman, M.D. 
David E. Comstock 
Byron V. Foster 
199 N. Capitol Blvd, Ste 500 
P.O. Box 2774 
Boise, 1083701-2774 
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I. 
INTRODUCTION 
The jury, having rendered a verdict in favor of Plaintiffs against Defendants Nathan 
Coonrod, M.D., and Primary Health Care Center, and the Court having entered a judgment 
in favor of Plaintiffs against said Defendants, Plaintiffs hereby submit their Memorandum in 
Support of Plaintiffs' Request for Award of Discretionary Costs. As prevailing party, 
Plaintiffs are entitled to costs as a matter of right pursuant to Rule 54(d)(1 )(C) and those 
costs as delineated in Plaintiffs' Verified Memorandum of Costs are governed by mandatory 
rule and will not be addressed herein. The purpose of this Memorandum is to supplement 
Plaintiffs' request for an award of discretionary costs. 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1 )(A) states that a prevailing party shall be 
awarded costs unless otherwise provided by the Court or limited by the Rules. "The 
determination of which party is a prevailing party for purpose of awarding costs is within the 
discretion of the trial Court." JR Simp/ot Co. v. Heritage Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 582, 584, 977 
P.2d 196, 198 (1999). Rule 54(d)(1)8) lists the factors that this Court should consider in 
ruling on whether Plaintiff is the prevailing party as follows: "In determining which party to 
an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, the Trial Court shall in its sound 
discretion consider the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought 
by the respective parties, whether there were multiple claims, multiple issues, 
counterclaims, third party claims, cross claims, or other multiple or cross issues between 
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the parties, and the extent to which each party prevailed upon each of such issue or claims. 
The Trial Court in its sound discretion may determine that a party to an action prevailed in 
part and did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may apportion the costs between and 
among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after considering all of the issues and 
claims involved in the action and the resultant judgment or judgments obtained." 
Plaintiffs have requested an award of discretionary costs. Rule 54(d)(1 )(0) governs 
discretionary costs. It states that: 
"Additional items of cost not enumerated in, or in an amount in 
excess of that listed in subparagraph (c), may be allowed upon 
a showing that said costs were necessary and exceptional 
costs reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice 
be assessed against the adverse party. The trial Court, in 
ruling upon objections to such discretionary costs contained in 
the Memorandum of Costs, shall make express findings as to 
why such specific items of discretionary costs should or should 
not be allowed. In the absence of any objection to such an 
item of discretionary costs, the Court may disallow on its own 
Motion any such items of discretionary costs and shall make 
express findings supporting such disallowance." 
Rule 54(d)(1 )(0) commits the decision of whether to award costs to the discretion of 
the trial Court. Van Brunt v. Stoddard, 136 Idaho 681 689,39 P.3d 621,629 (2001). When 
an objection to discretionary costs is presented, the trial Court "shall make express findings 
as to why such specific item of discretionary cost should or should not be allowed." IRCP 
54(d)(1 )(0). Thus, the Court must make specific findings regarding each claimed 
discretionary cost whether it was (1) necessary, (2) exceptional, (3) reasonably incurred, 
and (4) should be assessed against the adverse party in the interest of justice. Evans v. 
State, 135 Idaho 422,432,18 P.3d 227, 237 (Court of Appeals 2001). 
The Honorable Ronald J. Wi/per, ~istrict Judge in the District Court of the Fourth 
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Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in the case of Jones, et al v. ACTV, et ai, (See Case 
No. CV PI 04004860, Fourth Judicial District, County of Ada, Memorandum Decision and 
Order, January 12, 2007, attached hereto) when awarding discretionary costs to the 
prevailing Plaintiffs in a medical malpractice case, found first that the Plaintiffs' discretionary 
costs were necessary to bring the medical malpractice case to trial and were reasonably 
incurred considering the length of the trial and the complexity of the issues that were tried. 
Judge Wilper went on to determine that the costs were exceptional as "the Plaintiffs could 
not have foreseen a need to expend these costs when the decedent was planning her 
surgery". Judge Wi/per further found that the costs associated with retaining expert 
witnesses that exceed the costs allowed as a matter of right were necessary and 
exceptional "because medical experts are essential in a medical malpractice case and they 
cannot be retained for the $2,000.00 awardable under Rule 54(d)(1 )(C) as costs as a matter 
of right". Finally, Judge Wilper determined that because Plaintiffs would already be required 
to pay their own attorney's fees, it would be in the interest of justice for the Plaintiffs to be 
awarded discretionary costs. 
1. Expert fees in addition to amount allowed at a matter of right. 
A. Lorraine Shoaf-Kadish, RN 
Lorraine Shoaf-Kadish is a registered nurse and legal consultant who was 
retained by Plaintiffs to assist in the initial screening and evaluation of the merits of 
this case in addition to the preparation of this matter for presentation to expert 
witnesses and ultimately trial. For these reasons, Plaintiffs request an award of 
discretionary costs to include the expenses incurred for the assistance of Lorraine 
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Shoaf-Kadish, RN. 
B. Paul Blaylock. M.D. 
Dr. Blaylock is a physician specializing in emergency medicine with knowledge of 
family practice medicine. Dr. Blaylock not only testified as to the standard of care for Drs. 
Newman and Coonrod, but also as to the sequence of events, Maria Aguilar's signs and 
symptoms of pulmonary embolus from April 23, 2003 to June 4, 2003, the cause of her 
death from a showering of small pulmonary emboli to the final saddle embolus and the 
preventability of her death. For these reasons, and the fact that expert medical witnesses 
are required, Plaintiffs request an award of discretionary costs to include the expenses 
incurred for Dr. Blaylock. The Court should note that Plaintiffs have proportioned one-
quarter (%) of Dr. Blaylock's expenses out as time and expense incurred relating to Dr. 
Newman. 
C. Richard Lubman. M.D. 
Dr. Lubman is a physician specializing in pulmonary and critical care medicine. Dr. 
Lubman testified primarily as to causation which is necessitated by the fact that it is 
Plaintiffs' burden to prove that the negligence of the Defendants caused Maria Aguilar's 
death. In addition, he opined that Maria Aguilar was experiencing a showering of small 
pulmonary emboli before the final event. Lastly, Dr. Lubman described the effectiveness of 
thrombolytic therapy and the likelihood of her survival absent the Defendants' negligence. 
For these reasons, and the fact that expert medical witnesses are required, Plaintiffs 
request an award of discretionary costs to include the expenses incurred for Dr. Lubman. 
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D. Dean Lapinel, M.D. 
Dr. Lapinel is an Idaho physician specializing in emergency medicine. Dr. Lapinel 
was called as a rebuttal witness and testified against Defendant Coonrod's theory that the 
saddle pulmonary embolus occurred as an isolated event as opposed to a series of smaIl, 
non-lethal pulmonary emboli which were symptomatic, went undiagnosed and lead to the 
final fatal saddle embolus. Dr. Lapinel testified to rebut Defendant Coonrod's theory that 
Maria Aguilar's aIleged lack of risk factors validated Dr. Coonrod's failure to diagnose 
pulmonary embolus. For these reasons, and the fact that expert medical witnesses are 
required, Plaintiffs request an award of discretionary costs to include the expenses incurred 
for Dr. Lapine/. 
E. Samuel LeBaron, M.D., Ph.D. 
Dr. LeBaron is a family medicine specialist and a Professor of Family Medicine at 
Stanford School of Medicine. Dr. LeBaron testified solely against Dr. Coonrod as to the 
standard of care for a family practice physician, that Dr. Coonrod breached that standard 
and that Maria Aguilar would be alive today absent Dr. Coonrod's breach of the standard of 
care. For these reasons, and the fact that expert medical witnesses are required, Plaintiffs 
request an award of discretionary costs to include the expenses incurred for Dr. LeBaron. 
F. Cornelius Hofman 
Mr. Hofman is an economist and testified as to the economic loss suffered by 
Plaintiffs to fulfill Plaintiffs' burden of proof as to economic damages. Plaintiffs respectfully 
request an award of discretionary costs to include the expenses incurred for Mr. Hofman 
who testified at trial. 
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G. Kenneth Bramwell, M.D. 
While Dr. Bramwell did not testify at trial, there was testimony about Dr. Bramwell. 
Dr. Bramwell assisted in qualifying Plaintiffs' expert witnesses regarding the applicable local 
standard of care. Plaintiffs request an award of discretionary costs to include the expenses 
incurred for Dr. Bramwell's telephone conference with Plaintiffs' out-of-state experts. 
H. William Blahd, Jr., M.D. 
While Dr. Blahd did not testify at trial, there was testimony about Dr. Blahd. Dr. 
Blahd assisted in qualifying Plaintiffs' expert witnesses regarding the applicable local 
standard of care. Plaintiffs request an award of discretionary costs to include the expenses 
incurred for Dr. Blahd's telephone conference with Plaintiffs' out-of-state experts. 
J. Michael Roach, M.D. 
While Dr. Roach did not testify at trial, there was testimony about Dr. Roach. Dr. 
Roach assisted in qualifying Plaintiffs' expert witnesses regarding the applicable local 
standard of care. Plaintiffs request an award of discretionary costs to include the expenses 
incurred for Dr. Roach's telephone conference with Plaintiffs' out-of-state experts. 
2. Additional costs for preparation of exhibits. 
In any medical malpractice case, given the questionable hand writing on medical 
charts, it is imperative to obtain pristine color copies of the records to eliminate mistakes. In 
addition, presentation of color copies of family photographs and costs thereof is effective 
and essential to the award of damages. Plaintiff requests an award of discretionary costs 
to include the costs incurred for copying the medical charts and photographs used in the 
preparation for trial. 
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3. Costs of procuring and copying all medical records for use in 
preparation for trial (in addition to cost for admitted exhibits). 
Plaintiff incurred costs with respect to providing copies of medical records to all 
parties, the Court and to the clerk. It is absolutely imperative to provide copies upon 
request and in preparation for the actual trial of a long and lengthy case. Plaintiff requests 
an award of discretionary costs to include the costs incurred for copying medical records 
used in the preparation for trial. 
4. Cost of out-of town travel for attendance at depositions. 
A. Paul Blaylock, M.D. 
Defendants sought and noticed the deposition of Dr. Blaylock in Portland, Oregon. 
In order to attend this deposition and represent Plaintiffs' interests, Plaintiffs' counsel 
incurred $393.00 for flight travel expenses. As Dr. Blaylock was a key standard of care 
witness and imperative to the presentation of Plaintiffs' case at trial, it was incumbent upon 
Plaintiffs' counsel to attend Dr. Blaylock's deposition. Plaintiffs seek an award of 
discretionary costs to include this item of expense. 
B. Samuel LeBaron, M.D, Ph.D. 
Defendants sought and noticed the deposition of Dr. LeBaron at Stanford University 
in Stanford, California. In order to attend this deposition and represent Plaintiffs' interests, 
Plaintiffs' counsel incurred $1,095.49 for flight travel expenses. As Dr. LeBaron was a key 
witness as to causation and standard of care for a family practice physician, and imperative 
to the presentation of Plaintiffs' case at trial, it was incumbent upon Plaintiffs' counsel to 
attend Dr. LeBaron's deposition. Plaintiffs seek an award of discretionary costs to include 
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this item of expense. 
C. Richard Lubman, M.D. 
Defendants sought and noticed the deposition of Dr. Lubman in Los Angeles, 
California. In order to attend this deposition and represent Plaintiffs' interests, Plaintiffs' 
counsel incurred $619.50 for flight travel expenses. As Dr. Lubman was a key witness as to 
causation and imperative to the presentation of Plaintiffs' case at trial, it was incumbent 
upon Plaintiffs' counsel to attend Dr. Lubman's deposition. Plaintiffs seek an award of 
discretionary costs to include this item of expense. 
5. Expenses for attendance at trial. 
A. Paul Blaylock, M.D. 
In order for Dr. Blaylock to attend trial it was necessary for him to obtain a hotel room 
and stay two nights in Boise, Idaho, the result of which was a $443.20 expense for meals 
and two nights in Boise and parking fees at his local airport. Plaintiffs request that the 
award of discretionary costs include these expenses. 
B. Samuel LeBaron, M.D, Ph.D. 
In order for Dr. LeBaron to attend trial it was necessary for him to obtain a hotel room 
and stay one night in Boise, Idaho, the result of which was a $261.69 expense for meals 
and one night in Boise and parking fees at his local airport. Plaintiffs request that the award 
of discretionary costs include these expenses. 
C. Richard Lubman, M.D. 
In order for Dr. Lubman to attend trial it was necessary for him to obtain a hotel room 
and stay two nights in Boise, Idaho, the result of which was a $419.74 expense for meals 
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and two nights in Boise and parking fees at his local airport. Plaintiffs request that the 
award of discretionary costs include these expenses. 
6. Office expenses necessary for prosecution of case. 
These items of expense delineated in Plaintiffs' Verified Memorandum of Costs are 
self-explanatory. Primarily, these are the general types of expenses which are reasonable, 
necessary, and exceptionally incurred because of the complexity and length of the case of 
this type. Plaintiffs seek an award of these additional discretionary expenses as part of the 
overall award of discretionary costs. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Plaintiffs have made an adequate showing that the discretionary costs were 
(1) necessary, (2) exceptional, (3) reasonably incurred, and (4) should be assessed against 
the adverse party in the interest of justice, Plaintiffs hereby respectfully request an award of 
all discretionary costs set forth in their Verified Memorandum of Costs. 
~...t 
DATED This -r day of June, 2009. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST FOR AWARD OF 
DISCRETIONARY COSTS - 10 
~?7n 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
p..,l . 
I hereby certify that on the 1 -day of June, 2009, I served a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Steven K. Tolman 
Tolman & Brizee, PC 
132 3rd Ave. E 
P.O. Box 1276 
Twin Falls, ID 83303 
Attorneys for Defendants Nathan 
Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care 
Center 
Gary T. Dance 
Moffatt Thomas Barrett Rock & 
Fields Chartered 
412 W. Center, Suite 2000 
PO Box 817 
Pocatello ID 83204-0817 
Attorneys for Defendant Steven R. 
Newman, M.D. 
D U.S. Mail 
D .. Hand Delivery 
12f.... Facsimile (208) 733-5444 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Facsimile (208) 232-0150 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF AD 
MICHAEL ANTHONY JONES, 
individually and as guardian ad litem for 
natural mother of LORI MARJE JONES, 
deceased, and KIM ROYER, as step-
father of LORI MARJE JONES, 





OF TREASURE VALLEY, PLLC, 
DEBORAH JENKlNS, M.D., THOMAS 
LARK, M.D., B&B 
AUTOTRANSFUSION SERVICES, 
INC., an Idaho Corporation, and JOHN 
DOES I through V 
Defendants. 
. .' 
,; . -. ,~ ,:'-
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Case No. CV PI 0400486D 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER 
In this wrongful death action, an Ada County jury awarded $6,012,083.00 to the family of 
decedent Lori Jones, a wife and mother of two who died while being operated on at Treasure Valley 
Hospital in August 2004. The claims of wrongful death were brought by her husband and children, 
her mother, and her father. The Court granted summary judgment to one of the Defendants, 
Treasure Valley Hospital, on September 1, 2006, with a Judgment being entered on December 27, 
2006 making that decision final. The trial began on October 18, 2006. The jury returned a verdict 
on November 14, 2006. The jury found that the defendants, B&B Autotransfusion Services, Inc., 












Dr. Deborah Jenkins, Dr. Thomas Lark, and Anesthesiology Consultants of Treasure Valley (as 
employer of Jenkins and Lark) negligently caused the death of Lori Jones. The jury ,!-pportioned 
49% of the fault to B&B Autotransfusion, 36% to Dr. Jenkins, and 15% to Dr. Lark. The jury also 
found that Dr. Jenkins and B&B Autotransfusion acted recklessly and that Dr. Lark did not. The 
Court entered the Judgment on November 15, and issued an Amended Judgment on December 22. 
A number of motions are pending before the Court and this Memorandum Decision and Order 
addresses each pending motion. 
Based on the following analysis, the Court hereby grants and denies the motions as. follows: 
• The Court grants the costs as a matter of right requested by Defendant TVH, but denies 
discretionary costs 
11 • The Court denies Defendant B&B Autotransfusion's Motion for New Trial and its Motion 
12 for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict 
13 • The Court denies Defendant Jenkins' Motion for a New Trial, and the Motion for Periodic 
14 Payments 
15 • The Court grants the Plaintiffs' motions for costs as a matter of right and discretionary costs 
16 Motions Pending Before the Court , 
17 Treasure Valley Hospital filed a motion requesting costs pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54. 
18 The Plaintiffs filed respective motions for costs pursuant to 1.R.C.P. 54. 
19 Defendants Dr. Deborah Jenkins and Anesthesiology Consultants of Treasure Valley 
20 (ACTV) moved the Court for a new trial. l The motions both argue that the Court. erred in 
21 instructing the jury on the definition of recklessness. Defendant Dr. Jenkins also tiled a motion 





I The motions were filed by Defendants B&B Autotransfusion and Dr. Deborah Jenkins. The motion filed by Dr. 
Jenkins was joined by counsel for ACTV because ACTV is liable for the actions of its agent Dr. Jenkins. Defendant 
Thomas Lark has not joined in this motion. 





























Defendant B&B Autotransfusion moved for a new trial based on: 
(1) Irregularities in the proceeding (improper comments made during closing arguments); 
(2) The contention that the verdict was not supported by the evidence; 
(3) Alleged errors by the Court in not admitting proffered evidence; 
(4) Allegedly erroneous rulings constituting abuse of discretion as follows: 
(i) That I.e. § 6-1012-13 (2004) governed the actions of Ms. Kurtz, a medical 
technologist employed by the B&B; 
(li) The Court's rejection of the argument that Kurtz's duties did not extend beyond 
the moment she gave the blood bag to the anesthesiologist; 
(iii) That Plaintiffs' standard of care witnesses were not qualified to testify about the 
standard of care applicable to Ms. Kurtz; 
(iv) Limiting the scope of the testimony of the expert proffered by B&B; and 
(v) Not including various non-parties on the verdict fonn; 
(5) The contention that the jury verdict was based on passion and prejudice; (6) the 
contention that the actions of Ms. Kurtz were outside the scope of her employment, and 
therefore could not be imputed to her employer, B&B Autotransfusion. 
B&B also moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict based on: 
(1) The alleged error of the Court's decision that I.e. § 6-1012-13 (2004) governed the 
actions of Kurtz, a medical technologist employed by the Defendant B&B Autotransfusion; 
(2) The argument that the duties of Kurtz did not extend beyond the moment she gave the 
blood bag to the physicians providing anesthesia, therefore thejury's verdict was erroneous; 
(3) The contention that the experts proffered by the Plaintiffs to testify about Kurtz's breach 
of the standard of care were erroneously allowed to testify because proper foundation was not laid 
out by the Plaintiffs; 
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1 (4) The contention that the Court erred in limiting the scope of the testimony of the expert 
2 proffered by the Defendant B&B; and 
3 (5) The contention that the Court erred by not including various non-parties on ,the verdict 
4 form. 
s The Plaintiffs filed a motion requesting attorney's fees against all the Defendants Jenkins, 





















Autotransfusion pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 & 123 (2004). 
The Court heard oral arguments on the motion for costs filed by TVH on December 8, 2006 
and took the matter under advisement. The Court heard oral arguments on the remaining motions 
listed above on January 8,2007 and took the matters under advisement. 
ANALYSIS 
Motions (or a New Trial 
The trial court is entrusted with a sound judicial discretion to be exercised in granting or 
refusing to grant a new trial. Blaine v. Byers, 91 Idaho 665, 671, 429 P.2d 397, 403 (1967). The 
Court has considered the arguments made by each party requesting a new trial and finds all 
arguments to be without merit. For the reasons set forth below, the collective motions for a new 
trial are hereby denied. 
Motion/or a New Trial/Dr. Jenkins and ACTV 
The Motion for a New Trial filed by Defendant Jenkins and joined by Defendant ACTV 
alleges that the Court erroneously instructed the jury regarding the definition of recklessness. ff a 
jury is given an inaccurate instruction misstating the law and a party has been prejudiced thereby, the 
trial court can grant a new trial. Corey v. Wilson, 93 Idaho 54, 58, 454 P.2d 951, 955 (1969). The 




























Court finds that the instruction was not an inaccurate statement of the law in Idaho and denies the 
motion. l 
Dr. Jenkins argued that the definition of "reckless disregard" as defined in Athay v. Stacey 
should have been the definition used by the Court in this matter. 
In Hodge v. Borden, 91 Idaho 125, 134, 417 P.2d 75, 84 (1966), we adopted the 
definition announced by the Oregon Supreme Court in Williamson v. McKenna, 223 
Or. 366, 354 P.2d 56, 67 (1960), which is, " 'Reckless disregard of the rights of 
others' could be regarded as the type of conduct engaged in by the driver when he 
actually perceives the danger and continues his course of conduct." We distinguished 
reckless disregard from gross negligence in that the latter would apply where the 
driver does not know of the high degree of manifest danger, but should have known. 
Athay v. Stacey, 142 Idaho 360, _, 128 P.3d 897,902 (2005). . 
However, Athay deals with a statutory definition of reckless disregard in light of a change in 
statutory language replacing reckless disregard with gross negligence. Under this circum.'ltance, the 
Idaho Supreme Court found that the legislature must have. intended that, in this statutory context, 
the terms gross negligence and reckless disregard must be different. In that light, the Court defined 
reckless disregard. The definition contained in Athay is limited to cases arising under the Idaho 
Guest Statute. 
This is explained in State v. Sibley, 138 Idaho 259, 263-64, 61 P.3d 616, 620-21 (Ct. App. 
2002). In Sibley, a criminal case, the district court had instructed the jury concerning the definition 
of gross negligence by using the pattern jury instructions. Id. The defendant argued that the 
definition found in Petersen v. Parry, 92 Idaho 647, 657, 448 P.2d 653, 663 (1968), should have 
been used. 138 Idaho 263,61 P.2d 620. Peterson cited to Hodge v. Borden, as did Athay v. Stacey. 
The Court of Appeals found that the definition of gross negligence (and therefore by logical 
I The Court instructed the jury that: 
The word "reckless" when used in these instructions and when applied to the allegations in this case, 
means more than ordinary negligence. The word means actions taken under circumstances where the 
actor knew or should have known that the actions not only created an unreasonable risk of harm to 
another, but involved a high degree of probability that such harm would actually result. 
This instruction was a modification ofIDll 2nd 2.25. 




1 extension "reckless disregard") contained in Peterson applies to cases arising under the Idaho Guest 
2 Statute. Jd. ("The definition of gross negligence in the Petersen case is one that applies in the 
3 context of civil cases involving the Idaho guest statute. "). Because the pattern jury in~tructions 
4 contained a definition of gross negligence in a criminal context, the Court of Appeals held the district 
5 court did not err in defining gross negligence according to the pattern instructions rather than the 
6 definition in Peterson, which it found to be limited to cases arising under the Idaho Guest Statute. 
7 Jd. 
8 This Court also considered the fact that Idaho Courts have recently upheld jury instructions 
9 defining reckless conduct similar to the instruction given in this case. See, e.g., Galloway v .. Walker, 
10 140 Idaho 672, 676-77, 99 P.3d 625, 629-30 (Ct. App. 2004) (upholding use of definition of 
11 reckless conduct found in REST. TORTS 2nd (1965) as correct standard).l The current pattern jury 
12 instruction did not apply in Galloway, however the language stating that actions could be considered 
13 reckless if a person "had reason to know" of unreasonable risk is contained within the Restatement 
14 definition. Moreover, Idaho cases have traditionally used the Restatement definition when 
15 instructing juries on the definition of reckless conduct. See Hunter v. Horton, 80 Idaho 475, 479 
16 (1958); Johnson v. Sunshine Mining Co., 106 Idaho 866 (1984); DeGraffv. Whight, 130 Idaho 577 
17 (1997); See also Kuntz v. Lamar Corp., 385 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2004) (interpreting reckless 
18 conduct under § I.C. 6-1603 to contain knowing or having reason to know offacts ... ). 
19 Because the definition of reckless conduct found in Athay is limited to cases involving actions 







lREST. TORTS 2nd § 500 (1965): 
A person's conduct is reckless ifhe does an act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to 
the other to do, knowing or having reason to know off acts which would lead a reasonable man to 
realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, but also 
that such risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary, under the circumstances. 




























definition of recklessness in other tort actions, Jenkins motion for a new trial based on the argument 
that the Court erred in instructing the jury on recklessness is hereby denied. The Court's jury 
instruction, a modification ofIDfl 2.25, was not given in error. 
Motion for a New Trial / B&B Autotransfusion 
(1) Irregularities in the proceeding (improper comments made during closing arguments) 
B&B alleges that certain connnents made during closing arguments constituted irregularities 
in the proceedings. 1 However, the Defendant failed to make a timely objection to those comments. 
A party that fails to timely object to an irregularity in the proceeding is not entitled to a new trial 
based on the alleged irregularity. See, e.g., Hall v. Johnson, 70 Idaho 190, 196,214 P.2d 467,469 
(1950). Because B&B failed to object to the alleged irregularities at trial, the Defendant is not 
entitled to a new trial based on these allegations. 
(2) The'contention that the verdict was not supported by the evidence 
! 
B&B alleges that the verdict was not supported by sufficient evidence. Unlike a motion for 
JNOV, a trial court may grant a new trial even though there is substantial evidence to support the 
jury's verdict. Bott v. Idaho State Bldg. Auth., 122 Idaho 471, 475, 835 P.2d 1282, 1286 (1992). 
"The trial court may grant a new trial when it is satisfied the verdict is not supported by, or is 
contrary to, the evidence, or is convinced the verdict is not in accord with the clear weight of the 
evidence and that the ends of justice would be subserved by vacating it, or when the verdict is not in 
I B&B alleged the following irregularities: (1) attorney Comstock's references to the meanings his staff would associate 
with the mother/daughter relationship and (2) attorney Ramsden's arguments that Kurtz sat and watched the decedent 
die without acting. At oral argument, B&B also alleged that the distortion of the Court's jury instruction on recklessnes 
during closing arguments, specifically the statement or statements that a failure to act could also be reckless under the 
Court's instructions, was also an irregularity in the proceeding. This clarified the nebulous contention made in B&B's 
motion that the Court's instruction on recklessness was "distorted in final argument." While this latter allegation also 
suffers from the lack of a timely objection and could be denied on that ground, B&B did not set out in detail the basis for 
this allegation in its briefing or affidavits. The Court will therefore not consider this argument as proper on the 
additional ground that the allegation was not sufficiently detailed for the Court to be in a position to make a 
determination. See Highland Enterprises, Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 350, 986 P.2d 996,1016 (1999) (finding one 
sentence allegation by party insufficient under I.RC.P. 59(a) standards). 
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1 accord with either law or justice." Blaine v. Byers, 91 Idaho 665, 429 P.2d 397 (1967). The 
2 consideration of a motion for a new trial based on allegations that the verdict was not supported by 
3 the evidence involves an element of discretion on the part of the trial court, and involves the 
4 weighing of evidence, as opposed to motions for directed verdicts motions for lNOV, :where the 
5 Court is not free to weigh the evidence. See Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 767, 727 P2d 1187, 
6 1195 (1986). The Court finds that the verdict for the Plaintiffs was supported by the proffered 
7 evidence. The motion based on the contention that the verdict was not supported by the ~vidence is 
8 denied. 
9 (3) A lleged errors by the Court in not admitting Exhibits 316 and 311 
10 Failure to admit evidence is an "error in law, occurring at the trial." LR.C.P. 59(a)(7). 
11 Whether to admit or exclude evidence is a matter of the trial court's discretion. Morris v. Thomson, 
12 130 Idaho 138, 144, 937 P.2d 1212, 1218 (1997). In the case of an incorrect ruling regarding 
13 evidence, a new trial is merited only if the error affects a substantial right of one of the parties. Id 
14 "No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence is grounds for granting a new trial or 
15 for setting aside a verdict unless refusal to take such action appears to the court to be inconsistent 
16 with substantial justice." Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co., Ltd., 127 Idaho 565, 575, 903 P.2d 
17 730, 740 (1995). 
18 B&B has not identified a substantial right that was affected by the alleged error in not 
19 admitting these exhibits. The purpose of admitting exhibit 316 would have been to explain the use of 
20 the V-Type blood tube. See Defendant B&B Autotransfusion Services, Inc.'s Motion for a New 
21 Trial, p.5 ("the Court erred in preventing the admission of Exhibit 316, which explains the function 
22 of the V-type Blood Set"). The blood set had been admitted into evidence, see id., and its function 
23 had been explained by the Defendant's expert witness as well as other witnesses during the trial. 
24 Therefore, the Defendant cannot demonstrate how the failure to admit this evidence affected a 
25 substantial right or would be inconsistent with substantial justice. 
26 



























The refusal to admit exhibit 311, a hospital protocol amended after the death of Lori Jones, 
was based on a ruling that the change in the protocol was a subsequent remedial meilsure. The 
change in policy of TVH as reflected in {he changed protocol is aimed at preventing another death 
based on the actions of persons in the operating rooms. The Court did not err in finding this to be a 
subsequent remedial measure, therefore properly barred admission under I.R.E. 407. 
(4) Allegedly erroneous rulings constituting an abuse of discretion as follows: 
(i) That I.e. § 6-1012-13 (2004) governed the actions of Ms. Kurtz, a medical technologist 
employed by B&B 
I.e. § 6-1012 & § 6-1013 cover all providers of health care. The statute covers: 
any physician and surgeon or other provider of health care, including, without 
limitation, any dentist, physicians' assistant, nurse practitioner, registered nurse, 
licensed practical nurse, nurse anesthetist, medical technologist, physical therapist, 
hospital or nursing home, or any person vicariously liable for the negligence of them 
or any of them ... 
Ms. Kurtz was trained to operate a cell saver machine and was employed by a firm that provided 
healthcare services. The contention that she was not a provider of health care is without merit. 
(ii) The Court's rejection of the argument that Kurtz's duties did not extend beyond the moment she 
gave the blood bag to the anesthesiologists 
The argument made by counsel appears to be that the verdict was based on insufficient 
evidence because the evidence demonstrated Ms. Kurtz did not have a duty to act once she handed 
the blood bag to the anesthesiologists. This argument was made repeatedly throughout the trial and 
was found to be without merit by the jury. The evidence established that the standard of care 
required Ms. Kurtz to notify the anesthesiologists of the warning on the re-infusion bag and the jury 
found that she did not do so adequately. The jury's determination was not against the weight of the 
evidence, and the Court, in weighing the evidence, believes the jury was correct. See QUick v. 
Crane, 111 Idaho 767, 727 P.2d 1195 (when presented with motion for new trial based on 
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1 insufficiency of the evidence, Court may weigh the evidence). The request for a new trial based on 
2 this argument is denied. 
3 (iii) That Plaintiffs' standard of care witnesses were not qualified to testify about the standard of care 
4 applicable to Ms. Kurtz 
5 The facts demonstrate that the Plaintiffs' experts properly demonstrated they were familiar 
6 with a national standard of care for operators of cell saver machines and they contacted local 
7 practitioners to determine if there were any local deviations from the national standard of care. This 
8 is an accepted method of familiarizing an out of area expert with the local standard of Gare. See, 
9 e.g., Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, -' 136 P.3d 338,347 (2006). 
10 (iv) Limiting the scope of the testimony ofthe expert proffered by B&B 
11 B&B argues that is was error for the Court to limit the scope of the testimony of Certified 
12 Registered Nurse Anesthetist (CRNA) Troy Britton. Errors concerning the admission of testimony 
13 will only merit a new trial if the error affects a substantial right. Morris, 130 Idaho at 144, 937 P.2d 
14 at 1218. B&B argues that their expert was not allowed to testify about "transfer bags" nor the 
15 standard of care applicable to anesthesiologists. 
16 The Defendant provides no factual support for the allegation that the expert was not 
17 permitted to testify about "transfer bags." I.R.C.P. 59(a)(7) states that, "Any motion based on 
1 8 subdivisions 6 or 7 must set forth the factual grounds therefore with particularity." Alleged errors in 
1 9 evidentiary rulings are legal errors. Moms, 130 Idaho at 144, 937 P.2d at 1218. Britton was 
20 prevented from testifying about the use or non-use of transfer bags as related to the standard of care 
21 of the hospital. Britton was not disclosed as an expert with knowledge of the standard of care 
22 relating to hospitals. 
23 There is no factual basis for the contention that Britton was prevented from rebutting the 
'24 testimony of Plaintiffs' experts' statements that there was a national standard of care applicable to 
25 cell saver technicians. 
26 
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( 
1 The Defendant failed to proffer their expert, CRNA Britton, as an expert to testify about the 
2 standard of care applicable to anesthesiologists. Because the Defendant failed to disclose Britton as 
3 an expert on the standard of care applicable to ?Uesthesiologists, Britton was not allowed to testify 
4 about that subject. LR.C.P. 26(e)(4) authorizes the trial court to exclude testimony of witnesses not 
5 disclosed by required supplementation of a response to a request for discovery. Exclusion or 
.', 
6 admission of such evidence is discretionary with the trial court. Cf Smith v. Webber, 97 Idaho 703, 
7 551 P.2d 1339 (1976). Because the Court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, was 
8 authorized to bar the testimony under I.R. C.P. 26( e), and reached the decision by an exercise of 
9 reason, no error was committed. 
10 (v) The contention that the Court erred by not including various non-parties on the verdict form 
11 Because B&B failed to produce any expert testimony demonstrating that ACTV (as opposed 
12 to an agent of ACTV) or TVH's actions fell below the applicable standard of care, including these 
13 entities on the special verdict form was not warranted by Idaho law. 
14 In order to have TVH or ACTV listed on the verdict form, B&B was required to present 
15 evidence sufficient to make a case for medical malpractice against them. See Vannoy v. Uniroyal 
16 Tire Co., 111 Idaho 536, 551, 726 P.2d 648, 663 (1985) (Bistline 1., concurring) ("It is the general 
17 rule that before nonparties are placed on jury verdict forms, there must be a showing that the 
18 requisite elements of a cause of action against them have been presented at trial.") (citation 
19 omitted) (emphasis added). The elements of a cause of action for medical negligence are stated in 







In any case, claim or action for damages due to injury to or death of any person, 
brought against any physician and surgeon or other provider of health care ... such 
claimant or plaintiff must, as an essential part of his or her case in chief, affirmatively 
prove by direct expert testimony and by a preponderance of all the competent 
evidence, that such defendant then and there negligently failed to meet the applicable 
standard of health care practice of the community in which such care allegedly was or 
should have been provided .... 




























1. C. § 6-1 0 12 
Therefore, before any non-parties would be included on the verdict form, Defendant B&B 
was required to demonstrate as part of their case in chief that the non-parties breached the applicable 
standard of care applicable to them and that the breaches of care were substantial factors in the death 
of Lori Jones. 
B&B designated Dr. Blotter, a mechanical engineer, to testify that the 1. V. tubing selected by 
the plaintiff Anesthesiology Consultants of Treasure Valley and the non-party Treasure Valley 
Hospital was a cause of the death of Lori Jones. This expert was not qualified under § 6-1012 to 
testify that the hospital breached the standard of care applicable to hospitals. 
An expert testifying as to the standard of care in medical malpractice actions must show that he or 
she is familiar with the standard of care for the particular health care professional for the relevant 
community and time. Perry v. Magic Valley Reg'l Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46, 995 P.2d 816 (2000); 
Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 868 P.2d 1224 (1994). The expert must also state how he or 
she became familiar with that standard of care. Id. 
The Court correctly determined that the special verdict form should not have included TVH 
or ACTV because B&B had not provided any competent evidence ofTVH's or ACTV's breach of 
the standard of care.! Nor did B&B present any evidence that Haemonetics was negligent for the 
construction of the blood-saver machine used in the surgery. 
1 Defendant B&B repeatedly claims that the testimony of Dr. Hines andlor Dr. Migiliori would have established the 
requisite expert testimony to establish a breach of the standard of care. However, neither doctor was designated as an 
expert by B&B at any time prior to trial. I.R c.P. 26( e)( 4) authorizes the trial court to exclude testimony of witnesses 
not disclosed by required supplementation of a response to a request for discovery. Exclusion or admission of such 
evidence is discretionary with the trial court. Smith v. Webber, 97 Idaho 703, 551 P.2d 1339 (1976). Similarly, the 
determination whether a witness is qualified to state an opinion is committed to the discretion of the trial court. See e.g., 
Sorensen v. Pickens, 99 Idaho 564,585 P.2d 1275 (1978); Bean v. Diamond Alkali Co., 93 fdaho 32,454 P.2d 69 
( 1969). 




























Because no evidence established that the Defendant B&B would have been able to establish 
the elements of medical negligence and negligent manufacture or design, relative to TVH, ACTV, 
and Haemonetics, the Court properly declined to include these non-parties on the verdict form. 
(5) The contention that the jury verdict was based on passion and prejudice 
The evidence at trial supported the verdict rendered by the jury. The evidence demonstrated 
that at the time of her death, Lori Jones was well educated, well employed, ambitious and the 
primary wage earner in her family. The evidence also demonstrated that Lori and her parents had a 
close relationship. Based on the evidence presented to the jury, the Court finds the verdict was not 
the result of passion and prejudice. 
(6) The contention that the actions o/Kurtz were outside the scope of her employment, and 
therefore could not be imputed to her employer. B&B Autotransfusion 
The evidence at trial demonstrated that Kurtz was acting within the scope of her employment 
when the negligent and reckless acts occurred. The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that: 
There is a "rebuttable presumption that any act or omission of an employee within the 
time and at the place of his employment is within the course and scope of his 
employment and without malice or criminal intent." I.C. § 6-903(e). Acts that are 
within the scope of employment are "those acts which are so closely connected with 
what the servant is supposed to do, and so fairly and reasonably incidental to it, that 
they may be regarded as methods, even though quite improper ones, of carrying out 
the objectives of employment." The Richard J. and Esther E. Wooley Trust v. 
DeBest Plumbing, Inc., 133 Idaho 180, 184, 983 P.2d 834, 838 (1999) ( Wooley ). 
Wooley elaborated that an employee's conduct is within the scope of employment if 
"it is of the kind which he is employed to perform, occurs substantially within the 
authorized limits of time and space, and is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to 
serve the master." Id. 
Anderson v. Spalding, 137 Idaho 509, 518-19, 50 P.3d 1004, 1013-14 (2002). 
The fact that the act was found to be reckless does not mean that the act was not within the 
scope of employment. See Richard J. and Esther E. Wooley Trust v. DeBest Plumbing, Inc., 133 
Idaho 180, 983 P .2d 834 (1999). [V]icarious liability extends to any and all tortious conduct of the 
servant which is within the 'scope of the employment. (citing W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and 



























Keeton on Torts § 70, at 501 (5th ed. 1984»(quotations removed); see also Rest. Agency § 230 
Forbidden Acts ("An act, although forbidden, or done in a forbidden manner, may be within the 
scope of employment. "). 
The evidence demonstrated that Kurtz acted within the scope of her employment and it was 
not an en-or of law to instruct the jury that Kurtz was the agent of B&B Autotransfusion. 
Motion for JNOV 
A motion for judgment n.o.v. under I.R.C.P. 50Cb) admits the truth of all 
adverse evidence. Every reasonable inference is drawn in the light most favorable 
to the non-moving party. The question is not whether the record is literally devoid 
of evidence .supporting the non-moving party, but whether there is substantial 
evidence upon which the jury could properly find a verdict for that party. Mann v. 
Safeway Stores, Inc., 95 Idaho 732,518 P.2d 1194 (1974). Hence, the trial court is 
not free to weigh the evidence or pass on the credibility of witnesses, making its 
own independent findings of fact and comparing them to the jury's findings, as 
would be the case in deciding a motion for a new trial. Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 
759, 727 P.2d 1187 (1986). Rather, the requisite standard is whether the evidence 
is of sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could reach the 
same conclusion as did the jury. Mann v. Safeway Stores, Inc., supra. 
Smith v. Praegitzer, 113 Idaho 887,889,749 P.2d 1012, 1014 (Ct. App. 1988). 
The Court considered the motion for JNOV and finds that the verdict was supported by 
evidence of sufficient quality and probative value. The motion is denied. 
Motions for Costs under 54(d) 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( d)(1 )(A) states that a prevailing party shall be awarded 
costs, unless otherwise provided by the Court or limited by the Rwes. "The determination of which 
party is the prevailing party for purpose of awarding costs is within the discretion of the trial court." 
J.R. Simplot Co. W. Heritage Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 582, 584, 977 P.2d 196, 198 (1999). Rule 
54(d)(l)(B) lists the factors that this Court must consider in ruling on which party is the prevailing 
party as follows: 
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, the 
trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of the 
action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties, whether there were 
mUltiple claims, multiple issues, counterclaims, third party claims, cross-claims, or 



























other multiple or cross issues between the parties, and the extent to which each party 
prevailed upon each of such issue or claims. The trial court in its sound discretion 
may determine that a party to an action prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, 
and upon so finding may apportion the costs between and among the parties in a fair 
and equitable manner after considering all of the issues and claims involved in the 
action and the resultant judgment or judgments obtained. 
Each of the Plaintiffs and Defendant TVH have filed a motion with the Court requesting 
costs. After considering the factors enumerated above, the Court finds that each ofthe Plaintiffs and 
Defendant TVH are the prevailing parties in this matter. These parties are therefore entitled to their 
costs as a matter of right. 
The Court finds that Plaintiff Bowers is entitled to $2,345.36 in costs as a matter of right. 
The Court finds that Plaintiff Royer is entitled to $5,534.41 in costs as a matter of right. 
The Court finds that Plaintiffs Michael, Moira, and Rhys Jones are entitled to $23,794.50 in 
costs as a matter of right .. 
The Court finds that Defendant TVH is entitled to $4,086.99 in costs as a matter of right. 
The Court finds that, because the experts engaged by Defendant TVH did not testify at trial, these 
costs are properly considered discretionary costs analyzed under Rule 54(d)(1)(D). See Swallow v. 
Emergency Med. of Idaho, P.A., 138 Idaho 589, 598, 67 P.3d 68, 77 (2003). 
Each of the Plaintiffs and Defendant TVH have also requested discretionary costs. Rule 
54( d)( I )(D) governs discretionary costs. It states that: 
Additional items of cost not enumerated in, or in an amount in excess of that listed in 
subparagraph (C), may be allowed upon a showing that said costs were necessary and 
exceptional costs reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed 
against the adverse party. The trial court, in ruling upon objections to such 
discretionary costs contained in the memorandum of costs, shall make express 
findings as to why such specific item of discretionary cost should or should not be 
allowed. In the absence of any objection to such an item of discretionary costs, the 
court may disallow on its own motion any such items of discretionary costs and shall 
make express findings supporting such disallowance. 
Rule 54( d)( 1 )(D) commits the decision of whether to award costs to the discretion of the 
trial court. Van Brunt v. Stoddard, 136 Idaho 681,689,39 P.3d 621,629 (2001). When an objection 
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1 to discretionary costs is presented, the trial court "shall make express findings as to why such 
2 specific item of discretionary cost should or should not be allowed." LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D). Thus, the 
3 Court must make specific findings that each discretionary cost was 1) necessary, 2) exceptional, 3) 
4 reasonably incurred, and 4) should be assessed against the adverse party in the interest of justice. 
5 Evans v. State, 135 Idaho 422, 432, 18 P.3d 227,237 (Ct. App. 2001); Swallow, 138 Idaho at 598, 
6 67 P.3d at 77. 
7 Discretionary Costs Requested by the Plaintiffs 
8 The Court finds that the discretionary costs requested by the plaintiffs were reasonably 
9 incurred, necessary, exceptional, and in the interest of justice. The miscellaneous costs requested by 
10 the Plaintiffs are costs necessary to bringing a case to trial and the costs were reasonably incurred 
11 considering the length of the trial and issues that were tried. The costs were exceptional as the 
12 Plaintiffs could not have foreseen the need to expend these costs when the decedent was planning 
13 her surgery. The Court finds that the costs associated with retaining expert witnesses that exceed 
14 the costs allowed as a matter of right are necessary and exceptional because medical experts are 
IS essential in a medical malpractice case and they cannot be retained for the $2000 awardable under 
16 Rule 54(d)(1)(C) as costs as a matter of right. The costs incurred by the Plaintiffs to engage their 
17 experts were reasonable. Because the Plaintiffs will already be required to pay their attomeys' fees, 
18 the Court finds that it is in the interest of justice that the Plaintiffs be awarded these discretionary 
19 costs. 
20 The Court finds that Plaintiff Royer is entitled to $4,418.66 in discretionary costs. 
21 The Court finds that Plaintiffs Michael, Moira, and Rhys Jones are entitled to $77,590.43 in 
22 discretionary costs. 
23 Discretionary Costs Requested by Defendant TVH 
24 The discretionary costs requested by the plaintiffs are the costs associated with retaining 
25 expert witnesses that exceed the costs allowed as a matter of right. The Court finds that these costs 
26 



























are necessary and exceptional because medical experts are essential in a medical malpractice case and 
they cannot be retained for the $2000 awardable under Ru1e 54(d)(I)(C) as costs as a matter of 
right. The Court also finds these costs were reasonably incurred. However, because the Defendant 
is a provider of medical services and able to foresee and plan for the costs of operating such a 
business, which includes the unfortunate fact that lawsuits will need to be defended and expert 
witnesses retained, the Court finds that it is not in the interests of justice to award the discretionary 
costs to TVH. The request is therefore denied. 
Attorneys' Fees 
The Plaintiffs have requested attorneys fees based on two legal arguments: (1) Against B&B 
Autotransfusion pursuant to I.C. § 12-121; and (2) Against B&B, Dr. Lark & ACTV, and Dr. 
Jenkins pursuant to 1.R.e.P 37(c) 
Against B&B Autotransfusion pursuant to Ie. § 12-121 
Under Idaho Code section 12-121 and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(l), a trial court 
may award attorney fees to a prevailing party where it finds that "the case was brought, pursued or 
defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." Shettel v. Bamesberger, 130 Idaho 217, 
221, 938 P.2d 1255, 1259 (Ct.App.1997). This determination rests in the sound discretion of the 
trial court, but any such award "must be supported by findings and those findings, in tum, must be 
supported by the record." Sunshine Mining Co. v. Metropolitan Mines Corp., 111 Idaho 654, 659, 
726 P.2d 766, 771 (1986). 
The Court finds that the legal theories and defenses pursued by B&B were not frivolous, 
unreasonable, or without foundation, therefore denies the motion to tax attorneys' fees pursuant to 
I.e. § 12-121. 
Against B&B, Dr. Lark & ACTV, and Dr. Jenkins pursuant to IR.C.P 37(c) 
Under Rule 37(c): 




























[I]f a party fails to admit the truth of any matter requested under Rule 36, and the 
requesting party then proves the truth of the matter, the requesting party may "apply 
to the court for an order requiring the other party to pay reasonable expenses 
incurred in making that proof, including reasonable attorney fees." The trial COUlt 
"shall make the order unless it finds that 1) the request was held 0 bjectionable 
pursuant to Rule 36(a), or 2) the admission sought was of no substantial importance, 
or 3) the party failing to admit had reasonable grounds to believe that the party might 
prevail on the matter, or 4) there was other good reason for the failure to admit." /d. 
(emphasis added). In Ruge v. Posey, 114 Idaho 890, 761 P.2d 1242 (Ct.App.1988), 
the Court of Appeals concluded Rule 37(c) requires trial courts to award reasonable 
expenses unless one of the above exceptions applies. See also Chenery v. Agri-Lines 
Corp., 115 Idaho 281, 288, 766 P.2d 751, 758 (1988). 
Bailey v. Sanford, 139 Idaho 744, 754, 86 P.3d 458,468 (2004). 
The Court finds that no attorneys fees should be awarded pursuant to I.R.e.P. 37(c) because 
of the exception for parties who have a reasonable belief that they will prevail applies in this instance. 
The evidence proffered by conflicting experts demonstrates the Defendants had a reasonable belief 
they would prevail. Additionally, Dr. Jenkins points out that she indeed admitted negligence and 
causation in her amended answers to requests for admissions. See Payne v. Wallace, 136 Idaho 303, 
309,32 P.3d 695, 701 (Ct. App. 2001) (finding no attorney fees available when party admitted 
liability prior to trial). 
Motion for Periodic Payments 
Dr. Jenkins moved the Court for an order allowing periodic payments pursuant to I.e. 6-1602 
(2004), which states: 
(1) In any civil action seeking damages for personal injury or property damages in 
which a verdict, award or finding for future damages exce.eds the sum of one hundred 
thousand dollars ($100,000), the court may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, 
and at the request of either party, enter a judgment which provides for the periodic 
payment of that portion of the verdict, award or finding which represents future 
damages. 
(4) Unless otherwise agreed to by the claimant, periodic payments shall not be 
ordered in any case involving an intentional tort, or wrongful conduct perpetrated 
with or accompanied by fraud, dishonesty, malice, willfulness, gross negligence or 
which represents an extreme deviation from reasonable standards of conduct. 
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1 The Court denies the motion because; (1) the jury found Dr. Jenkins to be reckless; and (2) 
2 the Plaintiffs did not stipulate to afford Dr. Jenkins the opportunity to periodically pay the damage 
3 award. The Court finds that the finding of recklessness precludes the Court from ordering periodic 
4 payments without the stipulation of the claimant under § 6-1602(4). 
5 In the Alternative, the Court denies the motion because, recognizing this matter as one of 
6 discretion, the Court weighed the arguments for and against granting the order and reasoned that this 
7 case did not call for an order of periodic payments of damages by Dr. Jenkins. 
8 Apportionment of Awarded Costs and Fees 
9 The Court recognizes the apportionment of the costs and fees awarded is a matter of 
10 discretion. See Prouse v. Ransom, 117 Idaho 134, 791 P.2d 1313 (Ct. App. 1989). The Court 
11 hereby apportions the fees and costs in relation to the finding of liability as to the costs awarded to 
12 the Plaintiffs. The Court apportions the costs awarded to Defendant TVH equally to each Plaintiff 
13 ID. CONCLUSION 
14 The Motions for New Trial are hereby denied. The Motion for JNOV is denied. The Motion 
15 for Periodic Payments is denied. The Motions for Costs and Fees were granted in part and denied in 
16 part. The Parties are ordered to pay costs as follows: 










To Plaintiff Bowers 
To Plaintiff Royer 
To Plaintiffs Michael, Moira & Rhys Jones 
Defendant Dr. Jenkins I ACTV: 
To Plaintiff Bowers 
To Plaintiff Royer 
To Plaintiffs Michael, Moira & Rhys Jones 
Defendant B&B Dr. Lark IACTV: 








1 To Plaintiff Bowers 
2 To Plaintiff Royer 
3 Plaintiffs Michael, Moira & Rhys Jones 
4 
To Defendant Treasure Valley Hospital 
5 Plaintiff Bowers 
6 
To Defendant Treasure Valley Hospital 
7 Plaintiff Royer 
8 
To Defendant Treasure Valley Hospital 
9 
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Facsimile: (208) 344-7721 
ISB #: 2455 
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
C.DYE,DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON COUNTY 
JOSE AGUILAR, individually, as the Personal ) 
Representative of the Estate of Maria A. Aguilar, ) 
deceased, and as the natural father and guardian of ) 
GUADALUPE MARIA AGUILAR, ALEJANDRO ) 
AGUILAR, and LORENA AGUILAR, minors, and ) 







STEVEN R. NEWMAN, M.D., NATHAN COONROD, ) 
M.D., and PRIMARY HEALTH CARE CENTER, an ) 
Idaho corporation, JOHN and JANE DOES I through ) 
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Case No. CV 05-5781 
PLAINTIFFS' VERIFIED 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
COME NOW, Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel of record, the law firm of 
Comstock and Bush, and Byron V. Foster, Attorney at Law, and this matter having come 
before the Court for trial by jury, the jury having rendered a verdict in favor of the Plaintiffs 
against Defendants Nathan Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care Center, the Court 
having entered a Judgment in favor of Plaintiffs against Defendant Nathan Coonrod, M.D. 
and Primary Health Care Center, hereby submit their Memorandum of Costs as follows: 
I. COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT, RULE 54(D)(1)(C) 
DescRIPTION OF COST 
1. Court Filing Fees: Rule 54(d)(1)(C)(1) 
Filing Complaint: $77.00 
2. Service of Process: Rule 54(d)(1)(C)(2) 
Service upon Jr. Simplot Company 
(Maria Aguilar Employment File): $92.00 
Service upon Maria Luken 
(MMC Records Custodian): $74.80 
3. Travel EXj2enses of EXj2ert Witnesses: Rule 54{d}{1}{C}{4} 
Paul Blaylock, M.D. 
(417 mi. x $0.30): 
Samuel LeBaron, M.D.: 
(652 mi. x $0.30): 
Richard Lubman, M.D: 
(830 mi. x $0.30): 









4. Reasonable Costs for Preparation of Exhibits: Rule 
54(d)(1 )(C)(6) 
Ascensio - Color photocopies and black 
and white photocopies and CD of 
Trial Exhibits: $436.43 
5. Reasonable Expert Witness Fees: Rule 54(d)(1)(C)(8) 
Paul Blaylock, MD.: 
Cornelius Hofman: 
Dean Lapinel, MD.: 
Samuel LeBaron, M.D.: 






6. Costs for Reporting & Transcribing Depositions: 
Rule 54(d)(1)(C)(9} 
Steven Newman, M.D. (Video Deposition) 
September 25, 2007 $643.67 
Mitchell Long, D.O. (Video Deposition) 
September 7,2007 $726.33 
Andrew Chai, MD. (Video Deposition) 
December 5, 2007 $502.63 
Kay Hall 
January 18, 2008 $129.20 
Nathan Coonrod, MD. (Video Deposition) 
February 7,2008 $2,266.91 
James Field, M.D. 
March 11, 2009 $302.19 





6. Costs for One {1} COI2~ of Del2ositions: 
Rule 54(d){1 )(C){1 0) 
Guadalupe Maria Aguilar 
November 28, 2006 $217.51 
Jose Aguilar, Sr. 
November 28, 2006 $89.68 
Jose Aguilar, Jr. 
November 29,2006 $53.42 
Alejandro Aguilar 
November 29,2006 $30.53 
Daniel Brown, M.D. 
April 14, 2008 $209.83 
Thomas Donndelinger, M.D. 
April 25, 2008 $117.24 
Dean Lapinel, M.D. 
May 20,2008 $368.99 
Paul Blaylock, M.D. 
May 29,2008 $1,258.75 
Richard Lubman, M.D. 
May 30,2008 $517.50 
Samuel LeBaron, M.D. 
June 3, 2008 $604.05 
Dean Lapinel, M.D. 
September 23, 2008 $211.84 
Robb Gibson, M.D. 
February 11, 2009 $228.38 
William Blahd, Jr., M.D. 
April 24, 2009 $76.59 
$3,984.31 
TOTAL COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT $19,805.17 
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II. DISCRETIONARY COSTS ALLOWED UNDER RULE 54(0)(1)(0) 
DESCRIPTION OF COST 
1. Expert Fees in addition to amount allowed as a matter 
of right: 
Shoaf & Associates / Lorraine Shoaf-Kadish, RN 
Locate experts; research; review of medical 
records: $3,893.00 
Dean Lapinel, M.D 
Review of medical records and depositions; 
preparation of disclosures; response to 
defense disclosures; prepare for and 
attend and testify at deposition; prepare 
for, travel and testify at trial; consultation 
with counsel: $10,272.50 
Cornelius Hofman, GEC Group 
Review of records, prepare assessment 
of economic loss; preparation of disclosures; 
response to defense disclosures; prepare 
for, travel and testify at trial: $3,626.20 
Kenneth Bramwell, M.D. 
Telephone conference with counsel and 
experts regarding local standard of care: 
Michael Roach, M.D. 
Telephone conference with counsel and 
experts regarding local standard of care: 
Paul Blaylock, M.D. (3/4 of total charges) 
Review of medical records and depositions; 
preparation of disclosures; response to 
defense disclosures; prepare for and 
attend and testify at deposition; prepare 
for, travel and testify at trial; consultation 
$400.00 
$250.00 
with counsel: $29,351.20 
Richard Lubman, M.D. 
Review of medical records and depositions; 
PLAINTIFFS' VERIFIED MEMORANDUM OF COSTS - 5 
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TOTAL AMOUNT 
preparation of disclosures; response to 
defense disclosures; prepare for and 
attend and testify at deposition; prepare 
for, travel and testify at trial; consultation 
with counsel: $1,019.94 
William Blahd, Jr., M.D. 
Telephone conference with counsel and 
experts regarding local standard of care: $350.00 
Samuel LeBaron, M.D., Ph.D 
Review of medical records and depositions; 
preparation of disclosures; response to 
defense disclosures; prepare for and 
attend and testify at deposition; prepare 
for, travel and testify at trial; consultation 
with counsel: $40,773.29 
2. Additional Costs for Preparation of Exhibits: 
Color and black and white photocopies and 
CD for trial: $346.28 
3. Cost of procuring and copying all medical records for use in 
preparation for trial: (in addition to cost for admitted 
exhibits): 
Lee Nelson, M.D. 
Mercy Medical Center: 
Robin King, DC, CCRD 
St. Alphonsus RMC 
The Digestive Health Clinic 







4. Cost of out-of-town travel for attendance at depositions: 
Travel to San Jose, CA, for Dr. LeBaron's 
Deposition: $1,095.49 
Travel to Los Angeles, CA, for Dr. Lubman's 






Travel to Portland, OR, for Dr. Blaylock's 
Deposition: $393.00 
5. Expenses for attendance at trial: 
The Grove Hotel and Double Tree Hotel 
Meals and 2 nights for Dr. Blaylock 
And airport parking: $443.30 
The Grove Hotel 
Meals and 1 Night for Dr. LeBaron 
and airport parking: $261.69 
The Grove Hotel 
Meals and 2 nights for Dr. Lubman 
and airport parking: $419.74 
6. Office Expenses Necessary for Prosecution of Case: 
Attorney Messenger Service: $554.43 
In House Copies - medical records, 
documents produced in discovery and 
exhibits thereto, depositions, witness 
disclosures and exhibits thereto, pleadings, 
and expert reports: $3,260.70 
Vendor Copies - medical records, pleadings, 
depositions, documents produced in 
discovery and exhibits thereto: $1,409.15 
Postage / Shipping Charges: $2,099.82 
Facsimile Charges: $115.00 
Long Distance / Telephone Conferences: $587.00 
Legal Research: $659.96 




Paralegal Travel to Nampa for Kay Hall 
Deposition: 
TOTAL DISCRETIONARY COSTS 
GRAND TOTAL: 
STATE OF IDAHO 
: ss. 





DAVID E. COMSTOCK, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. That I am one of the attorneys of record for the Plaintiffs in the above-entitled 
action and as such I am informed relative to the costs and fees incurred in said action. 
2. That to the best of my knowledge and belief the items of cost set forth in this 
Memorandum are correct and were necessarily incurred and have been paid by Plaintiffs in 
the above-entitled action. 
3. That the total costs are set forth in this Memorandum and the items of cost are 
set forth as costs of right and/or discretionary costs under Rules 54(d)(1 )(C) and (D). 
4. That said discretionary costs were necessary and exceptional, and reasonably 
incurred to pursue Plaintiffs' case and should, in the interest of justice, be assessed against 
Defendants. See also Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Request for Discretionary 
Costs. 
5. That the costs set forth in this Memorandum are in compliance with Rules 
54(d)(1 )(C) and 54(d)(1 )(0) of the Idaho Rul 





SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE me this ~ day of June, 2009. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
My Commission Expires: I 0 I 0"'7 I d DOC; 
CERTI~CATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ~ day of June, 2009, I served a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Steven K. Tolman 
Tolman & Brizee, PC 
132 3rd Ave. E 
P.O; Box 1276 
Twin Falls, 1083303 
Attorneys for Defendants Nathan 
Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care 
Center 
Gary T. Dance 
Moffatt Thomas Barrett Rock & 
Fields Chartered 
412 W. Center, Suite 2000 
PO Box 817 
Pocatello 10 83204-0817 
Attorneys for Defendant Steven R. 
Newman, M.D. 
D U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
~ Facsimile (208) 733-5444 
D U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
~Facsimile (208) 232-0150 
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ORIGINAL 
John J. Burke 
ISB #4619;jjb@hallfarley.com 
Chris D. Comstock 
lSB #6581; cdc@hallfarley.com 
F i-A.k~.M. 
JUN 1 2 2009 
CANYON COUNTY CLEAK 
K CANNON, DEPUTY 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A. 
702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 1271 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 395-8500 
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585 
W:13\3-655.5Idismiss-stip.doc 
Attorneys for Defendant Mitchell Long, D.O. 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
JOSE AGUILAR, individually, as the 
Personal Representative of the estate of 
Maria A. Aguilar, deceased, and as the 
natural father and guardian of 
GUADALUPE MARIA AGUILAR, 
ALEJANDRO AGUILAR, and LORENA 
AGUILAR, minors, and JOSE AGUILAR, 
JR., heirs of Maria A. Aguilar, deceased, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
ANDREW CHAI, M.D., STEVEN R. 
NEWMAN, M.D., NATHAN COONROD, 
M.D., MITCHELL LONG,D.O., 
PRlMARY HEALTH CARE CENTER, an 
Idaho corporation, JOHN and JANE DOES 
I through X, employees of one or more of 
the Defendants, 
Defendants. 
Case No. Case No. CV 05-5781 
STIPULATION FOR DISMISSAL 
WITH PREJUDICE AS TO 
DEFENDANT MITCHELL LONG, 
D.O., ONLY 
STIPULATION FOR DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE AS TO DEFENDANT MITCHELL LONG, D.O., ONLY -
1 
3309 
COME NOW plaintiffs Jose Aguilar, individually, and as the personal representative of 
the estate of Maria A. Aguilar, and as the natural father and guardian of Alejandro Aguilar and 
Lorena Aguilar, Guadalupe Maria Aguilar, Jose Aguilar, Jr., and defendant MITCHELL LONG, 
D.O., by and through their respective counsel of record, pursuant to Rule 41 of the Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure, and hereby stipulate and agree to the voluntary dismissal of this action with 
prejudice as against defendant Mitchell Long, D.O., only, each party to bear its own costs and 
attorney fees. {-
/7/ >-
DATED this.;LL day of May, 2009. 
DATED this 2- rI day of May, 2009. 
. Comstock - 0 
orneys for Plaintiffs 
HALL,FARLEY,OBERRECHT 
& BLANTON, P.A. 
--,.------





JUN '5 2flOO 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
T. CRAWFORD, OEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
JOSE AGUILAR, individually, as the 
Personal Representative of the estate of 
Maria A. Aguilar, deceased, and as the 
natural father and guardian of 
GUADALUPE MARIA AGUILAR, 
ALEJANDRO AGUILAR, and LORENA 
AGUILAR, minors, and JOSE AGUILAR, 
JR., heirs of Maria A. Aguilar, deceased, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ANDREW CHAI, M.D., STEVEN R. 
NEWMAN, M.D., NATHAN COONROD, 
M.D., MITCHELL LONG,D.O., 
PRIMARY HEALTH CARE CENTER, an 
Idaho corporation, JOHN and JANE DOES 
I through X, employees of one or more of 
the Defendants, 
Defendants. 
Case No. Case No. CV 05-5781 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH 
PREJUDICE AS TO DEFENDANT 
MITCHELL LONG, D.O., ONLY 
Based upon the STIPULA TION FOR DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE AS TO 
DEFENDANT MITCHELL LONG, D.O., ONLY, filed herein, and good cause appearing 
therefor; 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE AS TO DEFENDANT MITCHELL LONG, 0,0., ONLY - 1 
3311 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that plaintiffs' cause of action 
is dismissed with prejudice as against Mitchell Long, D.O., only, each party to bear its own costs 
and attorney fees. /'"" 
12 J" Uk2.--DATED this ~ day of_--->_<--______ , 2009. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day of ~ ..... ,.:s.- , 2009, I caused 
to be served a true copy of the foregoing ORDER OF DIS.MiSSAL WITH PREJUDICE AS TO 
DEFENDANT MITCHELL LONG, D.O., ONL Y, by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to each of the following: 
John 1. Burke 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT 
& BLANTON, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1271 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
David E. Comstock L 
COMSTOCK & BUSH 
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2774 
Boise, 10 83701 
Fax: 208-344-7721 
Byron V. Foster ;( 
Attorney at Law 
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Suite 500 
P.O. Box 1584 
Boise, ID 83701 
Fax: 208-344-7721 
Andrew C. Brassey X 
BRASSEY WETHERELL & CRAWFORD 
203 W. Main Street 
P.O. Box 1009 
Boise, 10 83701 
Fax: 208-344-7077 
Gary T. Dance ~ 
MOFF A TT THOMAS 
412 W. Center, Suite 2000 
P.O. Box 817 
Pocatello, ID 83204 
Fax: 208-232-0150 
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Steven K. Tolman 
TOLMAN & BRIZEE, P.e. 
132 3rd Ave. East 
P.O. Box 1276 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1276 
Fax: 208-733-5444 
Clerk 
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..... .....- ...... ("..-
, 
ORIGINAL 
David E Comstock 
LAW OFFICES OF COMSTOCK & BUSH 
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste 500 
P.O. Box 2774 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2774 
Telephone: (208) 344-7700 
Facsimile: (208) 344-7721 
ISB #: 2455 
Byron V. Foster 
Attorney At Law 
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste 500 
P.O. Box 1584 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 336-4440 
Facsimile: (208) 344-7721 
ISB #: 2760 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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DE' F:: tj' r\1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON COUNTY 
JOSE AGUILAR, individually, as the Personal ) 
Representative of the Estate of Maria A. Aguilar, ) 
deceased, and as the natural father and guardian of } 
GUADALUPE MARIA AGUILAR, ALEJANDRO ) 
AGUILAR, and LORENA AGUILAR, minors, and ) 







STEVEN R. NEWMAN, M.D., NATHAN COONROD, ) 
M.D., and PRIMARY HEALTH CARE CENTER, an ) 
Idaho corporation. JOHN and JANE DOES I through ) 




Case No. CV 05-5781 
PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTIONS TO 
DEFENDANT STEVEN R. 
NEWMAN, M.D.'S 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND 
AFFIDAVIT OF JULIEN E. 
GABIOLA IN SUPPORT OF THE 
SAME 
PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTIONS TO DEFENDANT STEVEN R. NEWMAN, M.D.'S 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND AFFIDAVIT OF JULIEN E. GABIOLA IN SUPPORT OF 
THE SAME-1 
3315 
COME NOW Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel of record, and object and 
concede, in part, to Defendant Steven R. Newman, M.D.'s Memorandum of Costs pursuant 
to Rule 54(d)(6) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. This objection is based upon the 




Judgment was entered against Plaintiffs in favor of Defendant Steven R. Newman, 
M.D., on May 20, 2009. Plaintiffs hereby concede that Defendant Newman was a 
prevailing party. Plaintiffs object to certain of Defendant Newman's claimed costs as a 
matter of right and to the entirety of Defendant Newman's claim for discretionary costs. 
II. 
APPLICABLE LAW 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1)(A) states that a prevailing party shall be 
awarded costs, unless otherwise provided by the Court or limited by the rules. Plaintiffs 
concede Defendant Newman was a prevailing party with respect to their claims against 
him. Consequently, costs as a matter of right are governed by the application of Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54( d)(1 )(C). As will be argued herein, Plaintiffs will object to certain 
of Defendants' claimed costs as of right. Rule 54(d)(1 )(0) governs discretionary costs. It 
states: 
"Discretionary Costs. Additional items of cost not enumerated 
in, or in an amount in excess of that listed in subparagraph (C), 
PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTIONS TO DEFENDANT STEVEN R. NEWMAN, M.D.'S 
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may be allowed upon a showing that said costs were 
necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred, and 
should in the interest of justice be assessed against the 
adverse party. The trial court, in ruling upon objections to such 
discretionary costs contained in the memorandum of costs, 
shall make express findings as to why such specific item of 
discretionary cost should or should not be allowed. In the 
absence of any objection to such an item of discretionary 
costs, the court may disallow on its own motion any such items 
of discretionary costs and shall make express findings 
supporting such disallowance." 
Rule 54(d)(1 )(D) commits the decision of whether to award costs to the discretion of 
the trial court. Van Brunt v. Stoddard, 136 Idaho 681, 689, 39 P .3d 621, 629 (2001). When 
an objection to discretionary costs is presented, the trial court "shall make express findings 
as to why such specific item of discretionary costs should or should not be aHowed." 
I.C.R.P. 54(d)(1 )(0). Thus the Court must make the specific finding that each discretionary 
cost was (1) necessary, (2) exceptional, (3) reasonably incurred, and (4) should be 
assessed against the adverse party in the interest of justice. Evans v. State, 135 Idaho 
422,432, 18 P.3d 227,237 (Ct. of App. 2001); Swallow v. Emergency Med. of Idaho, P.A., 
138 Idaho 589,598,67 P.3d 68, 77 (2003). 
III. 
ARGUMENT 
1. COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT 
a. Court Filing Fees. Plaintiffs' have no objection to court filing fees. 
b. Fees for Service of any Pleading or Document. Plaintiffs' have no 
objection to fees for service of any pleading or document. 
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c. Expert Witness Fees ($2,000.00 per expert). Plaintiffs object to the 
amount claimed for William H. Blahd, M.D. of $350.00. Dr. Blahd was notan expert 
witness, he was a treating physician and acted as a local qualifying physician who 
spoke to Plaintiffs' expert witnesses Blaylock and Lapinel in order to lay a foundation 
for their actual knowledge of the applicable standard of care for Defendant Newman. 
As such, the charges for Dr. Blahd's attendance at his deposition are not an item of 
recoverable costs. 
Plaintiffs also object to the amount claimed for Samuel LeBaron, M.D. Dr. 
LeBaron was Plaintiffs' family practice expert, not an ER physician expert. 
Defendant Newman, an ER physician, did not seek his deposition, asked very few 
questions and learned that Dr. LeBaron would not be testifying as an ER physician 
expert. Dr. Newman voluntarily paid counsel for Dr. Coonrod $600.00 under some 
agreement amongst Defendants to split costs. Therefore, this item was not 
reasonably incurred to defend Dr. Newman and simply serves to increase Dr. 
Newman's cost award. 
d. Reporting and Transcribing Depositions. Plaintiffs have no objection to 
the costs of reporting and transcribing depositions. 
2. DISCRETIONARY COSTS 
For discretionary costs to be awarded the Court must be convinced the costs were 
necessary, reasonably incurred, exceptional and in the interest of justice should be 
awarded. IRep 54(d)(1)(D). 
In his Memorandum Decision and Order, dated January 12,2007, in Jones, et al v. 
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Anesthesiology Associates of Treasure Valley, et aI, Case No. CV PI 0400486D, Fourth 
District Judge The Honorable Ronald J. Wilper, had this to say regarding an award of 
discretionary costs in favor of Plaintiffs and his refusal to award discretionary costs to a 
prevailing Defendant: 
"Discretionary Costs Requested by the Plaintiffs 
The Court finds that the discretionary costs requested by the 
plaintiffs were reasonably incurred, necessary, exceptional, 
and in the interest of justice. The miscellaneous costs 
requested by the plaintiffs are costs necessary to bringing a 
case to trial and the costs were reasonably incurred 
considering the length of the trial and issues that were tried. 
The costs were exceptional as the Plaintiffs could not have 
foreseen the need to expend these costs when the decedent 
was planning her surgery. The Court finds that the costs 
associated with retaining expert witnesses that exceed the 
costs allowed as a matter of right are necessary and 
exceptional because medical experts are essential in a medical 
malpractice case and they cannot be retained for the $2000 
awardable under Rule 54(d)(1)(C) as costs as a matter of right. 
The costs incurred by the Plaintiffs to engage their experts 
were reasonable. Because the Plaintiffs will already be 
required to pay their attorneys' fees, the Court finds that it is in 
the interest of justice that the Plaintiffs be awarded these 
discretionary costs. 
*** 
Discretionary Costs Requested by Defendant TVH 
The discretionary costs requested by the plaintiffs (sic) are the 
costs associated with retaining expert witnesses that exceed 
the costs allowed as a matter of right. The Court finds that 
these costs are necessary and exceptional because medical 
experts are essential in a medical malpractice case and they 
cannot be retained for the $2000 awardable under Rule 
54(d)(1)(C) as costs as a matter of right. The Court also finds 
these costs were reasonably incurred. However, because the 
Defendant is a provider of medical services and able to foresee 
and plan for the costs of operating such a business, which 
includes the unfortunate fact that lawsuits will need to be 
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defended and expert witnesses retained, the Court finds that it 
is not in the interests of justice to award the discretionary costs 
to TVH. The request is therefore denied." (Emphasis added). 
Part of the reasoning of Judge Wi/per in the above-quoted portion of his 
Memorandum Decision and Order may have been the reality that discretionary cost awards 
to health care provider defendants in medical negligence cases are not awarded to the 
health care providers themselves but are rather for the benefit of the large, billion dollar 
insurance companies who fund malpractice defense litigation. Health care liability insurance 
companies spare no expense in defending litigation of this type in order to discourage such 
litigation. 
In then attempting to recoup the cost of the defense, every attempt is made to justify 
these expenditures as being necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred which in 
the interest of justice should be awarded to the prevailing party. However, the prevailing 
party has not incurred the costs. In addition, the great disparity in the financial power 
between a private party plaintiff and an insurance company with billions of dollars in assets 
highlights the injustice of awarding discretionary costs to an entity which is able to hide in 
the shadows and guide the course of litigation. Costs of this type are merely a cost of doing 
business for the insurer whereas they are a crushing burden to a plaintiff. 
a. Expert Costs Over and Above $2,000.00 Limit. 
b. Travel Expenses. 
c. Interpreter. 
d. Photocopies (Imaging). 
e. Delivery Messenger Service. 
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f. Computer Research. 
As to all these items of claimed discretionary costs; Plaintiffs object and urge the 
Court to adopt the reasoning of Judge Wilper as set forth above. Justice militates against 
an award of this type to Defendant Newman who has not incurred these costs. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Having delineated those items of costs of right which Plaintiffs argue should not be 
allowed, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court deny the aforementioned items of 
costs which are claimed as a matter of right. In addition, based upon the arguments herein 
and based upon the reasoning of Judge Wilper as set forth above, Plaintiffs respectfully 
request that all discretionary costs claimed by Defendant Newman be denied. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITIED This 'S day of June, 2009. 
Bf.~ V. Foster 
Attorneysf-o-r-Piaift· . 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the.--LL day of June, 2009, I served a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Steven K. Tolman 
Tolman & Brizee, PC 
132 3rd Ave. E 
P.O. Box 1276 
Twin Falls, 1083303 
Attorneys for Defendants Nathan 
Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care 
Center 
Gary T. Dance 
Moffatt Thomas Barrett Rock & 
Fields Chartered 
412 W. Center, Suite 2000 
PO Box 817 
Pocatello 1083204-0817 
Attorneys for Defendant Steven R. 
Newman, M.D. 
D U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
G- Facsimile (208) 733-5444 
D U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
0- Facsimile (208) 232-0150 
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